You can still click and see the whole URL. This is just making it easier for the average user to see the most important thing to them, which is the domain name.
It's not like they're just changing stuff randomly. The TLS padlock change has been going on for a while now, and not without reason. As we get to a point where almost everything is served over TLS it doesn't make sense to tell the user every time. It makes more sense to only notify them of the exceptional situation where we're on an insecure connection.
The certificate authority system is terrible, but it's what we have for now. There's been some advances to help make it better though. CT for example, ensures that if anyone starts making fake certs we can all see it at least.
I suspect (and hope) that browsers will slowly transition to using trusted spotters to verify certificates in addition to (and eventually instead of) authorities. If you remember a few years back when moxie marlinspike made that promising, but underspecified cert verification system that relied on the user supplying a list of trusted verifiers and the browser basically goes to each of them asking "I see cert 88:A4:etc" for domain "google.com", do you see the same thing? The idea was to make it really hard to MITM someone since you'd also have to MITM every verifier the browser asked. Not impossible, but probably harder than getting a fake cert under our current system.