I think you have to be more precise when making claims of this sort; in this case "establishing a global clock" is not very precisely defined. Suppose we have an oracle that implements this protocol: it publishes a new public key every hour, and at any time someone can present it a blob of data which it will sign with the private key corresponding to the current hour's public key. Furthermore, you can query it for the set of all blobs it has signed with a given public key. It is obvious that one can implement a distributed ledger with the only security assumption (for each user) being "I trust this oracle" and "I can determine the current time". OTOH, suppose we have a weaker oracle which implements this protocol: every hour it publishes a new blob of data. Then it is probably not possible to implement a distributed ledger using only the weaker oracle.
It is well-known that pure cryptography is strictly weaker than cryptography + economic assumptions or cryptography + subjectivity assumptions, due to some inherent information-theoretic asymmetries. For instance, pure cryptography allows us to prove that the owner of the secret key of a given public key has signed a message, but it cannot let us prove that the owner of a secret key has NOT publicly signed a message. A way to do this by relying on economic and non-coordination assumptions is to offer a public bounty (ie I will pay some USD) to anyone who can provide the signature and then to wait some time to see if anyone turns up. Another example: with pure cryptography it is easy to produce "private randomness" (say between 2 people) by using a commit-guess-reveal scheme, but a third party later who cannot trust that the two were not colluding cannot be convinced that the output was random. But once again this is possible with economic assumptions.
As for the distinctions between different kinds of non-cryptographic assumptions, I don't think it's clear-cut. Timestamping is strictly weaker than proof of publication (https://petertodd.org/2014/setting-the-record-proof-of-publi...), which is equivalent in strength to a distributed ledger. I'm not sure the anti-sybil assumptions have been modeled as such, but it is well-known that anti-coordination assumptions are needed even if we assume no double-spends are possible (e.g., a pool of 70% of btc hashpower can profitably censor the other 30% by orphaning their blocks; no double-spend needed!)