Earlier quoted context omitted.
The ".local" suffix was a terrible idea, to be sure. Active Directory domain rename in small environments is relatively painless.
Unless of course, you are running Exchange. In which case it's not supported :(
ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
141–150 of 321 posts
Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#142Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#143Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can you outline the approach how this would work? It was my understanding that in order to use Let's Encrypt you needed a public facing server to verify ownership.
For the standard LE certs, you need a public facing web server for the domain name in question, and LE give you a keyfile to put into: '/.well-known/pki-validation' For the wildcard certs, you just need to add a TXT record to the public DNS entry, no public web server required. Even if you have no intention of using your internal DNS domain name on the internet, it's good practice to register it anyway.
The problem here is that there's no such thing as domain ownership, only domain renting. You forget to pay your bill (read: someone loses an email) and a core part of your infrastructure is up in smoke, or worse, taken over by a squatter.
Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#144Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#145Earlier quoted context omitted.
I wrote that in anger, and almost right away removed it when I calmed down. Please see my current comment.
But why did it make you so angry? My guess is because my viewpoint is completely unfathomable to you. You can't even believe that someone would advocate for it. In situations like that, I always try and put myself in the shoes of that person. Sometimes they are wrong, and sometimes they have a point. But it's always a useful exercise. To your parent comment - No, I don't think it's a cabal of "grumpy old men" - I thi…
Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#146One of the wonderful aspects of this, that no-ones pointed out yet, is that these can used for INTERNAL domains, without you having to run your own internal CA. i.e. lets say your internal network DNS domain is 'my-company-lan.com' - all you have to do is ensure that 'my-company-lan.com' is also registered in public DNS[1], and then you can secure ALL your internal services using a free LE wildcard cert, that's autom…
Going to reply to my own comment here. It's at this point that I swear profusely at Microsoft yet again, for pushing the concept of '.local' domain suffixes a decade ago. As it's not a legal TLD, I can't get certs for any of my internal services without rolling my own internal CA, which only works automatically for Windows domain machines, and not for anything else.
Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#147Earlier quoted context omitted.
They are not the only CA that issues certificates for free. For example, AlwaysOnSSL[0] was on HN a few days ago[1], with some important differences (as pointed out in the HN comments) [0] https://alwaysonssl.com/ [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16566031
Also, https://aws.amazon.com/certificate-manager/
Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#148Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not sure how the availability of wildcard certs changes that scenario, if I can set the DNS record for secure-payments.yourbusiness.com then I can get a non-wildcard cert for it and get on with the spamming straight away
I think it's somewhat difficult to get a valid (CA-valid) certificate for a domain you don't own, though. At least, that's what the job of the CAs is: to verify that the certs they're issuing are for the actual owner of yourbusiness.com.
Any DNS-based validation is contingent on full DNS control, and that does mean FULL. CNAME records are absolute, if I CNAME foo to xyz then I'm trusting xyz 100%. I won't get an email round-trip or CAA ping for the certificate unless I'm looking for it, because CNAME implies that all things that apply to xyz apply to anything pointed at it. So the CAA record for xyz applies, not the CAA record for foo - it's not even valid to have any other record types for the same name as a CNAME record, and CAA resolution stops if it gets a valid response versus walking up to the domain root.
To be clear: CloudFlare issued a perfectly valid certificate for a perfectly valid use case, it just bothers me that I couldn't tell it was issued until after-the-fact by seeing it in CT logs, and couldn't have prevented it from being issued by the mechanisms that seem to be built for that.
Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#149Re: ACME v2 and Wildcard Certificate Support is Live
#150Earlier quoted context omitted.
> We're right back to the same level of security of you just checking that the browser bar points at the domain you actually intended to go to. So you’re sitting in a cafe, and you go to Facebook.com. Lo and behold, someone’s installed a MITM proxy on the router, that presents its own encryption key instead of Facebook’s, and your browser has no way to tell this because the CA system isn’t a thing. They now have your…
Technically, certificates automatically validated only guarantees that you are on the website that let's encrypt thinks correspond to facebook.com. MiTM state wide could tamper with it