I think the attacks are real. A year ago, Google announced their Titan firmware security chip[1], which would limit these kinds of attacks. I don't believe they designed and built this chip, and surrounding infrastructure, because of purely theoretical attacks. Besides that, over the last couple years there has also been a lot of work trying to neuter the Intel ME, because of how dangerous it is. Another example is t…
It's just my opinion, and so I held off saying, yesterday, but: The immediate economic outfall (co-morbid with institutional panic) would be so severe that this aspect alone would represent a national security issue.
Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
151–160 of 328 posts
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#152For example, Elemental never used that board. See my tweets here for the actual specs: https://twitter.com/hugelgupf/status/1048160794565861377?s=1...
Elemental boards come with GPUs. The blade pictured has neither GPUs nor PCIe.
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#153Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's as hard to imagine as the NSA's surveillance systems. I.e., it's not. The lesson of the Snowden leaks is clearly this: if it can be imagined, and it can be useful, and they have the budget, and it's remotely doable, then it's been done. China almost certainly did this because they could. You only get one chance to do something like this, so you have to do it even if it risks losing the ability to do it in the fu…
It's not that you get one chance to do something like this, it's that there is one total chance to do something like this. After it's been discovered, it's much harder to do it again for everyone - so if you never do it, then you don't get the benefit and Russia or USA or someone else does that and gets the benefit and you still lose the ability to do it in the future.
I think the real trick is a real covert channel that's hard to find both analytically and via stastics/machine learning.
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#154I think the attacks are real. A year ago, Google announced their Titan firmware security chip[1], which would limit these kinds of attacks. I don't believe they designed and built this chip, and surrounding infrastructure, because of purely theoretical attacks. Besides that, over the last couple years there has also been a lot of work trying to neuter the Intel ME, because of how dangerous it is. Another example is t…
I would really hope that this will give all the RISC-V open source effort some traction in the server / DC market. Certainly big corporations like Google, Facebook, Amazon and others could pull it off.
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#155Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thank you for the insight. I was rather naively imagining that every board is subject to some kind of x-ray image matching with the original PCB design to find differences. Not that simple, I see.
Some manufacturers do X-ray boards. Typically this is done to check that BGA devices ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ball_grid_array ) are soldered properly. Usually not done on every board, but only if there's a problem suspected. When it happens they tend to focus only on particular BGA components or suspect copper traces rather than the whole PCB.
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#156QSPI has 4 data lines, a clock and a chip-select line. In order to intercept a QSPI bus, you would therefore need 4+1+1+2xpower lines = 8 pins. This is not sufficient for QSPI. Single SPI on the other hand requires Clock, Data, ChipSelect, Ground & Power = 5 lines, so that would be plausible. (Yes, I know you can potentially get rid of the CS line, but that depends on what else is on the bus).
You harvest power when data is idle. CS is irrelevant. The rough clock speed is fixed, and you can match the precise timing from the data line. QSPI actually gets you access to data in both directions with the tradeoff of only getting one quarter of the bits.
Logically, you likely only need to recognize a few patterns that are each say 30 bits long. If you could shrink this down, it would look exactly like a boring pullup.
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#157Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's as hard to imagine as the NSA's surveillance systems. I.e., it's not. The lesson of the Snowden leaks is clearly this: if it can be imagined, and it can be useful, and they have the budget, and it's remotely doable, then it's been done. China almost certainly did this because they could. You only get one chance to do something like this, so you have to do it even if it risks losing the ability to do it in the fu…
It's not that you get one chance to do something like this, it's that there is one total chance to do something like this. After it's been discovered, it's much harder to do it again for everyone - so if you never do it, then you don't get the benefit and Russia or USA or someone else does that and gets the benefit and you still lose the ability to do it in the future.
I think the real trick is a real covert channel that's hard to find both analytically and via stastics/machine learning. Which is stil high enough bw.
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#158Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Why wouldn’t a company notice any of the outbound traffic using firewalls? This is telling you that your experience is limited, not that the story is wrong. Trying to do egress filtering at scale is extremely hard for all but the most basic threats. If they open a socket to data-collector.pla.cn, yes, probably a majority of large shops would notice that within a few months but what if it's just a connection to S3/E…
General practice for things like BMC and other out of band control systems is to put them on isolated vlans and default deny any non-approved traffic. There is no way that any large tech company security operation misses this traffic phoning home from a management vlan.
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#159I really hope that this is the straw that breaks the back of all these "management engines" Like seriously, why does my hobby consumer motherboard need that feature? Corp IT only ever deploys to large fleets of OEM machines.
Take a look at ASpeed (BMC supplier) stock movement: https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/5274.TWO/chart?p=5274.TWO
Re: Making sense of the alleged Supermicro motherboard attack
#160Earlier quoted context omitted.
Cloud instances are generally firewalled off from each other, usually cross-account, vpc, etc. Two machines can't reach each other just because they're AWS instances. That would be silly.
The attacker and target have VMs on the same hardware. The attacker has a fake presence serving cat pics which is constantly sending “valid” logging traffic to an S3 bucket. The chip passes the stolen data between the VM instances by DMA. The stolen data hitches a ride inside an otherwise innocuous TCP packet storing log entries in that S3 bucket. Logs are routine backed up off site. There would be absolute nothing a…
Original article supposes that the implanted chip was used to modify the boot process of the BMC in such a way that the BMC loaded its software over the network. The question is why this network activity wasn't easily detectable and firewalled off by default.
It seems that you suppose that the chip can be directly used for some sort of userspace-inside-a-VM to ring0(?) escalation. In particular, you suppose that the chip has access to main memory. Can you elaborate on what functionality do you think the implant could've had?