The truth is the password is just another failed security concept- because those that work, cant be remembered by the users. So ones security researches terrible, is a neurologists reasonable. The actually embarrassing part is that after years of research- we still do not have a alternative.
86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
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Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#22Ofcourse this is not optimal, but I think this is more convenient than let say sending a login link via email.
Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
How about a password manager? Or even better: Some kind of hardware token and a good standard that goes with it?
People should use password managers, but it's a crutch.
1. Have a very short prefix and a suffix I can expect to remember 2. Password for every website gets generated like this + website name + 3. Generate SHA256 hash of #2 4. Use #3 as password for the site. 5. Save password to password manager
Pros - 1. losing a password on one site doesn't compromise the pattern on others because cracking sha256 is still not possible (afaik) 2. relatively easy rules to create new password 3. If I HAVE to login on a computer without my password manager (e.g., public workstation), I can regenerate my password on the fly.
Cons - 1. I use an external sha-256 calculator 2. Some sites enforce password length and arbitrary case/symbols rules. Have to manipulate generated password by hand
Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#24I'm still not sure why most services don't default to just mailing you a one time, short lived login link.
Because my password manager is faster than checking mail. Because spam. Because people change mails and may forget to let you know. Because bots scan emails and they are mostly in clear text.
Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#25If you're responsible for running a website, how are you going to be resilient against attackers who come to your site with legitimate usernames and passwords of your members? One way is to email the user when they log in from a new device or computer. They then have to enter a 6 digit one time password from the email. Someone who grabs the users email and password from a breach would also need access to their email.
What I do is similar. I use auth0, and have it configured for passwordless use. If you have a Google Account or Microsoft Account then you can simply use the OIDC / OAuth flow and have those third parties that you trust identify you and handle the authentication... we only ask for an email as it's necessary for our service. Because it's only auth0 talking to the identity provider, Google and Microsoft don't actually…
I use KeePass and Kee for firefox, and it works the same in private browsing as in "normal" browsing.
Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#26The truth is the password is just another failed security concept- because those that work, cant be remembered by the users. So ones security researches terrible, is a neurologists reasonable. The actually embarrassing part is that after years of research- we still do not have a alternative.
How about a password manager? Or even better: Some kind of hardware token and a good standard that goes with it?
* Password Managers are good but inadequate as a solution because, at present, only a motivated set of any given number of users are likely to make use of them.
Do we want a solution that works well for all or nearly all users? Or will we simply settle for a solution that protects only ourselves?
At present, password managers are often third-party luxuries even though they are indispensable for basically every person. In truth, they are essential enough that standardized API hooks for password managers really ought to be baked into every consumer OS, and if we are serious about protecting users in a world where 86% of passwords are terrible, users should have to explicitly opt out of whether to use a password manager or not.
The only choices most users should be making are
* whether to use a default or nominated password manager,
* what physical tokens / 2FA approaches they want to use
* and whether they want their credentials to be stored in the cloud (convenient) or only ever stored locally (more secure, credential transfer fully under control of users).
Sites / Applications / etc requesting credentials should really provoke a standardized credential request UI on the OS, not have bespoke credential dialogues in a thousand different designs and approaches bleeding all over the internet.
The choice to have a distinct credential per site should not be a choice offered to most humans, because most humans will always make the wrong choice.
Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#27But, the issue is that 86% of all websites offer so little value that 86% of people would just not bother using the site if they had to do the 2FA dance each time.
That is the fundamental problem here - not people reusing passwords, or password policies that break when encountering my password manager.
It's not surprising people use rubbish passwords to access rubbish websites
Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#28If you're responsible for running a website, how are you going to be resilient against attackers who come to your site with legitimate usernames and passwords of your members? One way is to email the user when they log in from a new device or computer. They then have to enter a 6 digit one time password from the email. Someone who grabs the users email and password from a breach would also need access to their email.
No, please don't. This is arduous for those of us who like a bit of privacy and regularly clear their cookies etc.
Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#29Re: 86% of CrashCrate subscribers used passwords already leaked in other breaches
#30Earlier quoted context omitted.
People should use password managers, but it's a crutch.
I do this but I'd love to have someone tell me why this is a terrible idea (apart from the obvious one of using a 3rd party sha256 calculator) 1. Have a very short prefix and a suffix I can expect to remember 2. Password for every website gets generated like this + website name + 3. Generate SHA256 hash of #2 4. Use #3 as password for the site. 5. Save password to password manager Pros - 1. losing a password on one s…
2. You have no credential expiry built into this approach. Even should you decide to not use credential expiry, if one site demands it, your strategy doesn't work.
3. You are still at risk of having your passwords leak because: Anyone who compromises a public machine on which you generated your password manually (eg leaving any traces in logs, bash history etc) who eyeballs your SHA256 input prefix_ashleymadison.com_suffix , now has very clear reasons to expect they can generate passwords based on prefix_facebook.com_suffix and pre_barclaysbank.com_suffix because your credentials between sites are now not independent of each other, and worse, directly suggest each other.
Ignoring keyloggers and bash history issues etc any simple 'over the shoulder' attacker, likewise, get a pretty good guess at all of your passwords all at once by observing you generate a password for one site just once.
In short, if you attempt to use an approach like this, you no longer just have to protect your password, you have to absolutely protect the knowledge of the algorithm by which you generate your password for different sites. This being compromised just once potentially compromises all your passwords, substantially widening the ways in which you can be harmed.