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Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

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Re: Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

#112

When will people start using plain old PGP — a tool that does one thing only, and does it right? Sure, it's a little harder than using just one tool that handles contacts, communication, formatting, and encryption, while making popcorn and walking the dog, but it works, and it's secure if you use it right. Our efforts to make encryption easy are going to get someone killed.

> a tool that does one thing only, and does it right?

It does multiple things (signing messages, encrypting messages, signing and encrypting messages, signing other people's keys, publishing keys, downloading keys, finding trust paths between keys, publishing your contact list to the world, publishing information about when you met certain people, displaying photos of people, revoking keys, symmetrically encrypting files with a password), and it does none of those things right.

In particular, it unambiguously does authenticated encryption wrong (streaming decrypt, then authenticate), which was one of the root causes of the EFAIL vulnerability.

Re: Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

#113
post #97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We called it that way in React in order to call out attention to the fact that it was actually dangerous. React also properly escapes everything else it prints. The app isn't using React but jQuery, which doesn't have those protections.

This doesn't seem to be true, here's the v1.10.0 code: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/blob/f6eb745632c... They do seem to be using react, and using dangerouslySetInnerHTML. Now that said, I haven't confirmed that this is the code that caused the issue, but it is in the Quotes component, which is referenced in the article. They seem to have fixed this specific issue a few days ago (v.11.0): https://github…

They are using many frameworks mixed together like jQuery, React, and underscore.

Re: Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

#114

Why is this flagged?

I had the same question, the title seemed generous considering this was technically a RCE exploit.

EDIT It also appears lots of comments just got hit with a wave of downvotes. It's possible there is some brigading or vote manipulation.

Re: Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

#115
post #24

Honestly, and none of you are going to like hearing this, and the Signal people aren't going to appreciate me saying it: if you're serious about messaging securely, don't use Signal Desktop; don't use desktop secure messengers at all. Desktop applications are incredibly risky, far more so than iOS mobile apps are.

What about qubesOS?

Re: Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

#116

Why is this flagged?

Same question. Also, is there somewhere where we can see why a thread is flagged ?

Unfortunately there's no way to know why users flag something, but that brings up an interesting idea: in order to flag something require the user types out a reason, and if an article is flagged it could show why people flagged it.

Re: Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

#117
post #41

On their Android app, first thing it makes you do is give them permission to read your SMSs. It wont let you vefiry by entering a code. I immediately uninstalled - doesn't seem like a privacy focussed organisation to me.

That seems odd. Perhaps it's to do with the fact that the app can act as your primary SMS app as well (I use it like this). But still, should be able to have it as an option.

Re: Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

#118
post #41

On their Android app, first thing it makes you do is give them permission to read your SMSs. It wont let you vefiry by entering a code. I immediately uninstalled - doesn't seem like a privacy focussed organisation to me.

That sounds absolutely horrendous. Even Whatsapp allows you to verify using a fixed line and claim that number on the mobile for privacy. Coupled with the recent LocationSmart revelations, it would make Signal unusable for those who wish to keep their location private. You absolutely need to provide the mobile number of the actual terminal being used.

At least on iOS, apps cannot get the phone number of the device through any APIs in the iOS SDK (AFAIK). So no app on the platform can reliably confirm if the number you entered is the number of the device. They all assume that to be true when you confirm the code they send by SMS. As another reply here has put it, you just need a device to receive the code via SMS. You can then use that code on any other device to set it up.

Re: Another flaw in Signal desktop app leaks chats in plaintext

#119
post #81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You have my upvote, but I imagine that tptacek means that iOS is very very well sandboxed, and has an extremely tight and well authenticated download and update system which is extremely difficult for a third party to monkey with. This is security via centralization and trusting a benevolent capitalist dictator. As long as your personal interests are aligned with interests of the benevolent capitalist's shareholders,…

I like open source software as much as most people on HN, and have worked with it for most of my career. But help me understand how a decentralized FOSS model gets ordinary lawyers, reporters, and congressional campaign staffers the level of security that iOS does? What are the mechanisms that assure safety for users? The closest I can come to seeing something like this work is a Chromebook, and Chromebooks are locke…

> What are the mechanisms that assure safety for users?

What are the mechanisms that assure safety for users of iOS? I understand that it's had a good track record so far, but the proprietary closed nature doesn't inherently inspire trust. Surely a decentralised FOSS model done right could be secure for lawyers &c.

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