Everyone's quickly jumping in to post "physical access is not secure", while over there Apple have iPhones that appear to be almost completely secure against all but the most dedicated state-level attacks (and of course compromised accounts). We can do better, and should. Without compromising the freedom to change operating system. Mind you we also need to keep pressing on security for the desktop, against ransomware…
IPhones are probably vulnerable to cold boot too. It's just that cold boot attacks are absurdly difficult to execute. They only work if you already have physical access to an unlocked device before it powers down. If you shut off your machine and wait two seconds before walking away, you can never be cold-booted
Cold Boot Attacks
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Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#22Everyone's quickly jumping in to post "physical access is not secure", while over there Apple have iPhones that appear to be almost completely secure against all but the most dedicated state-level attacks (and of course compromised accounts). We can do better, and should. Without compromising the freedom to change operating system. Mind you we also need to keep pressing on security for the desktop, against ransomware…
If you're carrying nuclear codes then yeah, you should be worried about these attacks. If you're security officer for a small company then you probably have a long list of things to worry about before you have to consider cold boot vulnerabilities.
Furthermore if you're worried about an attacker having physical access to your computer what about simply installing a keylogger or a device that broadcasts your display for instance? That seems massively easier and faster to pull off than the attacks described here.
Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#23Cold boot, you keep using this word and you don't know what it means. Or is it me who have a screwed definiton of cold boot?
Even if you disagree, "cold boot attack" is the established name for the actual attack, the new aspect presented here is how to circumvent a certain firmware protection that would overwrite the memory on a cold boot to prevent that attack.
If you would give your definition we could see if it is right, too.
Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#24Everyone's quickly jumping in to post "physical access is not secure", while over there Apple have iPhones that appear to be almost completely secure against all but the most dedicated state-level attacks (and of course compromised accounts). We can do better, and should. Without compromising the freedom to change operating system. Mind you we also need to keep pressing on security for the desktop, against ransomware…
IPhones are probably vulnerable to cold boot too. It's just that cold boot attacks are absurdly difficult to execute. They only work if you already have physical access to an unlocked device before it powers down. If you shut off your machine and wait two seconds before walking away, you can never be cold-booted
Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#25So when are we getting encrypted RAM? With all the talk I hear about "cache being the new RAM", since it's so much faster, particularly the L1, it sounds like it would make sense to have some transparent encryption going on. A random key generated at power on, then kept inside the CPU, and instantly lost at power off, would be enough to secure the contents of DIMMs against attacks like this.
Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
IPhones are probably vulnerable to cold boot too. It's just that cold boot attacks are absurdly difficult to execute. They only work if you already have physical access to an unlocked device before it powers down. If you shut off your machine and wait two seconds before walking away, you can never be cold-booted
Are you sure/can you provide sources? Given the substantial efforts law enforcement has been taking to get access to suspects' iPhones, this doesn't seem right.
Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#27So when are we getting encrypted RAM? With all the talk I hear about "cache being the new RAM", since it's so much faster, particularly the L1, it sounds like it would make sense to have some transparent encryption going on. A random key generated at power on, then kept inside the CPU, and instantly lost at power off, would be enough to secure the contents of DIMMs against attacks like this.
Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#28That's why the #1 rule of security is physical security. If someone has physical access to your computer, it's pretty much game over.
Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#29From a security standpoint, isn’t there a common understanding that if an attacker gains physical access to your computer, you already lost? As a side note, there are so many vulnerabilities constantly coming out that I’ve almost became desensitized. I’m sure that’s not a good thing but it’s almost like “when” not “if” someone will just steal my data. Not sure if anyone agrees or I’m just a one-off...
I don‘t think so. It would mean that securing information in the workplace is nearly impossible and colocation hosting security intrusion boils down to picking a physical lock (of your rack).
Re: Cold Boot Attacks
#30So when are we getting encrypted RAM? With all the talk I hear about "cache being the new RAM", since it's so much faster, particularly the L1, it sounds like it would make sense to have some transparent encryption going on. A random key generated at power on, then kept inside the CPU, and instantly lost at power off, would be enough to secure the contents of DIMMs against attacks like this.