Earlier quoted context omitted.
Trust is inescapable. You've simply shifted yours from reputational trust to trust in the decentralization of the computing frontier of a specific hashing problem. But while reputational trust is cheap and a well-solved problem, the trust you're using _requires_ large amounts of computing value to be burned continuously, in the hopes that electricity and computation are decentralized enough in the real world that mul…
I agree mostly with the point you're making, but there's an important distinction between "reputational trust" and an assumption that game theory and market forces will continue to provide the necessary levels of decentralization for Bitcoin to operate as intended. I'm not sure it's fair to put those two ideas on equal ground as if all forms of trust should be embraced because it's "inescapable". Reputational trust (…
It's worth considering what these things are. What you essentially want is:
- There should be a limited total amount of money
- Iff people want to give money to somebody else in exchange for something, they should be able to do so in a timely fashion
- People should only be able to give away their money
- There should be no possibility of double-spending.
- People should generally be willing to accept money for things you want at a stable rate.
Given that you cannot personally examine every transaction ever made and ask people if they _really_ wanted to do that at the time, and that you also cannot control what people want, where does the abstraction you use start leaking?