101–110 of 373 posts
Do you think that chaotic systems would be better analysed by quantum computing over classical computing? More generally, is BQP powerful enough to deal with chaotic systems in the same way P is for linear systems?
Oh, and I think your review of "Enlightenment Now" was a bit too rosy. When he analysed the data he's superb, but he seems to lambast people he heavily disagrees with. Its a tad disheartening.
You were said to be a skeptic of quantum computing company d wave. Then you started believing and then went back to skepticism. What is your current status, do you think it works? What would you like to see from them? Also, what is your take on Max Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment. Would it work? If yes would that imply that each of us should expect to live a really long time subjectively?
My position on the technical fundamentals never changed much: namely, D-Wave is building devices that could be interesting from various engineering perspectives, but that as far as most of us can tell, are not getting speedups over existing computers that are clearly attributable to quantum computation (as opposed to building special-purpose hardware that's, essentially, very fast at simulating itself). If you want q…
Hi Scott, Shtetl-Optimized's tagline is famously "Quantum computers would not solve hard search problems instantaneously by simply trying all the possible solutions at once". What phrase do you think should replace 'trying all the possible solutions at once' in the public conciousness as a succinct description of the mechanisms of a quantum computer? Or is this topic simply too complex to be distilled into a neat syn…
Edit: this seems roughly answered to a question by user r4um
How do you feel about the Axiom of Choice?
But then, if we reject AC, we can have infinite sets that are incomparable (i.e., they're not isomorphic and neither is larger than the other). So pick your poison!
Thinking about such things for too long makes me feel grateful that I spend most of my time in the finite world (or, let's say, the world of continuous parameters that we only ever measure to finite precision, so that the statements we care about can ultimately be phrased arithmetically). In this world, because of e.g. the Shoenfield absoluteness theorem, anything that can be proved with the help of AC can also be proved without it.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
my point exactly. The class P contains this silly stuff.
He's already covered that; not sure what's left to explain: he's said that if P=NP and if we get there with a practical running time algorithm (e.g. one that solves 3SAT in O(n^4) or something, and with reasonable constants too), then such-and-such consequences. So what are you asking?
Why is P=NP/P!=NP so difficult to prove? I just wanted to say that I think your writing helped me appreciate Michael Cohen and learn what an amazing person he was. The more I read about him, the more I want to be like him. What qualities do you think helped him contribute and be such a great person? What do you think a lackluster programmer could do to be more like him?
If you have not seen it, you may be interested in his 116-page survey of the problem. https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=3095
Hi Scott, Do you think there is a significant chance that quantum will never take off (i.e. there are non-obvious limitations that will prevent quantum architectures like superconducting qubits / trapped ions / quantum dots /... from ever outperforming classical supercomputers)? Related, what in your opinion is the best indicator (or would be the best indicator if demonstrated) of the potential of quantum devices?
Is anyone in your field working on the implications of computational complexity for normative ethics? Hume's guillotine relies on the impossibility of any evidence for or against moral facts, but one could stipulate to that while using e.g. Kolmogorov complexity to select moral facts with the highest prior probability to a naive computational oracle.
Not saying it's how I'd necessarily choose my ethics, but if AGI employs algorithmic inference (e.g., approximating Solomonoff induction) for conventional epistemology, the potential may exist for it to extend those algorithms to normative judgments, for better or worse.