Earlier quoted context omitted.
> U2F can only be used as a second factor. I mean, certificationally, sure. But what prevents a website from trusting you to input your identifier (user name or e-mail address) and then accepting a U2F signed blob as your only credential?
The fact that if someone steaks the key they can impersonate you anywhere. U2F doesn't support pin authentication, as far as I know.
(I would suggest that a single physical device that takes a PIN before it does some signing is still 2FA even if there is only one _communicated_ credential, but I appreciate we need better terminology for this. Other versions of this to consider: if you username + password + Duo into your SSO portal and then sign into a service with SAML, is that not 2FA? If it isn't, does using a session cookie prevent something from being 2FA? For the latter, I'd say obviously not :-) I think the "who can impersonate you" is a good line in the sand, since in the former the SSO system holds full authority in most cases.)