Did you turn on that 'Block dangerous and deceptive content' feature in Firefox' security tab? It works by consulting Google each time you visit a new website. You can imagine the rest. Patently wrong. Here's how the API works: The Update API lets your client applications download hashed versions of the Safe Browsing lists for storage in a local database. URLs can then be checked locally. Only if a match is found in…
Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
21–30 of 65 posts
Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#22Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
it's hidden by default. see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=967977#c17
Is there a major performance impact for having not using the session tickets? It seems odd that it's buried this deeply.
Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#24So DNS over HTTPS sounds great.
Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#25Did you turn on that 'Block dangerous and deceptive content' feature in Firefox' security tab? It works by consulting Google each time you visit a new website. You can imagine the rest. Patently wrong. Here's how the API works: The Update API lets your client applications download hashed versions of the Safe Browsing lists for storage in a local database. URLs can then be checked locally. Only if a match is found in…
also why does it collect client ID at all and also "should uniquely identify a client implementation, not an individual user" doesn't sound a lot like "can't identify an individual user" ... especially in a home user context.
Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#26Mitigated by uMatrix and other Firewall tools, no? I don't find myself ever needing to allow Google Fonts/Analytics to view a page.
https://www.easyjet.com had a hilarious bug where their menu bar wouldn't work if you were blocking Analytics. But yes, it is often not a problem at all to block Google Fonts/Analytics - almost everything works as expected.
Just checked my uBlock Origin on smh.com.au: fonts.gstatic.com are loaded ...
Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#27security.ssl.disable_session_identifiers = true on firefox mitigates this.
Any reason for Mozilla to not have this disabled by default?
Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#28Did you turn on that 'Block dangerous and deceptive content' feature in Firefox' security tab? It works by consulting Google each time you visit a new website. You can imagine the rest. Patently wrong. Here's how the API works: The Update API lets your client applications download hashed versions of the Safe Browsing lists for storage in a local database. URLs can then be checked locally. Only if a match is found in…
So then it semi-randomly sends Google URLs you visit? That's better , but I wouldn't say patently wrong. Statistically usually wrong?
No, it computes a 4 byte hash of the URL (domain?) and if this matches a local DB entry then it asks google for all malicious URLs with that hash (explained in the link of parent).
Depending how many entries there are your browser contacts google fairly frequently and then google using techniques mentioned in the article can link your TLS-Cookie to your IP.
Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#29Did you turn on that 'Block dangerous and deceptive content' feature in Firefox' security tab? It works by consulting Google each time you visit a new website. You can imagine the rest. Patently wrong. Here's how the API works: The Update API lets your client applications download hashed versions of the Safe Browsing lists for storage in a local database. URLs can then be checked locally. Only if a match is found in…
Ideally Firefox wouldn’t rely on contacting any third parties in their default browser configuration.
Re: Google can track surfing habits without need for HTTP cookies
#30The author states: >"Eight years later, everyone in the business seems keen to point out that TLS version 1.3 will finally address this issue by encrypting session data, although it isn't obvious if the measures taken by IETF actually work." Can someone say why it not yet if the measure taken by the IETF in TLS 1.3 work? Is it simply that this part of the spec hasn't been finalized yet? Or does the author mean someth…
TLS 1.3 servers send the session identifiers encrypted to the client, and then the client sends it back in cleartext, but each successful handshake will generate a new identifier; a passive observer will not be able to correlate sessions -- except for retries, but the service owner still could. In TLS 1.3, the server can establish a session ticket any time after the handshake is complete, so conceivably, the server could wait until it had some idea of who you are, and establish a token then which contains your userid. (Anyway, it could always associate a random session id with your userid later)