Would this affect certificate-validating clients doing DNS-over-HTTPS to 1.1.1.1 — doesn’t it have an ipAddress certificate and demand HTTPS resolution only?
Well, if you control the host behind the IP, you could have any CA issue a challenge, and successfully pass it (e.g. if Let's encrypt uses the erroneous routes). So no. The only thing protecting you would be to have the expected hash of the certificate you expect to see (TOFU - Trust on First use, though you're screwed if you didn't contact 1.1.1.1 before the incident!).
Possible BGP hijack of 1.1.1.1
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Re: Possible BGP hijack of 1.1.1.1
#62Earlier quoted context omitted.
Traffic meant to go to 1.1.1.1 (cloudflare DNS) could be routed elsewhere. Since this is a common DNS server, this could be used to alter domain resolution for people that use it.
I'm assuming this would/could be done by a malicious party in order to substitute different IP addresses for some sites in an attempt to direct traffic for nefarious purposes. If my host is configured to use DNSSEC would that prevent sites from resolving? If DNSSEC is not employed and a connection is directed to a malicious site (using https) wouldn't that prevent the connection? (I'm afraid I'm out of my depth on th…
There’s a lot of ifs on both those roads, though.
Re: Possible BGP hijack of 1.1.1.1
#63Would this affect certificate-validating clients doing DNS-over-HTTPS to 1.1.1.1 — doesn’t it have an ipAddress certificate and demand HTTPS resolution only?
Well, if you control the host behind the IP, you could have any CA issue a challenge, and successfully pass it (e.g. if Let's encrypt uses the erroneous routes). So no. The only thing protecting you would be to have the expected hash of the certificate you expect to see (TOFU - Trust on First use, though you're screwed if you didn't contact 1.1.1.1 before the incident!).
EDIT: https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/where-does-letsencrypt-r...
Re: Possible BGP hijack of 1.1.1.1
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, if you control the host behind the IP, you could have any CA issue a challenge, and successfully pass it (e.g. if Let's encrypt uses the erroneous routes). So no. The only thing protecting you would be to have the expected hash of the certificate you expect to see (TOFU - Trust on First use, though you're screwed if you didn't contact 1.1.1.1 before the incident!).
Is there a CAA equivalent for ARIN assignments?
Re: Possible BGP hijack of 1.1.1.1
#65Re: Possible BGP hijack of 1.1.1.1
#66I'm using AnchNet's services. And We've asked AnchNet when I recieved a e-mail from our BGPMon. They said their staff was configured a wrong config on router. Also they don't know 1.1.1.0/24 is used by CloudFlare&APNIC. So they used this prefix to test.
Re: Possible BGP hijack of 1.1.1.1
#67I'm using AnchNet's services. And We've asked AnchNet when I recieved a e-mail from our BGPMon. They said their staff was configured a wrong config on router. Also they don't know 1.1.1.0/24 is used by CloudFlare&APNIC. So they used this prefix to test.
It shouldn't really matter who is currently using that net, it's not a private range :/
Re: Possible BGP hijack of 1.1.1.1
#68Does anyone else find it sort of beautiful watching replays of events like this? It's amazing to watch how the routers organise themselves, making and breaking connections when needed.