The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
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Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#2Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#3For example, Apple has touted about its use of differential privacy, but researchers [1] have shown that the privacy budget is reset every day and the parameters, buried inside the code, lack a proper derivation. Similarly, Uber seems to use DP for internal analytics. However, the proposed model does not seem really robust and does not provide accurate results at all [2]. One should always carefully review claims associated with implementations of differential privacy.
[1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.02753
[2] https://github.com/frankmcsherry/blog/blob/master/posts/2018...
Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#4Differential privacy appears regularly on Hacker News, with either theoretical articles or projects that aim to implement it. Yet often there is a huge gap between both. For example, Apple has touted about its use of differential privacy, but researchers [1] have shown that the privacy budget is reset every day and the parameters, buried inside the code, lack a proper derivation. Similarly, Uber seems to use DP for i…
Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#5You have two identical databases (sets of n bits) that do not communicate. You want to know a single bit from the database. How many bits do you have retrieve from each database so that neither database would learn about which bit you were looking for?
The simplest answer is n, retrieve all bits. But we were also given a better answer, square root of n - you order the bits into a square, ask for a xor of random subset of columns but to the first/second database respectively with/without the column you're looking for.
And here is my question, we were also told that this can be done even better, in cube root of n bits. But I never learned the answer, and since I wonder, was that claim correct? Does anyone know this problem and the better solution?
Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#6I don't know anything about DP, so my question might be unrelated. But I think perhaps someone can answer it. Almost 20 years ago, I was told of the following problem at the university: You have two identical databases (sets of n bits) that do not communicate. You want to know a single bit from the database. How many bits do you have retrieve from each database so that neither database would learn about which bit you…
Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#7I don't know anything about DP, so my question might be unrelated. But I think perhaps someone can answer it. Almost 20 years ago, I was told of the following problem at the university: You have two identical databases (sets of n bits) that do not communicate. You want to know a single bit from the database. How many bits do you have retrieve from each database so that neither database would learn about which bit you…
Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#8Also doesn't help that differential privacy itself is maybe too arcane and subtle for the public to talk about and demand, unlike for example encryption which people probably generally at least understand to mean something along the lines of hiding their data in some sense.
Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#9Re: The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (2014) [pdf]
#10Differential privacy appears regularly on Hacker News, with either theoretical articles or projects that aim to implement it. Yet often there is a huge gap between both. For example, Apple has touted about its use of differential privacy, but researchers [1] have shown that the privacy budget is reset every day and the parameters, buried inside the code, lack a proper derivation. Similarly, Uber seems to use DP for i…
This paper [1] is much better for practitioners, and actually gives very reasonable values for the privacy guarantee (e.g., (1.2, 1e-9)), and builds on this great paper: [2]. Worth a read if you train neural networks.
[1]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.06963.pdf [2]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.00133.pdf