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How not to run a CA

blog.koehntopp.info

11–20 of 255 posts

Re: How not to run a CA

#11

SSL is fundamentally broken. Web-of-trust is the only real way to do security.

SSL is not fundamentally broken. The server authentication process is. Besides what does web-of-trust add? The client usually does not authenticate himself to the server. How should a client share "hey, I trust this server" with others?

Re: How not to run a CA

#12

SSL is fundamentally broken. Web-of-trust is the only real way to do security.

It's not. It's actually worse.

You're assuming that random people on the internet are going to collectively be more secure than CAs, which is obviously not the case.

Imagine you get an email signed by the IRS, and which is trusted by people A1, A2 and A3, who are trusted by people B1, B2, and B3 ... who are trusted by Z1, Z2, and Z3, who are fully trusted by you.

Should be reliable, right?

But while Z1, Z2 and Z3 may keep all OPSEC rules, you have no guarantee that they verified that Y1, Y2 and Y3 did. And even if they did, you have no guarantee that ...

And even if you did, can you guarantee that no one there got any malware, which signed off on a bunch of fake certs?

Re: How not to run a CA

#13
They have a tool that allows you create a private key + CSR

https://www.trustico.com/ssltools/create/csr-pem/create-a-ne...

Apparently they decided to keep a copy of the private key.

Edit: Looks like they are having problems atm. A copy can be found at

https://web.archive.org/web/20180217071027/https://www.trust...

Re: How not to run a CA

#14
post #4
post #2

The thing that isn’t clear to me is how Trustico even had the private keys to begin with. It’s been a while since I’ve purchased a SSL certificate, but I remember generating the private key locally and providing a certificate signing request, which isn’t the private key. What am I misunderstanding here?

You remember correctly the way things should happen. But, presumably, Trustco generated the public and private keys for the customers, signed the certificates, and handed the whole mess to the customers. I imagine some customers would even pay a bit more to not have to bother learning to generate a keypair and signing request themselves. The thing I don't understand is how the CEO thought things would likely work out…

It sounds like Trustico got these certificates from Symantec. The CEO of Trustico was arguing that they should be revoked as they weren't secure and emailed the private keys as proof. Which, while a dumb thing to do, did prove his point I guess.

EDIT: From Trustico's account

> We believe the orders placed via our Symantec account were at risk and were poorly managed. We have been questioning Symantec without response as to concerning items for about a year. Symantec simply ignored our concerns and appeared to bury them under the next issue that arose... We were also a victim whereby Symantec mis-issued SSL Certificates owned by us, subsequently we were asked to keep the matter quiet, under a confidentially notice.

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/...

Re: How not to run a CA

#16
post #8

Oh, it's worse than that: https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258 You can run arbitrary shell commands as root from their webserver.

For some reason their server is "temporarily busy" right now.

Re: How not to run a CA

#18
post #8

Oh, it's worse than that: https://twitter.com/svblxyz/status/969220402768736258 You can run arbitrary shell commands as root from their webserver.

I guess someone started playing around, their server now responds with a 503.

Re: How not to run a CA

#19
post #6
post #2

The thing that isn’t clear to me is how Trustico even had the private keys to begin with. It’s been a while since I’ve purchased a SSL certificate, but I remember generating the private key locally and providing a certificate signing request, which isn’t the private key. What am I misunderstanding here?

"Trustico allows customers to generate a Certificate Signing Request and Private Key during the ordering process," the statement read. "These Private Keys are stored in cold storage, for the purpose of revocation." Maybe they decided preparing CSR is too hard for their clients :/

Lots of companies used to allow this, GlobalSign being one of the biggest that jumps to mind (iirc they stopped it in the last couple of months).

The idea that the company would store the private keys, however, is even more troubling.

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