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What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

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Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#171

Not a great opinion piece with an overly-dramatic title. The forecasting failures of major world economic bodies leading up to the 2008 financial crisis were (and somewhat still are) widely examined and criticized. > https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2011/02/11/the-warni... From that article a choice quote from a referenced report: > "In the United States, for example, it did not discuss, until the crisis had a…

" So to say that Economists still "don't get" the 2008 crisis is a somewhat heavy rose-colored embellishment of the actual state of the field. " Have economists actually changed their models, or are they still referring to the 2008 crisis as an unexpected shock? What are the chances that their "understanding" of the 2008 crisis will prevent them from being surprised by the next one?

The 2008 financial crisis is a pretty expansive event but it's unclear whether or not Economists were "surprised" to the extent the public has been led to believe by somewhat biased media coverage.

For example, the quote from my original comment was from an internal report by the IMF on the IMF's own forecasting/reporting in the period leading up to the financial crisis. It even calls out a presentation made by it's Chief Economist (at the time) which warned against risky behavior that was wholesale ignored by the fund's management (from the Economist article before):

> Even when some of its officials had different ideas, the fund's management seemed not to be listening. Its then chief economist, Raghuram Rajan, concluded a presentation at the annual Jackson Hole conference of central bankers in 2005 by arguing that “we should be prepared for the low probability but highly costly downturn”. But the IMF now admits that:

> "Despite the importance of the Economic Counsellor's position, there was no follow up on Rajan's analysis and concerns— his views did not influence the IMF's work program or even the flagship documents issued after the Jackson Hole speech."

That presentation by Raghuram Rajan is now fairly well known as having fairly accurately predicted the crisis (in 2005) but fell on ears deafened by prosperity (he was the Chief Economist at the IMF and IMF Management completely dismissed it). Here he is on a different list of 6 economists who "predicted the global financial crisis":

https://www.intheblack.com/articles/2015/07/07/6-economists-...

He later went on to be the 23rd governor of the Reserve Bank of India.

I am by no means an expert on the subject so take this all as a layman's loose following of the topic...but it seems to me that the lack of recognition of the dangers by Economists is only part of the problem. It also seems that many major organizations were incentivized to turn a blind eye or even actively downplay concerns in the face of overwhelming financial growth. Even before the crisis, there were Economists writing about the dangers[1] (2006); so to say the entire field of Economics were completely blindsided is itself a bit of an exaggeration. In reality, many large Economic organizations were incentivized to downplay concerns by rampant growth. No one wants to be the one that says, "Hey let's slow down," when the economy is booming.

[1] http://keenomics.s3.amazonaws.com/debtdeflation_media/2007/0...

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#172

It's a pleasure to read an article by a writer who understands of the history economic thought, though I suspect I will disagree with him on a lot of things. Anyway, this is interesting. I'll look up these economists. On the face of it, I think it's interesting how economists are hesitant to consider money real. Money is fictional to most economists. What's real is consumer surplus, utility or some other abstract way…

Reminds me of an amusing story I read somewhere a while back: >It is the month of August; a resort town sits next to the shores of a lake. It is raining, and the little town looks totally deserted. It is tough times, everybody is in debt, and everybody lives on credit. >Suddenly, a rich tourist comes to town. He enters the only hotel, lays a 100 dollar bill on the reception counter, and goes to inspect the rooms upst…

Does it not seem more likely that the hotel proprietor would find a dollar bill in the couch, then pay part of his debt the butcher, who pays part of his debt to the farmer, who pays part of his debt to the store owner, who pays part of his debt to the prostitute, who pays part of her debt to the proprietor, who pays another part of his debt to the butcher....

For the town to maintain that debt for an appreciable amount of time seems the most precarious of contrived scenarios. It's like contemplating the effects of butterfly wings on a house balanced on a nail. It makes for a great story, but it took a lot of unrealistically meticulous effort to balance the house in the first place.

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#173

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Reminds me of an amusing story I read somewhere a while back: >It is the month of August; a resort town sits next to the shores of a lake. It is raining, and the little town looks totally deserted. It is tough times, everybody is in debt, and everybody lives on credit. >Suddenly, a rich tourist comes to town. He enters the only hotel, lays a 100 dollar bill on the reception counter, and goes to inspect the rooms upst…

It's not that clever, they might be out of debt but they are also out of creditors. Nobody got richer or poorer just balances were settled. That's kind of the point of money.

Exactly.

> However, the whole town is now without debt

And without credit.

I next expect to hear a ingenious story about someone who pays off a car loan in a way that results in an empty bank account.

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#174
post #89
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

QE pumped up balance sheets, cash was not released into the wild.

This is the correct answer. Bank deposits at the USFED skyrocketed. It was FED money, lent to banks to be redeposited with the FED, on which deposits the banks earned interest I might add. It was a both a liquidity injection and a handout. And, it wasn't just provided to US Banks.

In economics terms I guess this means,

- Economists say "MV = PQ", and QE adds to "M", so shouldn't "P" or "Q" go up?

- But the marginal dollar of added "M" had ~zero "V", so that didn't happen.

("I guess" because I've never taken any macroeconomics and can't pretend to understand it...)

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#175
post #25

It's a pleasure to read an article by a writer who understands of the history economic thought, though I suspect I will disagree with him on a lot of things. Anyway, this is interesting. I'll look up these economists. On the face of it, I think it's interesting how economists are hesitant to consider money real. Money is fictional to most economists. What's real is consumer surplus, utility or some other abstract way…

Hated Graeber's book on debt, but I thought the idea that debt preceded money was uncontroversial. Homer & Sylla go back at least to the Sumerians in 'A History of Interest Rates'

the money replaced barter model is a pretty prevalent just-so story in econ departments. It even made it into a PSA infomercial (starting about 1:30, but the whole thing is a gem) :

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JUvm9UgJBtg

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#176
post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is the correct answer. Bank deposits at the USFED skyrocketed. It was FED money, lent to banks to be redeposited with the FED, on which deposits the banks earned interest I might add. It was a both a liquidity injection and a handout. And, it wasn't just provided to US Banks.

In economics terms I guess this means, - Economists say "MV = PQ", and QE adds to "M", so shouldn't "P" or "Q" go up? - But the marginal dollar of added "M" had ~zero "V", so that didn't happen. ("I guess" because I've never taken any macroeconomics and can't pretend to understand it...)

Not a bad guess!

If money isn't directly pumped into the system by receiving banks, then the only direct impact is on those banks balance sheets, which affects their choices and decisions. So the effects to the overall economy are second order, and don't have the same fractional amplification like changing the reserve ratio has.

While I'm an economist, and have training on the model you are mentioning, I'm not speaking from a formal model. Rather from what I've seen in a large bank's treasury while it happened.

Another impact I've not seen considered is what happens when different banks have different effective reserve requirements.

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#177
post #21

I remember distinctly the moment I realized the housing bubble was going to end badly. I was wondering in the early 00's how house prices, more or less everywhere, could continue rising past what most people could actually afford to pay. I hadn't really being paying much attention to the financial world, but sometime in 2004 or so, I saw an ad on tv for a mortgage deal that seemed to make no sense. I looked it up and…

I wonder that same thing today. To me, it feels like the bubble burst in 2007. But, that we're still here today, seems to indicate it didn't really pop, but instead it's a side-effect of another system. Recently in Southern California, listening to the local NPR affiliate, they were covering a candidate race where one candidate accused the other of not hearing his constituents: ~"House prices have fallen, and that's…

I think the problem in California is that investors can go in and buy housing at unsustainable prices, and just rent it out, since their long term goal isn't to house themselves, but to have an asset that has a fixed return value at a near minimum, especially given the taxes hardly increase year over year.

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#178
post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Active traders tend to lose money relative to the “rest of us” passive index investors.

Is this based on research or just that theoretical model that passives do better while actives churn fees in a zero sum game?

Actively managed mutual funds don't tend to outperform the S&P 500 over the long term, when you account for selection biases (i.e. if you look at a set of mutual funds from a given brokerage, most of them will appear to outperform the index because they've cancelled the ones that didn't; if you actually choose some of those funds, however, they're going to eventually underperform and get cancelled and replaced with a new set of funds).

This selection bias works somewhat like the old sports betting scam:

1. You get 16,000 email addresses from people who want to receive your expert tips to predict NFL games. You send each of them your pick for the Monday Night Football game. You tell 8,000 of them that the home team beats the spread and the other 8,000 that the away team beats the spread. Be sure and include complicated rationales that will seem prophetic after the fact.

2. Of the 8,000 who received the "correct" tip, you send 4,000 of them one pick for Thursday Night Football and 4,000 of them the opposite.

3. Repeat for the Sunday Night game.

4. You now have 2,000 people who think that you can accurately predict who's going to win a football game, because you've done so for three nationally broadcast games in a row, and the odds of that are astronomical! (I mean, they're 1 in 8, but the kind of people who sign up for spammy sports betting tip newsletters aren't necessarily that sharp). Con 10% of them into paying you $50 for your expert tips for the next Monday Night Football game and you've made $10,000 out of 16,000 email addresses and a week's worth of making up shit about football.

(the exception being, with mutual funds, it's the funds themselves that are dropped instead of the poor saps who invested in them).

...

On the one hand, when it comes to active vs. passive investing, you have the Bogleheads and the hardcore efficient-market-hypothesis types who will tell you that every possible rationale you could ever have for ever making an active investment decision is already priced into the market. On the other hand, Warren Buffett spent virtually his entire life overperforming the market. How to reconcile this?

Actually, I think it's entirely possible for active investment to beat the market, but with a LOT of caveats:

1. The market isn't 100% efficient, which is logically equivalent to saying that it's possible for active investment to beat the market. This seems pretty obvious when you put it this way--100% efficiency is fucking magical, it's not a realistic expectation to have of the world--but how efficient is it? 95%? At that point, you're spending a ton of time and effort finding a market opportunity where you can realize a return of $100 instead of $95. That's a lot of work, and if you're smart and diligent enough to make your marginal $5 that way, you're probably smart and diligent enough to make $10 doing real work instead.

2. So let's say you follow your passions, and active investing is it. You work long and hard to find $5 opportunity after $5 opportunity, and nothing else matters to you other than your loved ones, your weekly bridge match, and advocating for tax reform because you think it's ridiculous how low your taxes are. See where I'm going with this? If active investing is hard enough, and lucrative enough, you're not going to go around asking bored salary drones to let you invest their retirement money in exchange for commissions and fees. That's ridiculous. If you know how to beat the market, beat it yourself and keep all the money. In other words, active investing only works if you, personally, are the active investor. It's not a justification for buying mutual funds.

3. So let's imagine that you are literally the single most successful person in the world at active investing. You're a household name, a genius, an "Oracle", you go to the White House and play bridge with Bill Gates and you're in the top ten billionaire list...

...wait, did I say "Bill Gates"? Take another look at that list, while you're at it. If you're really smart, and diligent, and ambitious, and want to get really really rich by working really really hard at it, it turns out actually creating new businesses works out a lot more often than investing in existing ones. Active investing is exactly the kind of field where you would expect massively outsized returns, and yet, once you eliminate out the heirs, heiresses, and developing country oligarchs who ended up with a controlling stake in newly privatized industries through Totally Not Corrupt Processes™, you're a lot more likely to make a huge fortune by getting 2 billion people to use your ad-supported website, selling cheap flat-pack furniture, selling database software to large companies, selling running shoes, or literally doing any other kind of real work.

So, yeah. Active investing can work out for you, but there's no free lunch, and if you have the money to spare and you're willing to put in the work, you might be better off doing something like buying and flipping houses. Sure, you'll spend frightening amounts of spare time covered with sawdust and choking on mold spores, but at least you'll expect that going in.

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#179

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Fidelity is a cheap provider?

> Fidelity is a cheap provider? No, but they have different tiers of service. In my account, for example, I can sell and purchase intraday. They do what they do for my personal account, which is credit the cash intraday. TL; DR This is not a legal, but contractual, requirement.

I see! Good to know. Still, I'm inclined to believe that more people are in my tier of service than are in yours.

Re: What Economists Still Don’t Get About the 2008 Crisis

#180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s simple; a lot of the QE from US left US and went to emerging markets, when there was an interest rate difference between those markets and US’s 0 percent. Overtime, the profits earned from those overseas investments stayed overseas. However, when China’s stock market collapsed in 2015 and more money started flowing back into US, US raise interest rate in late 2015. This prompted more return of money back into US…

Yup, that's why China lost 3.8Trillion out of their 7Trillion wealth in the last decade. https://www.forbes.com/sites/insideasia/2017/02/22/china-cap... And why China is in deep trouble because they have 3Trillion (supposedly) in foreign reserves, but IMF said China needs at least 2.5Trillion for normal import/export operations. So really, they only have 500B in foreign reserves. And now they're going through reserve…

Why do they need 2.5T USD for import-export? Could you elaborate on this?
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