Earlier quoted context omitted.
No. Falsification is necessary but not sufficient. The best theory is one that has two properties: 1) it is consistent with all the observed data (i.e. has not been falsified) and 2) it is a "good explanation". Explaining what is meant by "good explanation" is too long for an HN comment, but roughly speaking it means that it is concise and brittle -- any modification would cause it to become inconsistent with the dat…
That sounds like Solmonoff induction. But, there is still the same problem. Why are concise explanations better? Solomnoff justified this assumption by claiming we are generated by a computable prior. But, that again pushes the question back to why we can assume this. Otherwise, no observation justifies a computable prior over random luck.
Because they require less effort to work with. Note that concise is only better all else being equal. Being consistent with the observed data is necessary, but not sufficient. We can only ever have a finite amount of data, and any finite dataset is consistent with an infinite number of theories. Conciseness is just a heuristic we use to select among the infinite possibilities. It just turns out that in the universe we live in, concise theories consistent with the data have a lot of predictive power. No one know why our universe is this way. That's just how it turns out to be.