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Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

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Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#91
post #73
post #67

I wonder what other (somehow) laptop-worthy CPUs offer a better management engine story? * AMD processors do have an equivalent management engine (PSP), but I didn't hear anything about remote exploits for it. * Beefier ARM CPUs also have something like a management engine ("trustzone" only accessible to the manufacturer). I have no idea if it has any remote-access capabilities on any common hardware. On RPi the trus…

I believe AMD lets you disable it from BIOS.

I've seen this claim a few times but never seen it solidly verified. Can anyone make the case either way?

Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#92
post #32
post #20

Has Intel offered an official "disable ME" patch? I'd like to close the door once and not worry about it again.

There are no official ways of disabling the ME. The Coreboot project and the Hardenedlinux project have worked on it, and here are some resources on their progress: https://hardenedlinux.github.io/firmware/2016/11/17/neutrali... https://www.coreboot.org/Intel_Management_Engine And here is a general writeup on the Intel chips and their "features": https://libreboot.org/faq.html#intel If Intel aren't going to patch old…

There's also system76's method of disabling the ME

Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#93
post #43

I finally pushed the button on my lenovo T450S there is a setting in the bios to delete the AMT. While the best route is to reprogram... I would just rather click one button and set bios passwords afterwards.

The ME (AMT) is never actually disabled or deleted as long as the FW is there and running. Plus you should take advantage of the fact that the 450 is still supported and gets a ME FW update. Yesterday I updated all my machines with Gen 4 CPU with new BIOS, new ME FW, and (surprisingly) new TPM FW. The Gen 3 CPU machines barely got a BIOS update for Metldown/Spectre and that's it.

So I would just update the bios and it will return back to normal?

Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#94

Can MacBook owners do something to disable or cripple Intel ME? Is Apple disabling it for us? I can’t find Apple responses to these issues.

As far as I know while the Management Engine is in all chipsets that accompany Intel CPUs, Apple never shipped any AMT enabled firmware. This is the more exposed component.

Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#96

I don't want a patch. I don't use that thing for anything. I want them to disable that thing by default! Leaving those backdoors open in older products should lead to a recall because the flaw was there all along.

Yeah man I forgot to post my usual website about management engines and laptops.... :( https://libreboot.org/faq.html

Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can't disable ME.

I thought you can in C2D (Nehalem?) era ThinkPads? https://libreboot.org/ and you can minimize ME in Sandy and Ivy Bridge, using ME_Cleaner? edit: according to sounds' comment* in HN (2016), The ME is purportedly placed in "recovery" mode [*] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13056997

Is that an official tool supported by intel?

Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#98
post #62
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As far as I understand: * In general you cannot. * You can try to remove ME with non-official tools like https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner * Some vendors ship specific laptops with ME disabled ( https://fossbytes.com/laptops-intel-me-chip-disabled/ ) * For servers or desktops, you can plug in a separate PCI network adapter instead of using the one on the mainboard (please correct me if this is wrong or confirm it a…

me_cleaner does not disable the ME. It is a partial disablement of ME functionality, but some functionality remains enabled. The ME firmware is an Intel-signed proprietary binary blob part of which is instrumental in the system boot process, so complete removal is impossible. me_cleaner and/or the HAP bit, or the services offered by laptop vendors which is basically doing the very same for you, may certainly reduce t…

At this point ME should simply be considered malware.

Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#99
post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The ME (AMT) is never actually disabled or deleted as long as the FW is there and running. Plus you should take advantage of the fact that the 450 is still supported and gets a ME FW update. Yesterday I updated all my machines with Gen 4 CPU with new BIOS, new ME FW, and (surprisingly) new TPM FW. The Gen 3 CPU machines barely got a BIOS update for Metldown/Spectre and that's it.

So I would just update the bios and it will return back to normal?

Updating the BIOS if you have this option goes without saying. TBH, the BIOS and various FW in your machine should always be kept up to date. Just give them 1 month from launch and let others test it to make sure it doesn't have any serious issues, then just update.

And as long as you are not using it and don't need it you might as well disable and unconfigure it in BIOS.

Of course in this state your machine is ready for reconfiguring it and it will accept the default "admin" ME password. Which means you have to make sure you have a good BIOS password. This will prevent someone who has 2 minutes alone with your machine from reenabling and configuring it without you even noticing.

Re: Intel patches new ME vulnerabilities

#100
post #67

I wonder what other (somehow) laptop-worthy CPUs offer a better management engine story? * AMD processors do have an equivalent management engine (PSP), but I didn't hear anything about remote exploits for it. * Beefier ARM CPUs also have something like a management engine ("trustzone" only accessible to the manufacturer). I have no idea if it has any remote-access capabilities on any common hardware. On RPi the trus…

In order to support reliable mass-remote-update, what is needed is an ME which is disabled by default but can be enabled via a non-reversible opt-in, such as breaking off a pin.

Then a supplier could configure bulk orders to enable the ME and it would be left up to the customer to choose the security-for-convenience tradeoff.

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