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We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

open.buffer.com

131–140 of 177 posts

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If those investors had put their money into the S&P500 instead, they would have had a better return on their investment.

Only in this specific timeline. On average over a longer timeframe that is more representative of the market, they definitely would not have.

The average yearly S&P returns is 9.8%, to reach 40% in 4 years you'd need 8.7% yearly returns.

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#132
The way this company operates is inspiring, but as a recent churned customer, the resulting product is lacking. The web UI mixes up order of operations when dragging posts around and when I looked at implementing an API client for their service, I quickly realized why the UI had out-of-order problems. The API doesn't respects any sort of contract, changes types of responses in inconsistent ways and is basically impossible to implement in a typesafe way. The API used by the UI seems to rely on ordering of events received on their backend, but these events don't seem to be commutative, and each UI update seems to be its own API call...

All this to say, I appreciate the goals of Joel in building a strong culture and strongly support this, but the product itself isn't that great to use as a customer, which is probably why growth isn't what VCs want. And I'm just hypothesizing that a hard look at the tech stack could maybe help.

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#133
post #124

If I remember correctly, these guys were proud and very public about building Buffer as a lifestyle business as were the VCs that backed them. At the end the VCs would came out with a negative IRR which was not unexpected—a lesson into why VCs don’t invest in lifestyle businesses.

I find it strange that being this profitable is labeled a "lifestyle business." The hypergrowth/unicorn exit isn't a healthy outcome for many businesses.

Because you aren't building a business. You are creating an asset you can sell.

Businesses are great and I don't think most people are trying to talk down about them. But VCs are trying to build an asset they can sell. Because when you sell an company that has a high rate of projected growth you get all that money now as opposed to waiting 20 years. There are plenty of investments that pay out solid returns for 20+ years. VC type funds are attractive in no small part because they pay out in a shorter period of time.

It really has little to do with building a business outside of the fact that the asset happens to be a company.

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#135
post #125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think it is a bold move. In their situation it seems like the right move. I am seeing a lot of sentiment on HN that feels sorry for VCs. VC already get paid above 200k/year; no need to feel sorry for them. People should feel sorry for the founders & the employees who did all the work. Now if they get liquidation, then that is good.

It's not just a return for the VCs, but all the contributors that gave their money to the VCs to invest, like your university's endowment fund, retirement and pension funds, etc.

[deleted]

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The interesting question, if the intention was to stick it out in the long term, is whether raising VC money in the first place was a good idea. Bootstrapping the business would have probably been closer in line with the vision and allowed him to retain control without eventually souring relationships

It's easy to have 20/20 hindsight. The situation was different when Buffer was formed. There weren't as many examples of successful bootstrapped companies and Joel (the founder) was much less experienced. I don't want to say getting VC was a mistake for Buffer because I can see it might have had an upside of connections and advice for what was an inexperienced team, and I think at that time the management team was mo…

It's not clear to me why a VC would invest in a business that did not want commit to a liquidity event. Maybe the VC didn't have a better deal to invest in at that time?

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#137

Does anyone even use buffer? I remember it gaining traction several years back but that's about it.

The data is open here: https://buffer.baremetrics.com/ As an anecdote, we are happy paying customers and have been for some time.

Interesting to see number of accounts decline, but revenue per account and total revenue increasing. Assuming social networks got better over time at providing account management features at the same time Buffer got better to selling to agencies and large companies.

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#138
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You are thinking from the perspective of an individual investor. For VCs, this kind of return is abysmal since it won't cover the 7/10 companies that went completely bust. In order to VCs to take high risks on early stage companies, they need the winners to return 100x so the fund even makes financial sense. It's one of the main reasons why VCs constantly push startups for hyper growth. This is certainly better than…

>> For VCs, this kind of return is abysmal since it won't cover the 7/10 companies that went completely bust. Only very myopic VCs would think this way globally. If every business did this, it would be terrible. But each business is its own opportunity/set of circumstances, and forcing everyone to 10X+ is as equally stupid as cashing out $1MM on a four year term sheet on $2.5MM invested. You must evaluate each opport…

> Only very myopic VCs would think this way globally.

Might this be a (converse version of a) No True Scotsman fallacy?

Elsewhere in the thread, a comment [1] referenced an article [2] that details the return imperatives that VCs face. In particular, it details how small returns "don't move the needle".

OTOH, the article asserts that only 5% of VCs (misleading, if a percentage of number of firms instead of AUM) succeed in meeting this imperative, so I wonder how the other 95% still attract enough LP money.

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17872045

[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17874278 https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/01/the-meeting-that-showed-me...

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#139
post #98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Family for 30 years in rental property business. Anything which involves rent is by far not risk free. Very cycle driven, heavy on litigation and management has to be perfect to make returns.

I’ve been doing real estate for about 25 years and haven’t seen much risk at all. Biggest risks have been vacancy and maintenance. Vacancy is solved by setting the right rent and maintenance is a 10% reserve fund. Also I said “almost risk free”. :)

I don’t know what country you are talking about, but in many places there was a huge decline in real estate prices one decade ago. That would seem a big risk...

Re: We Spent $3.3M Buying Out Investors: Why and How We Did It

#140
post #138

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>> For VCs, this kind of return is abysmal since it won't cover the 7/10 companies that went completely bust. Only very myopic VCs would think this way globally. If every business did this, it would be terrible. But each business is its own opportunity/set of circumstances, and forcing everyone to 10X+ is as equally stupid as cashing out $1MM on a four year term sheet on $2.5MM invested. You must evaluate each opport…

> Only very myopic VCs would think this way globally. Might this be a (converse version of a) No True Scotsman fallacy? Elsewhere in the thread, a comment [1] referenced an article [2] that details the return imperatives that VCs face. In particular, it details how small returns "don't move the needle". OTOH, the article asserts that only 5% of VCs (misleading, if a percentage of number of firms instead of AUM) succe…

>> In particular, it details how small returns "don't move the needle".

You never want small returns. But when you can choose a small return over basically a near-zero chance of losing all your money, it isn't that difficult of a choice - or it shouldn't be.

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