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Remote Code Execution on a Facebook server

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11–20 of 207 posts

Re: Remote Code Execution on a Facebook server

#11
post #5

In contrast, I submitted a bad vulnerability in Facebook’s password reset feature yesterday that lets attacker’s send password reset PIN numbers to email addresses the user doesn’t necessarily control. The security team said to works as designed so they’re not going to fix it. Basically if someone requests a password reset on your account then the PIN number gets sent to all email addresses associated with your accou…

If you have two factor authentication enabled, this will allow you to reset the password, but won't they still need the other factor? SMS? Presuming the other factor is not also an email. So the primary exploit might be stolen phone where the sms and email go to same device?

Re: Remote Code Execution on a Facebook server

#12
post #5

In contrast, I submitted a bad vulnerability in Facebook’s password reset feature yesterday that lets attacker’s send password reset PIN numbers to email addresses the user doesn’t necessarily control. The security team said to works as designed so they’re not going to fix it. Basically if someone requests a password reset on your account then the PIN number gets sent to all email addresses associated with your accou…

I tend to agree w/ the FB security team here. Don't list email addresses owned by an adversary in your account. :-/

Re: Remote Code Execution on a Facebook server

#14
post #5

In contrast, I submitted a bad vulnerability in Facebook’s password reset feature yesterday that lets attacker’s send password reset PIN numbers to email addresses the user doesn’t necessarily control. The security team said to works as designed so they’re not going to fix it. Basically if someone requests a password reset on your account then the PIN number gets sent to all email addresses associated with your accou…

Using a delegated email address to sign up for things sounds like the vulnerability then, not Facebook's handling of it.

Re: Remote Code Execution on a Facebook server

#16
post #5

In contrast, I submitted a bad vulnerability in Facebook’s password reset feature yesterday that lets attacker’s send password reset PIN numbers to email addresses the user doesn’t necessarily control. The security team said to works as designed so they’re not going to fix it. Basically if someone requests a password reset on your account then the PIN number gets sent to all email addresses associated with your accou…

I side with facebook on this one. It isn't like anyone can arbitrarily enter an email address association, or re-enter an associated email during the reset process.

So, in order to get in there, you would need to know the account you're trying to get into, and have access to an associated account in order to lift the PIN from there.

It isn't to say that it cannot be done, but it does sound like a reasonable action.

Re: Remote Code Execution on a Facebook server

#17
post #2

So, this was simply taking advantage of a crash-prone webapp running on a debug-enabled Django instance using Pickle session serialization, and more specifically this was only possible because _Django didn't redact the stored secret key used to sign serialized inputs out of the crashdump information!_ Did the author tell Django about this yet, or is this a (possibly unintentional) 0-day? Besides the above interesting…

Maybe I misunderstood the article, but I thought it said that Django does strip this information, and the Sentry app went out of its way to store the secret key in the SENTRY_OPTIONS payload. This custom, non-Django code effectively circumvents Django’s protections, making the bug the responsibility of Sentry, not Django.

Re: Remote Code Execution on a Facebook server

#19
post #5

In contrast, I submitted a bad vulnerability in Facebook’s password reset feature yesterday that lets attacker’s send password reset PIN numbers to email addresses the user doesn’t necessarily control. The security team said to works as designed so they’re not going to fix it. Basically if someone requests a password reset on your account then the PIN number gets sent to all email addresses associated with your accou…

I side with facebook on this one. It isn't like anyone can arbitrarily enter an email address association, or re-enter an associated email during the reset process. So, in order to get in there, you would need to know the account you're trying to get into, and have access to an associated account in order to lift the PIN from there. It isn't to say that it cannot be done, but it does sound like a reasonable action.

It does emphasize how your (Facebook account's) security is only as strong as the weakest link - there was a story not too long ago about someone's accounts getting hacked because they had an old college e-mail address still set as recovery e-mail address, allowing an attacker to circumvent gmail's 2FA and everything.

Re: Remote Code Execution on a Facebook server

#20
post #5

In contrast, I submitted a bad vulnerability in Facebook’s password reset feature yesterday that lets attacker’s send password reset PIN numbers to email addresses the user doesn’t necessarily control. The security team said to works as designed so they’re not going to fix it. Basically if someone requests a password reset on your account then the PIN number gets sent to all email addresses associated with your accou…

I would agree with Facebook's assessment that this isn't a vulnerability. If a user intentionally adds an untrusted email address as an official email address for their account, Facebook can't really detect or prevent that.
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