> The only limitations come from the platform itself (JavaScript/web), which do not allow for side channel resistance or reliable constant time operations. Overall however this is an exceptional library for JavaScript cryptography. How would this compare to something like WebCrypto, which assume would be implemented in a way that would allow for side channel resistance etc? It does seem surprising that we don't have…
You are confusing crypto primitives with a high-level spec like OpenPGP. OpenPGPjs used WebCrypto and node crypto libraries when available for primitives. You still need a library for the OpenPGP stuff.
OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
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Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#82I have zero trust in Proton after learning, that the free ProtonVPN service is provided by a data mining company from Eastern Europe[1]. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17258203 (please turn on "showdead" in settings, to see the entire thread)
Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#83Thanks to the great folks at PARAGONIE our open source platform (ie you can actually tell the code is always the same and you can host it yourself) also just passed an independent security audit: https://paragonie.com/audit/L7TtZbFoJBxR91Xg I didn’t think it was worth it to post to HN as news, though. Perhaps I should start posting our achievements a bit more. Like for example our Group Rides feature: https://youtu.b…
> Perhaps I should start posting our achievements a bit more. Maybe, but don't do it in someone else's thread trying to steal the spotlight from them... Really bad taste.
If anything, the comments saying that they shouldn't be trusted, etc. harm them more than my comment.
Actually my comment should be: I don't think being audited by a third party firm is newsworthy, this is us being audited and we didn't post it.
Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#84Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nothing you said here addressed the facts that were provided. Good luck!
Well one things certain: I'll never use Private Internet Access after this ridiculous comment from you[0] not even three months ago. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17261149 -- need to have "showdead" enabled in profile
Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#85Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Perhaps I should start posting our achievements a bit more. Maybe, but don't do it in someone else's thread trying to steal the spotlight from them... Really bad taste.
How am I stealing the spotlight from them? They are on the front page, whereas mine is just a comment that's relevant to it. They still have the spotlight, the link is still there and my comment only adds to the number of comments on the story. If anything, the comments saying that they shouldn't be trusted, etc. harm them more than my comment. Actually my comment should be: I don't think being audited by a third par…
;)
(Chin up and all that. This is not intended to be in any way hostile.)
Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#86I have zero trust in Proton after learning, that the free ProtonVPN service is provided by a data mining company from Eastern Europe[1]. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17258203 (please turn on "showdead" in settings, to see the entire thread)
I agree that people should read the linked comments. I did not find the the evidence to be as clear cut or damning as OP seems to think at all after reading through it. Most claims are also put forward by a co founder of Private Internet Access. A direct competitor.
Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are confusing crypto primitives with a high-level spec like OpenPGP. OpenPGPjs used WebCrypto and node crypto libraries when available for primitives. You still need a library for the OpenPGP stuff.
Does OpenPGPjs use WebCrypto to create keys which are not extractable? That's the big win here if you can make it impossible for a compromised client to leak keys which were used before/after the compromise.
Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
Doesn't SRI require the hashes to be in the __loaded__ html? I believe parent is referring to a page which is the same, but has been compromised on the server side, meaning you can't trust the html, even if the server is who it says it is.
Right, but what I'm saying is that you don't need the loader. Just have a bookmarklet with html that contains script tags with SRI. The loader is just another step you need to trust.
data:text/html,
In total that should be a lot smaller than the linked codegolf answer.Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#89Not that it matters. They could silently replace it with a backdoored script and your browser would never tell you it happened. And to preempt the ProtonMail rep who is probably going to respond to this comment, I know that you can run the web app on localhost. But that doesn't mean that users who don't are any more secure.
This (rightfully) comes up every time some browser-based encryption tool is posted. It seems like the desire for such tools isn’t going to go away. Is anyone working on solutions for making distribution of JavaScript applications more secure? There’s a range of assurances you could try to provide, e.x. signatures from the author (or even 3rd parties), prompting for updates, etc. It would likely require support from b…
Re: OpenPGPjs has passed an independent security audit
#90Not that it matters. They could silently replace it with a backdoored script and your browser would never tell you it happened. And to preempt the ProtonMail rep who is probably going to respond to this comment, I know that you can run the web app on localhost. But that doesn't mean that users who don't are any more secure.
These concepts are interesting: https://codegolf.stackexchange.com/questions/18217/javascrip... https://bitbucket.org/geraintluff/caution.js/ The idea is that a long data-uri containing hashes and a small loader function are bookmarked. The loader won't load the corresponding javascript unless the hashes match. The user only needs to verify the javascript once, then they can rely on their bookmark containing the hash…