I think the Effective Altruism movement really belies its own values and cause with the fact that one of its own funds is for supporting: > organizations that work on improving long-term outcomes for humanity. Grants will likely go to organizations that seek to reduce global catastrophic risks, especially those relating to advanced artificial intelligence. [1] Yes, an argument can be made that it's important to fund…
Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
81–90 of 220 posts
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
$10k worth of malaria nets will save a couple of lives.
not if they never reach their target. effective altruism is a joke, its just rationalism applied to charity, with all the idiocy the rationalist movement possesses. People who talk endlessly about problems like dolphins who obsess over hang gliding.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#83Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#84I think the Effective Altruism movement really belies its own values and cause with the fact that one of its own funds is for supporting: > organizations that work on improving long-term outcomes for humanity. Grants will likely go to organizations that seek to reduce global catastrophic risks, especially those relating to advanced artificial intelligence. [1] Yes, an argument can be made that it's important to fund…
Trouble is, if you invest enormous amounts of time and energy in arguing that a general belief stuff might work isn't good enough for philanthropy and even writing "why we don't recommend" articles about specific charities dispensing aid that don't deprive enough people of it to have a control group for RCTs, you deserve every criticism you get when you then funnel foundation money to very well-funded AI startups with unfalsifiable solutions to a purely hypothetical problem, even if you didn't have close personal relationships with people working for them. Even though I consider some EA analysis to be good and well reasoned (and they're certainly not the only people making evidence based bearish arguments about, say, microfinance) it's a little difficult to see how AI research could possibly pass a decision-making heuristic so supposedly rigorous that it writes off sanitation as an area to invest in because the estimations of diarrhea reduction aren't blinded. Ultimately, EAs have their cognitive biases just like anyone else, and I'm more sympathetic than they are to aid organizations' view that conducting RCTs is difficult and expensive and they don't want people suffering in control groups to quantify how well common sense healthcare interventions work, and disagree that such organizations should be held to higher standards of analytical rigour than AI researchers hoping to be Sarah Connor.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#85Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#86I think the Effective Altruism movement is great. I was wondering recently what the most effective way would be to donate money specifically to help the less fortunate within California, and unfortunately it is not clear to me how to do it. GiveWell seems to do a pretty good job evaluating charities fighting diseases in poor countries, so hopefully similar operations spring up to evaluate other types of charity as we…
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#87I think the Effective Altruism movement really belies its own values and cause with the fact that one of its own funds is for supporting: > organizations that work on improving long-term outcomes for humanity. Grants will likely go to organizations that seek to reduce global catastrophic risks, especially those relating to advanced artificial intelligence. [1] Yes, an argument can be made that it's important to fund…
> However, to consider artificial intelligence to be a potential global catastrophe at all, let alone the single one requiring extra funding, is mostly unfounded. As another commenter points out, EA is not a single unified group, but rather a disparate set of people who are united by the belief that we should put money where it has the largest effect. Some , but not all, of them are convinced by the arguments in favo…
It's even worse if you try to draw the probability distribution of something like "given strong AI will be acheived within the next 100 years, what is the distribution of the resulting likely outcomes?" In this case, the uncertainties are so large that, again, people can come to radically different conclusions even assuming both sides are being generally rational. It asks people trying to draw that distribution to consider what the most likely outcome is of at least a radically super-intelligent being is, and more likely, an arbitrarily large community of radically super-intelligent beings. Who can seriously claim to have an accurate probability distribution of that? If we understood radically super-intelligent beings, we'd already be radically super-intelligent beings, so we are not good at modeling them almost by definition.
But certainly by observation; I am opaque in many ways even to my 7 and 10 year old children, and as with most humans, they are already exceptionally intelligent as "intelligent systems" go. (A 5 year old of normal intelligence is already exceptionally intelligent as intelligent systems go.) The idea that I could model something that was even my clone otherwise but operating at a hundred times the speed is already absurd; add an actual increase in intelligence to it and I stand no chance. Our only commonality will be those things imposed on us by the universe; i.e., I can be confident it must consume some negentropy to survive, etc. But any higher-level actions would be impossible for me to model.
People who think intelligence is unlike to emerge quickly are unlikely to consider it a serious risk. People who think it's unlikely for an intelligent being to augment itself, then use its augmentations to augment itself, in an explosion of uncontrollable intelligence, will not consider AI risk a very likely outcome. And it's not as if it's an irrational or impossible outcome; for all we know, while there may be low-hanging fruit above human intelligence it is absolutely entirely possible that O(work to increase intelligence) > O(ability to perform intelligence-increasing work as intelligence goes up). After all, I can't help but look up in the sky and observe that there does not seem to be a near-lightspeed expanding bubble of computronium coming my way, per the most dramatic fears of the singularity. We could end up with something very intelligent, even dangerously intelligent, but not end up with us waking up one day to a digital god among us.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Isn’t this just a statement that you disagree either with the relative probability of an AI-related disaster or the relative degree of harm it could cause? Yes, but the point of this movement is that they're supposed to be evidenced-based and maximising ROI. There is evidence for the existence and threat of global warming and drug-resistant bacterial. When you move away from charitable efforts whose effectiveness w…
It's like calling someone morally repugnant because they agreed to give you money equal to the sum of two and two and then gave you three dollars, insisting that the math actually does come out that way. If they honestly do believe that, they are simply mistaken, not morally repugnant.
The big problem with this decision isn't that it's mistaken, it's that it's corrupt. He should have excluded things that were in his self-interest from consideration, even if he honestly, mistakenly believes they are the best thing anyone can do with their money.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#89> Not all of this money was given with the intention of maximising human welfare. Take, for instance, the Make-A-Wish Foundation, which helps children stricken with life-threatening illnesses, by granting “wishes”, such as meeting celebrities or visiting theme parks. The typical wish costs the foundation around $10,000 to fulfil—heartwarming for the recipient but of little help in improving health generally. This pre…
Are you suggesting donors to make-a-wish actually value making one dying kid (and his support network) happy more than saving the lives of several? I doubt that's usually the case because if you consider it for a moment is seems so unfair and cruel. No, it's probably something else that motivates their decision...
If you have religious mindset (it doesn't matter if you are an atheist) you donate to "save your soul", or, to be less vague, to alleviate your moral distress. If that's the goal it doesn't really matter whether the charity you give to is effective or not. It only matters if it makes you feel like a better person.
If you, on the other hand, care about actually helping people, it matters very much who you donate to.
Re: Can “effective altruism” maximise the bang for each charitable buck?
#90First of all, without some coordinated effort to spread out donations, won't some of the more effective charities still suffer? If everyone gives to the top 4 charities, for example, won't the 5th most effective one suffer? I don't believe this movement yet has the traction behind it to have this kind of negative effect, but won't it get worse as the movement grows?
Second of all, who decides what is the most effective cause (or who interprets the studies that indicate which cause is most effective)? If I could spend 1 dollar and know it would save 5 lives or prevent 50 people from living with horrible mental illness, I would have trouble deciding which one to give to, even if given empirical evidence as to which is cause is the most beneficial to society. Any field dealing with this many human variables is bound to produce at least some skewed results. To me, it seems like the trolley problem with a limitless number of tracks with different situations.
Third of all, some of the causes that are not effective might still benefit from some amount of involvement. The example they give - volunteering at a soup kitchen - is one such example. Say giving to the homeless is effective, but volunteering at a soup kitchen is not. Someone still needs to volunteer at the soup kitchen, even if it's not many people.