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F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

landave.io

21–30 of 30 posts

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#21
post #14
post #11

Are any AV vendors marketing themselves as more secure than the competition, with technically founded evidence? Such as memory-safe PLs, VM or OS sandboxes, running 3rd party native code in an emulator, bug bounties, etc. Though probably their customers are mainly corporate "intranet" environments where users open random content with Acrobat, Office etc and the high bit is to just halve (1) the daily mass malware inf…

From experience; no. A/Vs are largely attack vectors, a huge number of malware already tries to detect if an A/V is present and then uses it to get SYSTEM level privilege fairly easily. The number of actually good A/Vs is low and in my opinion, simply use Microsoft Defender on Windows. For 0-days it's detection rate is, to my knowledge, not significantly worse than any other A/V and unlike other products they properl…

Defender turned out to be an attack vector as well.

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/05/windo...

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#22
post #5
post #4

What are each of F-Secure RAR ASLR massage the heap (what heap, where) ROP chain RarVM etc.

An article about something assuming domain knowledge? Say it ain't so! F-Secure: an antivirus RAR: an ancient archival format ASLR: address space layout randomization, a system which loads code at unpredictable locations to make exploits harder to write (as you don't know where to jump) ROP chain: Return Oriented Programming. A way to circumvent non-executable memory protection and ASLR by manipulating the call stack…

Nice!!

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#23
post #9
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That is false. It's likely the end-user can update it, but the LGPL does not prevent it from being impossible. The LGPL makes it perfectly legal for the closed-source antivirus component to not load any 7zip .so binary that is not signed by the antivirus vendor, of a known hash, or so on... and the code loading said shared-object need not be available or modifiable, just the code for the vulnerable .so they do ship.

The LGPL clearly states that a Combined Work which includes the the Library must "1) Use a suitable shared library mechanism for linking with the Library. A suitable mechanism is one that (a) uses at run time a copy of the Library already present on the user's computer system, and (b) will operate properly with a modified version of the Library that is interface-compatible with the Linked Version." as well as insisti…

You are quoting LGPLv3, which has provisions for making so you can't restrict replacing the library.

7-zip is licensed under LGPLv2.1. "do not restrict" is not a string that appears in v2.1 The entire second part you quoted was added in version 3.

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#24
post #14
post #11

Are any AV vendors marketing themselves as more secure than the competition, with technically founded evidence? Such as memory-safe PLs, VM or OS sandboxes, running 3rd party native code in an emulator, bug bounties, etc. Though probably their customers are mainly corporate "intranet" environments where users open random content with Acrobat, Office etc and the high bit is to just halve (1) the daily mass malware inf…

From experience; no. A/Vs are largely attack vectors, a huge number of malware already tries to detect if an A/V is present and then uses it to get SYSTEM level privilege fairly easily. The number of actually good A/Vs is low and in my opinion, simply use Microsoft Defender on Windows. For 0-days it's detection rate is, to my knowledge, not significantly worse than any other A/V and unlike other products they properl…

So is Defender. The scanner runs as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM without any sandbox. One flaw in the scanner is a widespread and nearly wormable exploit. You can infect an entire company by just spamming them if you found an exploit in the file type parsers it uses.

Here's a bug found by Project Zero. The researcher had trouble getting the test case to Microsoft because Defender was running on their middleware boxes and would automatically scan it and die from the exploit testcase.

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=12...

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#25
post #16

And MalwareBytes is still using 7zip 18.01

Why do you think so? It seems they have updated to 7-Zip 18.05 on May 11, 2018: https://forums.malwarebytes.com/topic/228610-vulnerability-i...

I see. For some reason it was updating the database but not the software itself. I had to dowload the installer again.

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#26
post #11

Are any AV vendors marketing themselves as more secure than the competition, with technically founded evidence? Such as memory-safe PLs, VM or OS sandboxes, running 3rd party native code in an emulator, bug bounties, etc. Though probably their customers are mainly corporate "intranet" environments where users open random content with Acrobat, Office etc and the high bit is to just halve (1) the daily mass malware inf…

> Such as […] bug bounties

According to the OP, F-Secure paid them a bug bounty.

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#27
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From experience; no. A/Vs are largely attack vectors, a huge number of malware already tries to detect if an A/V is present and then uses it to get SYSTEM level privilege fairly easily. The number of actually good A/Vs is low and in my opinion, simply use Microsoft Defender on Windows. For 0-days it's detection rate is, to my knowledge, not significantly worse than any other A/V and unlike other products they properl…

So is Defender. The scanner runs as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM without any sandbox. One flaw in the scanner is a widespread and nearly wormable exploit. You can infect an entire company by just spamming them if you found an exploit in the file type parsers it uses. Here's a bug found by Project Zero. The researcher had trouble getting the test case to Microsoft because Defender was running on their middleware boxes and woul…

Yes and basically all other A/Vs have the same problem.

Defender has some advantages, notably not disabling security settings like ASLR or injecting DLLs.

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#28
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From experience; no. A/Vs are largely attack vectors, a huge number of malware already tries to detect if an A/V is present and then uses it to get SYSTEM level privilege fairly easily. The number of actually good A/Vs is low and in my opinion, simply use Microsoft Defender on Windows. For 0-days it's detection rate is, to my knowledge, not significantly worse than any other A/V and unlike other products they properl…

So is Defender. The scanner runs as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM without any sandbox. One flaw in the scanner is a widespread and nearly wormable exploit. You can infect an entire company by just spamming them if you found an exploit in the file type parsers it uses. Here's a bug found by Project Zero. The researcher had trouble getting the test case to Microsoft because Defender was running on their middleware boxes and woul…

The standard way to deal with that is putting it into an encrypted zip with a password like ‘virus’. That way it can’t be scanned.

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#29
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My main reason for using Microsoft Defender is the business model. It's in best interest of A/V companies for people to have viruses, it's in best interest of Microsoft for people not to have viruses on Windows.

But it's not? If people catches viruses with an AV installed, they are not going to be happy with their AV solution... Also, top AV are better at catching viruses and have less performance impact than Defender. https://www.av-comparatives.org/tests/real-world-protection-... https://www.av-comparatives.org/tests/performance-test-april... (Recent Defender has the most impact on system performance on all AV tested) Obvi…

The difference is that Microsoft has more incentive to optimise their AV against both false positives, and false negatives. And it can afford to stay invisible if there is no threat. A commercial AV has to make its presence known, and most I've seen do this constantly: If you never get a virus and the program remains silent all the time, people will wonder if they really need a commercial AV. If you never experience trouble and Microsoft Defender stays silent, you have a happy user: Windows works without issues.

Re: F-Secure Anti-Virus: Remote Code Execution via Solid RAR Unpacking

#30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So is Defender. The scanner runs as NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM without any sandbox. One flaw in the scanner is a widespread and nearly wormable exploit. You can infect an entire company by just spamming them if you found an exploit in the file type parsers it uses. Here's a bug found by Project Zero. The researcher had trouble getting the test case to Microsoft because Defender was running on their middleware boxes and woul…

The standard way to deal with that is putting it into an encrypted zip with a password like ‘virus’. That way it can’t be scanned.

True enough, but you don't do that before you run into it :)
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