Let's Encrypt is one of the best things that happened to the web recently. I wish we had more choices though. Relying so much on a single party is unnerving.
Do we have conclusive evidence yet that LE is not a honey pot? I mean, if I were the NSA...
Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
181–190 of 268 posts
Re: Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
#182Earlier quoted context omitted.
CORS requires an HTTP header white listing allowed domains. If the attacker can modify the HTTP headers they don't need to modify the HTTP body in order to perform an attack. > Also, the attacker could inject tags First, the image needs to be requested using the same protocol that requested the page or it will notify the user of insecure assets. Second, but they would have to write a custom script to gather the data…
>CORS requires an HTTP header white listing allowed domains. If the attacker can modify the HTTP headers they don't need to modify the HTTP body in order to perform an attack. The attacker owns evil.com. They can make it have any headers they want, and then javascript on yoursite.com or any other site is allowed to make ajax requests to it. (Of course, they'd still need to do a man-in-the-middle attack on yoursite.co…
Only if the page is originally requested from evil.com or if evil.com is listed in the CORS http header from the legitimate domain.
In order for this attack to work evil.com needs to be added to the CORS list in the http header and JavaScript needs to be inserted into the page body to make XHR calls to the evil.com domain.
> Did you test this on HN?
I tested it on a couple of sites both with http and https. It is not a valid vector of attack. Don't take my word for it. Try it.
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All these technical conversations are really a red herring based upon the untested assumption that modification of page traffic is trivial if the page is served over HTTP. While this is possible it isn't trivial and requires multiple stages of compromise.
Typically man in the middle attacks refer to encrypted traffic, such as HTTPS, instead of plain text traffic. The benefit of a man in the middle attack is that the attacker is in the encrypted tunnel between the two end points reading data that is otherwise encrypted and thereby voiding any benefit of encryption.
Modifying traffic is less trivial than reading traffic. It is certainly less valuable when there are security conventions in place to ensure end point authenticity, as in limited to only locations that are available by address and policy.
> I don't mean to brag, but just to point out a possibly relevant credential:
Don't care. I myself have found and reported a critical flaw in V8 that broke recursive function access under certain conditions. I don't remember when the resolution was released to V8, but it was first available to Node with 4.2.4 on 2015-12-23. All prior versions of V8 were impacted.
> If an attacker MITMs yoursite.com and modifies the javascript
And how would you do that? I have not seen anybody prove they can both MiTM a production site and modify the data in a way that breaks same origin policy yet everybody says its trivial. If you really want to brag and get another 4 digit bug bounty then prove that.
Re: Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
#183Re: Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
#184If browsers supported a method to provide content securely without the need to encrypt everything, lots of uses of the web would not be hampered by the TLS-everything-that-moves movement. The limitations we have accepted in our browsers are what causes these conflicts. But we don't have to accept them. We could do with less propaganda and more compromise and innovation.
Re: Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
#185Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do we have conclusive evidence yet that LE is not a honey pot? I mean, if I were the NSA...
HTTPS security model is fundamentally broken to meet the needs of the junta. National Security Letters can be used to "legally" obtain root certificate keys of all Root CAs even remotely affiliated with the United States. You must be extremely naive to believe that the NSA has not already collected all Root CA keys relevant to operations within USA borders. NSL also tend to forbid disclosure of the existence of the N…
Re: Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
#186EDIT: Nevermind, I'm confusing it with similar discussions:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17651652
Re: Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
#187If browsers supported a method to provide content securely without the need to encrypt everything, lots of uses of the web would not be hampered by the TLS-everything-that-moves movement. The limitations we have accepted in our browsers are what causes these conflicts. But we don't have to accept them. We could do with less propaganda and more compromise and innovation.
I'm unsure on how you could do what you've said without encryption. Any ideas?
Re: Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
#188If browsers supported a method to provide content securely without the need to encrypt everything, lots of uses of the web would not be hampered by the TLS-everything-that-moves movement. The limitations we have accepted in our browsers are what causes these conflicts. But we don't have to accept them. We could do with less propaganda and more compromise and innovation.
I'm unsure on how you could do what you've said without encryption. Any ideas?
Re: Why Static Websites Need HTTPS
#189Earlier quoted context omitted.
Of course, you're right. My phrasing was not the best. The rogue CA would need to perform a classical MiTM as all the other mortals do, having access to the signing keys does not give you special MiTM powers, other than when you actually are able to conduct a MiTM through other means, you'll have valid certs to intercept the connection. Totally agree with your point about trust being a very hard problem to solve, tha…
> The rogue CA would need to perform a classical MiTM as all the other mortals do, having access to the signing keys does not give you special MiTM powers, other than when you actually are able to conduct a MiTM through other means, you'll have valid certs to intercept the connection. But this thread is operating under the thought experiment that the NSA already owns LetsEncrypt. And in reality-- at least according t…
Also there _is_ a third piece of the triforce; certificate transparency logs; and those would be very difficult to compromise without the certificate transparency monitors noticing.