Is there an article that describes a bit more in detail what the chips actually did (or were capable of doing)? They only say "the microchip altered the operating system’s core so it could accept modifications.", which I might interpret as circumventing signature checks to allow installing modified firmware on the systems? But how does the chip connect to the network and how does it receive commands? That said, it's…
SuperMicro hardware has very extensive IPMI integration into the mothebroard, which amongst other things can take over and inject frames into the network interface, emulate a VGA device, talk to the CPUs serial lines directly, flash firmware, control the state of a number of physical devices- and this is what it supports just from the web interface it presents by default with the password "ADMIN:ADMIN". My money, bas…
The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
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Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#32Who else found the design of the page made the article difficult to read? I know darkness, spies and hacking go hand-in-hand but it's a bit too much imho.
Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#33The Chinese government didn’t directly address questions about manipulation of Supermicro servers, issuing a statement that read, in part, “Supply chain safety in cyberspace is an issue of common concern, and China is also a victim.” Essentially China ils saying "it was not me". Plausible
Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#34Why aren't these attacks constrained by normal corporate firewalls? How does a random server on a navy ship start contacting baddie.china.com without raising red flags?
Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#35This sounds like something out of a movie. I would like some technical details how this is supposed to work with only a 6 lead chip.
Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
Effectively nothing can be constrained by a whitelisting firewall if you have a sufficiently bored actor. You can smuggle data through a variety of benign looking protocols, things that wouldn't matter in the least generally. Your average server contacts hundreds of different public NTP servers, binary repositories, domain name servers every day. If the keys to the kingdom are a 32 byte ECDSA private key, you've lost…
Firewalls in high security environments aren't just port/protocol based. You lock everything down - source ip/port and destination ip/port. You should know where it is coming from and where it is going to. Navy ships don't upload via Dropbox.
Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
Right so all the stars need to align for it to go unnoticed - compromised server, firewall and other alerting/monitoring tools. I would have thought one single unexpected packet in these high security environments would raise significant alarm bells and any anomaly would be found very quickly.
I've worked on systems deployed in the financial sector in high risk environments. This sort of monitoring doesn't happen in the real world.
Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#38Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#39Is there an article that describes a bit more in detail what the chips actually did (or were capable of doing)? They only say "the microchip altered the operating system’s core so it could accept modifications.", which I might interpret as circumventing signature checks to allow installing modified firmware on the systems? But how does the chip connect to the network and how does it receive commands? That said, it's…
5. When a server was installed and
switched on, the microchip altered
the operating system’s core so it
could accept modifications. The chip
could also contact computers controlled
by the attackers in search of further
instructions and code.
So, in typical vulnerability/payload/exploit fashion, the board's bus is vulnerable by default, because the chip pierces all the usual lines of defense protecting against network and operator I/O. It carries a payload intended to target very common features used everywhere commodity servers are used, one that likely listens for DMA traffic on the bus, and alters the signal stream, by escaping upon the occurrence of a magic sequence, and inserting its own signal, before resuming the authentic stream in flight.The payload could be pretty small, since the server boards are likely using OS packages that match the chipset. This limits the software to a small set of well known targets, Linux, Windows, Apple. Target their kernels, and you only have to snip out a small chunk of bytes, and splice your own pre-defined package in. Splice in a miniature runtime, that operates a turing complete set of operations, and open up a listener that waits for network access, and now, your payload can enable arbitrary code execution, irrespective of permissions.
Now, to exploit, the payload needs to time the opportunity to splice itself onto the disk correctly. If certain well-known chunks of code will always exist in each given operating system, then with every disk access event one just needs to wait for the inevitable moment those magic system-specific bytes travel over the bus, in order to replace the known bytes with the poisoned modification. Events might target when the bytes are originally installed with the OS, or every time the OS reads those known bytes back into live memory, from any source.
The total payload package could probably fit inside a couple of megabytes, pack on a few more for the "listen & splice" part of the attack to round out the entire mass, and all we know how much data an SD card can fit into say... five grains of rice?
Re: The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate Amazon and Apple
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
SuperMicro hardware has very extensive IPMI integration into the mothebroard, which amongst other things can take over and inject frames into the network interface, emulate a VGA device, talk to the CPUs serial lines directly, flash firmware, control the state of a number of physical devices- and this is what it supports just from the web interface it presents by default with the password "ADMIN:ADMIN". My money, bas…
Cannot it be physically disabled with a jumper or maybe by cutting some lines on the motherboard?