I don't think I agree with the article. Not from a European perspective. I'm Danish and we've had anti-establishment parties all my life on both the left and right side of the political spectrum. The populist rightwingers most similar to Trump and the teaparty saw their dawn in 1998 where they got elected with 7.4% of the votes. In 2001, three months after 9/11, they recived 12%. In 2005 it was 13.3%. In 2007, before…
Tooze makes the case that Fidesz's victory in Hungary in 2010 was a direct result of the terms of the IMF bailout. That the supremacy of the Law & Justice party in Poland was a result of the crisis. That the fall of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko -- tarred with the pains of the crisi -- in Ukraine led to rehabilitation of Yanukovych and the subsequent Russian invasion of Crimea. In Greece the populists didn't take power i…
I mean, you definitely have a point, with them going from from 42.03% in 2006 to 52.73% in 2010, but they weren't born out of the crisis like their American counterparts, and while they started out anti-establishment, they kind of became the establishment in 2002.
I'm not saying the financial crisis didn't have an impact on Europe, it absolutely did, I just think it's much more nuanced and complicated than the article outlines. On one hand you have countries like Italy, that fit the bill perfectly, on the other hand you have the Scandinavian countries like my own, where we didn't really see a rise of populism because it was already here, in fact we kind of saw a decline. For a while anyway, because right-wing populism is certainly on the rise now, but is that really the delayed effect of the financial crisis or is it something much more complicated?