Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know that I really need an app to give beggars money or buy the Spare Change News from someone.
You absolutely don't need an app to give homeless individuals money. But when I was homeless, I found that it was vastly more helpful for me if someone gave me a few bucks than if I had to stand in line for hours, fill out reams of paper, etc to try to get some assistance. I am happy to encourage any model that fosters a little more direct giving of this sort. I am also looking to create a pilot program to try to hel…
Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
141–150 of 220 posts
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#142Earlier quoted context omitted.
I used to feel similarly until I realized that the EA movement isn't a hierarchical organization: it's just a bunch of totally separate orgs who have a common philosophy about how to do good in the world. Sure, OpenPhil funds AI research. But Givewell (who, last I checked, share the same office) has in their Top Charities list, only those that work in poor countries https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities [2…
Agreed. I've loosely held an EA-like philosophy for about a decade and I think that OpenPhil orientation towards AI is pretty disappointing. I account for my time in terms of things like number of people saved from blindness or death due to malaria, and I definitely do not count future simulated persons as worthy of any of the same concern as actual humans who exist today.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#143Earlier quoted context omitted.
You absolutely don't need an app to give homeless individuals money. But when I was homeless, I found that it was vastly more helpful for me if someone gave me a few bucks than if I had to stand in line for hours, fill out reams of paper, etc to try to get some assistance. I am happy to encourage any model that fosters a little more direct giving of this sort. I am also looking to create a pilot program to try to hel…
Fair enough. I also find it unfortunate that so many people seem to see themselves as freelance interrogators of the homeless asking about what they will do with the money they're given.
They were trying to ascertain if I would need help. A much better question format that isn't so problematic would be along the lines of "I have X (clothes, blankets, whatever). Would you like to have that?" If someone isn't actually homeless but would be happy to have a free blanket, what do you care? Maybe that blanket will help prevent them from becoming homeless.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#144I think the Effective Altruism movement really belies its own values and cause with the fact that one of its own funds is for supporting: > organizations that work on improving long-term outcomes for humanity. Grants will likely go to organizations that seek to reduce global catastrophic risks, especially those relating to advanced artificial intelligence. [1] Yes, an argument can be made that it's important to fund…
> I think it's absolutely morally repugnant to walk past them and not give them money, because instead you're paying people to sit around thinking about AI. This is not a new argument. Sister Mary Jucunda, a Zambian nun, wrote to a NASA scientist (Ernst Stuhlinger) in the early 70's with a similar critique of funding for space research. You can read Ernst's cogent reply here: http://www.lettersofnote.com/2012/08/why-…
The pit has a bottom as evident by the very realistic goal to end extreme poverty by 2030.
Still basic research is important, because it has such a long tail. Just saying both approaches have validity and will bring massive progress.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#145Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Either AI is going to be peaceful, or its going to kill us and there is nothing we can do to stop it. Have you heard of the AI Box experiments? http://yudkowsky.net/singularity/aibox/ The problem of containing a hostile AI does not seem to be particularly tractable to me.
It seems pretty tractable to not build such a thing as a hostile AI.
This seems hard, given:
- (a) The cost of starting an AI venture is minimal (perfectly within reach for a small group or a smart individual with $10 million or less for salaries plus cloud computing expenses). It's a lot harder to keep tabs on small and non-obvious activity like this than, say, the enormous centrifuge facilities needed to refine uranium for nuclear weapons.
- (b) The personal and societal economic, and other, benefits of advancing the state of the art in AI are potentially enormous. People will be motivated to try, whether their goal is to line their pockets, to better understand what intelligence is by advancing the state of the art of trying to put it into machines, or to make the world a better place.
- (c) The problem domain is not well understood, so it's possible to stumble into a dangerous design by accident.
It seems like only some extreme dystopian scenario could halt the progress of technology to the point where an AI-related disaster becomes impossible.
For example, a global war or disaster that destroys civilization's logistical and technological bases, kills much of the world population and forces the survivors to focus mainly on survival. Or an ideological revolution that sees all the nerds of the world lined up against a wall and shot, and those who remain alive become culturally permanently uninterested in advancing technology to avoid the same fate. Or a world-dominating tyrannical government that keeps a close watch on every expert programmer and computer system in the world, monitoring to make sure unauthorized AI experiments don't take place.
Even that might not be enough, because if any of the human population survives, even the biggest global catastrophe, cultural revolution or tyrannical world empire's effects probably won't last more than a few thousand years.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#146Well, measuring overhead isn't a great way to measure efficacy (trying to game this metric often leads to behaviors that are penny-wise and pound-foolish), but I don't find utilitarianism a compelling moral philosophy and really find the idea of trying to quantify how much good a charity does kind of silly.
If the EA movement forces big charities to focus a bit more on bang for buck, then that's a win. Perfect efficiency will never be possible anyways.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#147I think the Effective Altruism movement really belies its own values and cause with the fact that one of its own funds is for supporting: > organizations that work on improving long-term outcomes for humanity. Grants will likely go to organizations that seek to reduce global catastrophic risks, especially those relating to advanced artificial intelligence. [1] Yes, an argument can be made that it's important to fund…
> However, to consider artificial intelligence to be a potential global catastrophe at all, let alone the single one requiring extra funding, is mostly unfounded. As another commenter points out, EA is not a single unified group, but rather a disparate set of people who are united by the belief that we should put money where it has the largest effect. Some , but not all, of them are convinced by the arguments in favo…
but I have misgivings. in particular, the idea that marginal charitable dollars ought to be used to fund philosophers to think abstract thoughts is very counterintuitive!
(every argument that it's THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IN THE WORLD seems to have the same form. first give me a bunch of weird historical and metaphysical assumptions, then make me admit I'd assign them a finite probability of being true, then multiply by a kajillion future simulated lives or whatever.)
most of the philosophers who research this stuff, and most of the people involved in Effective Altruism, are part of the same niche subculture. i don't think this is a grift, I think they are quite honest in their convictions. but it makes me go "hmmmmm".
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#148Earlier quoted context omitted.
This would be an argument about corruption or disingenuous claims by a specific person involved with the charity movement, and could definitely heighten skepticism about other involved parties. But it would not be a criticism of the general idea of risk-return optimization applied to charity, and would not exclude a rational participant from belief that allocating some capital towards AI research was part of an optim…
If you're starting to talk about relative values and how one person values different things than another, who could disagree? But then the argument for effective altruism starts to crumble.
The original comment was the one that brought up "morally repugnant" choices in investing. That's what brought in relative value judgments. I was trying to ask how it differs from simply disagree with someone else's assessment of the evidence.
If Person A evaluated the evidence and sincerely believe you should give $3 to X and $2 to Y, based on empirical outcome optimization, they are using the EA framework.
Person B might look at the same evidence and believe you should give $5 to X and $0 to Y, but that hardly makes Person A "morally repugnant" (which might be Person B's unrelated moral judgment) nor does it make their choices fall outside the scope of the EA framework of decision-making.
As far as people disagreeing with posterior distribution over the goal-maximizing choices after seeing the same evidence, this would ideally fall under something like Aumann's Agreement Theorem (of course with the exception that people are not fully rational, Bayesian agents).
Given that, there is some expectation that if both parties are really rational and have the same value of goals, then they ought to come to the same conclusions given the same evidence.
But if they don't have the same goals (e.g. maybe you just happen to care more about animal welfare than me), then the EA framework doesn't say anything about you and I having the same investment priorities.
Really, popular EA press is mostly just saying, "Look, we take value judgment X on issues A, B, and C. If you agree and you start from the same value judgment we do, then based on the following evidence, we believe it's optimal to invest in foo, etc."
It seems like you're saying that it's not possible for two different people, *both making decisions in the effective altruism framework" could come to different beliefs about what to invest money into.
But there's no part of EA that requires that for two agents with different value judgments at the start.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#149Earlier quoted context omitted.
I used to feel similarly until I realized that the EA movement isn't a hierarchical organization: it's just a bunch of totally separate orgs who have a common philosophy about how to do good in the world. Sure, OpenPhil funds AI research. But Givewell (who, last I checked, share the same office) has in their Top Charities list, only those that work in poor countries https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities [2…
Agreed. I've loosely held an EA-like philosophy for about a decade and I think that OpenPhil orientation towards AI is pretty disappointing. I account for my time in terms of things like number of people saved from blindness or death due to malaria, and I definitely do not count future simulated persons as worthy of any of the same concern as actual humans who exist today.
"You are outside a burning building and are told that inside one room is a child and inside another is a painting by Picasso. You can save one of them. To do the most good, which do you choose?"
The point he's trying to illustrate is that, if you knew for certain that you could turn around and sell the Picaso for millions and use that money to purchase malaria bed nets, the expected number of lives saved by using the Picaso could be hundreds, and so there's a moral dilemma present.
Like many hypothetical questions, this one feels a bit "off" or "unrealistic", but if you don't get hung up on the oddities, I think one can sense the essence of his question, and it reminded me of the point you're making here as well as a responder's question asking you why you think the way you do.
I do think these questions are hard for us to wrap our heads around -- how to value high probability immediacy against somewhat uncertain non-proximal/non-immediate things that might be "much higher value". Part of my human brain goes splat when I try to weigh these things.
In terms of the moral dilemma with the painting, I do have quite a bit of sympathy for the argument that one should do what they feel will produce the most good, which might be to save the painting and purchase malaria nets. My father on the other hand seemed to believe that to be absolutely morally wrong, which seems to be siding with your sentiments. Practically speaking, I think I'd almost certainly save the child's life, because one's human impulses would be so strong that they would override any high-and-lofty-rationality, and one wouldn't have time anyway to do deep analysis. But the question in a hypothetical sense does seem quite valid and hard.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#150Earlier quoted context omitted.
>I don't think we should commit the fallacy of assuming that because their position seems absurd to us that it comes from a place of bias or ignorance. I had a really smart person talk about AI and how to deal with it. His conclusion was a gigantic let down. He was out of his element, hes an economist, but his conclusion was- Either AI is going to be peaceful, or its going to kill us and there is nothing we can do to…
> Either AI is going to be peaceful, or its going to kill us and there is nothing we can do to stop it. Have you heard of the AI Box experiments? http://yudkowsky.net/singularity/aibox/ The problem of containing a hostile AI does not seem to be particularly tractable to me.
His "experiment" is hard to control or reproduce, its goals are ill-defined, its results are hidden (really, which sort of experiment hides its results and merely asks us to have faith the result was positive?). He makes a lot of unwarranted assumptions, like "a transhuman mind will likely be able to convince a human mind" (why? where is the scientific or psychological evidence that a superior mind must necessarily be able to convince inferior minds of arbitrary things? This is a huge, unwarranted assumption right there).
This kind of psychological experiments -- because this is what they really are, rather than about AI -- are really hard to conduct properly, its results hard to interpret and difficult to reproduce even for subject matter experts, which Yudkowsky isn't. This one looks like it was designed by an amateur who happens to be a fan of sci-fi.