Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why isn’t it actually possible to just encrypt saved emails on server? So that government does not have access. Couldn’t one use a hash of the password as key for the data for the data and not save that hash to check password but another one. This way (practically), at least if the password is not eavesdropped and saved by the mail provider, it would be much harder to give away emails.
Apart from the "users lose their passwords all the fricking time" problem (seriously, before we implemented https://fastmail.blog/2017/12/06/security-account-recovery/ , lost password was always in the top 3 most common support requests of the week report) Impementing per-message-encryption would turn us into a dumb blob store. The whole point of FastMail is the value add - fast search, ability to deal with a lot of…
> if your provider get a subpoena or gets hacked, then a push request will make your device connect with the password, and boom - access granted
If the message is decrypted only on my device, then that wouldn't matter. I'm guessing endpoint decryption is not what you (or maybe the GP) are talking about, but I don't know what you mean.
> we don't let people store master passwords on their devices any more, because they get leaked due to hacked devices, so we require people to create app passwords. This would be in direct opposition to many of the other safety things that are done
What is an "app password"? If it's just a password stored in an app (and then what is a non-app password? one in a text file?), why wouldn't it be as vulnerable to device hacking?
.....
Also, a couple of genuine questions about what's possible:
> Impementing per-message-encryption would turn us into a dumb blob store. The whole point of FastMail is the value add - fast search, ability to deal with a lot of email quickly, etc.
Email messages arrive in the clear, unavoidably; new messages are always vulnerable. Why not do the processing then - spam filtering, build a search index of hash values, etc.? Then permanently (from the server's perspective) encrypt the old, stored messages, and give endpoint/user the only means of decryption.
> users lose their passwords all the fricking time
> we don't let people store master passwords on their devices any more, because they get leaked due to hacked devices
How do the end-to-end secure messaging applications, such as Signal, handle those issues, if anyone knows?