Earlier quoted context omitted.
A great koan, thank you. There's also a related, from-the-trenches, story: It is a very humbling experience to make a multimillion-dollar mistake, but it is also very memorable. I vividly recall the night we decided how to organize the actual writing of external specifications for OS/360. The manager of architecture, the manager of control program implementation, and I were threshing out the plan, schedule, and divis…
That sounds specious - grass is greener fallacy. The evidence was that the CP team failed at the job. But where is the evidence that the architecture team would succeed? The general suspicion of TMMM is that it extrapolates from failure but assumes that some untried else would be better.
Coherence Penalty for Humans
21–26 of 26 posts
Re: Coherence Penalty for Humans
#22I like the article. I think, in general, (project) management could learn a lot from computer science. People working on operating systems etc. figured out solutions to a lot of problems like scheduling and so on. Another similar penalty with humans that is often ignored is caching of skills into working memory. For example, consider a process, like writing an expense, that is really simple. Because it's simple, it m…
Re: Coherence Penalty for Humans
#23A manager went to the Master Programmer and showed him the requirements document for a new application. The manager asked the Master: "How long will it take to design this system if I assign five programmers to it?" "It will take one year," said the Master promptly. "But we need this system immediately or even sooner! How long will it take if I assign ten programmers to it?" The Master Programmer frowned. "In that ca…
Re: Coherence Penalty for Humans
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
A great koan, thank you. There's also a related, from-the-trenches, story: It is a very humbling experience to make a multimillion-dollar mistake, but it is also very memorable. I vividly recall the night we decided how to organize the actual writing of external specifications for OS/360. The manager of architecture, the manager of control program implementation, and I were threshing out the plan, schedule, and divis…
That sounds specious - grass is greener fallacy. The evidence was that the CP team failed at the job. But where is the evidence that the architecture team would succeed? The general suspicion of TMMM is that it extrapolates from failure but assumes that some untried else would be better.
Where is the koan where the Master tells the manager to hire better programmers? The Master doesn't because it's bad advice up chase waterfalls, unicorns, and 10x devs.
Re: Coherence Penalty for Humans
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
That sounds specious - grass is greener fallacy. The evidence was that the CP team failed at the job. But where is the evidence that the architecture team would succeed? The general suspicion of TMMM is that it extrapolates from failure but assumes that some untried else would be better.
Fred Brooks probably had reasons to think the untried else would have been better. His experience, hindsight from later cases, and also the architecture manager's predictions, which did turn out correct. When someone makes three predictions, two turn out to be correct, and the third ended up not tried, we would do well to think twice before dismissing that third prediction.
Why are we taking advice from someone who lets others fail so he and his team look better? This kind of internal competition destroyed Motorola and damages many other organizations.
Re: Coherence Penalty for Humans
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fred Brooks probably had reasons to think the untried else would have been better. His experience, hindsight from later cases, and also the architecture manager's predictions, which did turn out correct. When someone makes three predictions, two turn out to be correct, and the third ended up not tried, we would do well to think twice before dismissing that third prediction.
Why didn't he work internally to prevent these issues? It sounds like he was pleased to let them fail, so he could be correct with no effort. Why are we taking advice from someone who lets others fail so he and his team look better? This kind of internal competition destroyed Motorola and damages many other organizations.
What makes you think he didn't?
> Why are we taking advice from someone who lets others fail so he and his team look better?
From the quote, Fred brooks was clearly the boss of both the architecture manager and the control program manager. He wasn't part of any one team. I don't see the kind of conflict of interest you're hinting at.
> It sounds like he was pleased to let them fail, so he could be correct with no effort.
To me, it sounds like he simply made a bad call, and was saying "oops".