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Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

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Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#261
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> - you can provide your own server Nobody will do this except for maybe 5 individuals and a few dozen cooperations simply because there are no other public DoH servers around.

Many already run their own resolvers, so providing DNS-over-HTTPS proxy is not a problem. What is THE problem, is configuring the browser. No one is going to reconfigure their browser after each connection to a different network. There's a reason why we moved from static configuration towards DHCP, which can configure network-specific settings. DNS is a network-specific setting, and Mozilla is breaking it.

That’s really the issue I think, has to be a public server if it’s going to work for mobility.

Fixed desktops maybe, but a laptop or phone?

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#262
post #215

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The expected common deployment mode is soft fallback - using traditional DNS if connections cannot be made via the DoH resolved address. Captive portal provides the most common use case. There is a hard failure mode available that you can use for better security if you're in a vanilla Internet environment - but we don't see a way to broadly offer that choice other than in technical documentation.

Thanks for answering questions in this thread. This makes a lot more sense - so LAN-only names would still resolve then. This still seems like it could cause problems in certain circumstances, e.g.: - The local DNS server deliberately does not resolve certain hosts (e.g. because it's running PiHole) - An internal host also happens to resolve on the external DNS, though with a different IP. E.g., a company could have…

The most important attribute of DoH is, imo, authentication with the resolver. The browser has a terrible time with 3rd parties messing with the DNS stream. DoH allows the browser to be sure its using the resolver (and therefore the resolver policy) it intends to.

> - The local DNS server deliberately does not resolve certain hosts (e.g. because it's running PiHole)

The right answer, imo, is that the pihole implements doh and firefox is configured to use it directly. The reoslver is authenticated and you're sure you're using the policy you want. A quick search indicates some interest in doing just that - I know stubby is working on doh support.

in the interim of course, you can just disable DoH and hope that your unauthenticated udp makes it to the pihole and back in tact :) - there's never going to be a lock in.

> An internal host also happens to resolve on the external DNS, though with a different IP. E.g., a company could have its public DNS set to a catchall entry *.company.com, but at the same time could have dev.company.com set to a special IP

so far as we can tell, this doesn't seem to be a significant pattern with http content.. at least not to the point where both split horizon addresses correctly handshake from each side (defeating the fallback logic). I suspect this has to do with http caching not working very well in such a setup either. This is exactly what we're looking at error rates trying to determine, but the prevalence of other open resolvers like quad 8 seems to have really reduced the frequency of this kind of thing.

There are certainly some dev environments at the tail that will require manual config.. but for the most part those environments already have a bunch of manual config so this isn't a huge leap to do.

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#263

Earlier quoted context omitted.

that's great, but are you coming for the ip addresses too (probably the bigger challenge)?

wrt esni the anonymity pool is definitely the set of content that can share the same address pool. In a world with lots of CDNS (and several multi-CDN switching services) this covers a huge amount of content - but I agree - not everything.

cdn switchers/sharers are very interesting here. e.g. cedexis

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#264

More information: https://blog.nightly.mozilla.org/2018/06/01/improving-dns-pr... According to this page: - you can already test this right now - you can provide your own server And some more: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_over_HTTPS

> - you can provide your own server How do I RUN my own server? A few minutes of Googling hasn't revealed any DNS-over-HTTPS server that appears production-ready.

There are a lot of wrappers that you can use to provide a TLS proxy to an existing resolver,a few are listed at the bottom of this page:

https://github.com/curl/curl/wiki/DNS-over-HTTPS

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#265

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you substantially underestimate the number of networks that use split-horizon DNS for their functioning, and where hijacking the DNS is going to cause significant breakage.

Which are almost zero home network of non technical users

I've never seen any marketing materials, where Mozilla limits themselves to non technical users with zero home network. Did you?

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#266

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Great, all your data is stored for 24 hours and then collected in "anonymised" form for further processing and "internal research"! Also no mention of penalties, either for Cloudflare as a company or the responsible employees (starting with the CEO) in case of a violation. And no notice period of any time should Cloudflare decide to change those terms and have thousands of browsers still pointed at its resolvers. Why…

It's a legally binding contract between Cloudflare and Mozilla. If Cloudflare were to violate it, Mozilla could sue and a judge would determine the penalties for Cloudflare. There should be some rough guidelines written into law as well. And we're definitely not talking about small amounts. Cloudflare violating it would result in Mozilla violating the privacy of millions, which can be interpreted as significant damag…

Data from temporary logs will be moved (anonymized) to permanent logs. For me this reads as: once it is there, it is not your data anymore, not from Cloudflare Resolver for Firefox and not PII, so we can do ~whatever we wish.

IANAL but it looks like extreme weasel wording (and not even remotely GDPR compliant), there is nothing to violate.

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#267

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For me this comparison is seams false as it would work the same way if you replaced "military" with "US taxpayer".

Indeed, all us US taxpayers and, more importantly, citizens are complicity with the myriad heinous crimes of our government. They do them in our name, with our money, and in most cases with our vote.

OK, but I hope that you don't propose vilanizing any support helping US taxpayers because of it, as it was the purpose of the analogy to explore that. Are hospitals evil for providing healtcare to US citizens who are enabling NSA?

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#268

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's important to understand the advantages of HTTPS via other protocols or custom crypto: * HTTPS stacks are battle tested and there are multiple of them. Browsers in particular already ship a heavily maintained one that performs great, so using DNS on top of it gets all those benefits. Because there are multiple stacks the risk of people settling on a monoculture is a lot lower. * People running a DNS resolver like…

HTTPS gives you the packet ordering costs of TCP and the handshake costs of TLS. With an SSH-like key setup - i.e. just getting the server's pubkey on first use and rolling it over when it advertises a new one - you could asymmetrically encrypt every request in a single UDP packet and thus gain the same security and lower 99'tile latency.

HTTPS gives you clear upgrade path to QUIC and handshake costs of TLS 1.2-3 as well.

This is the very goal of this study - to determine how feasible is it in the real world and what's the performance impact.

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#269
I was thinking about this issue. Once this feature is on by default, all Firefox DNS query goes through the Cloudflare, a for-profit company which resides on US whose government is infamous for spying everything.

My conclusion is, what's the difference?

Currently, Cloudflare is one of the major CDN in the world and most traffics goes through them.

Even worse, by it's nature, Cloudflare and most of the CDNs are practically doing MITM attack so they can cache the data. For that, HTTPS isn't that secure the most browser vendor want us believe to be. The rise of CDN cause serious single point of failure but most of us don't worry about it like DNS.

To solve this problem, we need to invent completely decentralized new network that doesn't relies on the current Internet even at the physical layer. Probably fallback to the level such that we carry storage by foot or pickup dead drops.

Re: Firefox’s Trusted Recursive Resolver DNS feature is dangerous

#270

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s simply not true. Mozilla is not sharing DNS queries with Cloudfare by default, nor are they overriding your configured DNS servers per default. This is an experimental opt-in feature, and they are also running an opt-in study. There has been no announcement of an ”on by default” for DOH. If you enable the experimental feature there is no default provided and you have to set your own server, but if you opt in t…

Just to be clear, the authors are wrong? There will not be a September patch that overrides my network DNS settings? "With the next Mozilla patch in September any DNS change you configure in your network won't have any effect anymore, at least for browsing with Firefox, because Mozilla has partnered up with Cloudflare and will resolve the domain names from the application itself via a DNS server from Cloudflare based…

I don't see how they could enable it by default unless they query both local and DoH at the same time .. or perhaps a hybrid model where they only using DoH by default on certain TLD's and / or domains.

Corporate users would be utterly broken unless their IT staff are managing the proxy settings in all their installed browsers, which is often not the case. This would lead to Security and IT staff blocking CF DNS until it was fixed.

I believe this is a good thing to watch for, but I can't imagine Mozilla not having thought this through.

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