That's interesting. Traditionally European law eschewed private rights of action in favor of public regulators, while the U.S. heavily favored private enforcement. But now Europe is increasingly providing for private action. Whereas the U.S. is increasingly disfavoring private action (e.g. limitations on class actions), and attempts to extend public enforcement are failing (e.g. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
Here's an interesting law review article examining these developments: The Arc and Architecture of Private Enforcement Regimes in the United States and Europe: A View Across the Atlantic, https://law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/media/rathod_-_final...
Personally in terms of public policy I prefer private action, but maybe that's because I'm American. Private actions are usually predicated on actual, individualized harm, whereas regulators can strong-arm companies without any evidence of actual harm. Theoretically it makes for a better business environment, especially for startups, legal anxiety about nuisance lawsuits notwithstanding[1]. But private action doesn't scale; if you don't permit aggregation of claims (i.e. class actions) then private enforcement can't redress systemic behaviors.[2]
[1] The anxiety is invariably overblown. I think it's because most people's eyes will glaze over when hearing stories about regulator enforcement actions. But stories about slip & fall lawsuits are both legion and relatable; like with terrorism, people develop a false sense of the legal risks and costs.
[2] I mean, it could work without aggregation if you changed the rules of litigation to really streamline individual claims, such as by shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant for certain categories of behavior. Then it would sort of act like a dynamic tax that responded to business practices. Keep your customers happy and you pay a minimum, baseline tax--the cost-of-doing-business that is whatever amount you want to pay out for fraudulent claims, not unlike what businesses already do with accounts payable and shrinkage. Do something that might upset your customers and you'll have to face an onslaught of cases that either require a quick payout or costly litigation. I imagine such a regime would look much like that with class actions, with specialized law firms that identify and aggregate plaintiffs to benefit from economies of scale, and take a cut of the proceeds. But it would still make it much easier for people to prosecute small claims themselves.