What happens when you upgrade or, God forbid, lose your phone? Do I need to redo everything from scratch like I have to do with my Krypton PGP and SSH keys? That's a no go for me. I'm pretty happy with 1Password already!
> Do I need to redo everything from scratch I would hope so. Anything less is not secure. (This is one of the basic "problems" with hardware authentication.) However, the software model allows for pre-arranged cloud sync between multiple devices. Given how Krypton handles PGP/SSH this support isn't there, but there's no technical obstacle.
Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
51–60 of 100 posts
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#52Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is there no way to provide some paper backup for U2F at least?
Best bet is the service providing those kinds of codes for recovery. Twitter, Google, etc. provide them when you sign up for OTP and U2F.
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#53What is the business model here? They release what they purport to be their source code on Github, but under a license that prohibits ... everything (literally the words "All Rights Reserved"). So clearly they want to sell that, and then have the open source community debug it for them for free, which I just don't see happening. With no way to validate that the source code on Github is what ends up in their compiled…
https://github.com/kryptco/krypton-android/blob/e5e1399caea4... You weren't kidding. :(
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#54Earlier quoted context omitted.
or you can compile it yourself, or am missing something from you comment?
Right. You could also compile it yourself with the same chainset / toolset the Krypton folks use and compare the binaries. There's probably a way to compare everything but the digital signature with two binaries too... Not sure
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#55How does the browser communicate with the phone? Does it require an intermediary server that krypt.co runs?
It's listed in their docs.
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#56I've been using Krypton for SSH for a while (basically the private key is on the phone and you approve logins using the app, they must have just added U2F recently). Its worked really well and is super simple to setup when logging into a new server.
(although I can't access the section of the app on an iPhone 5SE)
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#57Can anyone comment on their "zero touch is safe" claim ( https://krypt.co/faq/ )? As far as I understand, tokens like YubiKeys require a touch as an explicit action by the user to prevent authentication without their knowledge. Doesn't a zero touch approach remove a security feature?
I haven't researched their claim, but my guess is that with something like yubikey you wouldn't know an authentication has happened. with Krypton, there would be a notification pending on your phone. Possibly you would only be able to authenticate if your phone is unlocked as well.
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#58Earlier quoted context omitted.
Best bet is the service providing those kinds of codes for recovery. Twitter, Google, etc. provide them when you sign up for OTP and U2F.
So, all this fancy security boils down to a notepad again. I am an early adopter of Krypton and I've been sorry so many times that I'm using it for SSH and PGP.
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#59What is the business model here? They release what they purport to be their source code on Github, but under a license that prohibits ... everything (literally the words "All Rights Reserved"). So clearly they want to sell that, and then have the open source community debug it for them for free, which I just don't see happening. With no way to validate that the source code on Github is what ends up in their compiled…
you can say the same about all the other open source projects that don't have reproduceable builds.
Re: Krypton: phone-based U2F Authenticator
#60I understand their argument about security vs. usability for laypeople as it's an age old one, but I think that applies better to situations where there's a marked tradeoff in principle.
Tapping just once or reaching for one's phone doesn't detract from usability. Quite the contrary, it's a common sense approach (and teaches common sense security posture) to give one's explicit agreement for authentication, U2F or otherwise.
Otherwise, the intended user base that zero-touch seems to target may end up being the same folks that question why it didn't work out of the box to protect their logins when their laptop gets physically compromised; since they assumed they didn't have to "understand or care about the differences between two-factor, U2F, or web authentication" in the first place, to quote the FAQ.