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The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

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101–110 of 162 posts

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s absolutely untrue that ex-Apple employees are helping them break in. Apple employees do not have an advantage in creating this type of thing.

I don't know if that's true, but if I had the same power as a government agency, which would allow way higher salaries than Apple's or any other hi tech corporation, that's the first thing I'd attempt to do: find ex/unhappy/disgruntled engineers and offer them 5x pay plus a luxury home and lab in some tropical island. Also don't forget the hardware. Like with most/all other phone vendors, iPhone chips aren't made in…

> If you have access to the hardware that should be trivial to do: just implement a small undocumented flash memory space anywhere, then when the user taps a password an also undocumented firmware routine (that's hundreds of bytes, very easy to conceal)

I sincerely apologize for being this blunt, but you clearly have no clue what you’re talking about. Ask anyone who’s shipped any piece of hardware they helped design, let alone a processor, and they won’t be able to answer because they’ll be laughing so hard. Adding persistent hardware based spying like you describe into a design is anything but trivial.

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's been a number of ways to bypass a locked iOS device throughout the years[1]. This hardware box worked up until iOS 11 beta[2]. I imagine Cellebrite is using something similar, but gets around the fix Apple released. [1] https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=everything+appl... [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXglwbyMydM

These devices allow you to perform a brute force attack. Jailbreak requires a reboot of the device and after a reboot the encryption key for the useful data on the device is not available. If the device uses a strong passcode (as opposed to a numeric code) it cannot practically be brute forced even if you force the device to allow you to enter many attempts quickly.

This is exactly why I use an XKCD style multi-word password for my phone. TouchID/FaceID keep me from having to enter it a lot and the rapid pressing of the power button to disable it give me convenience without significant compromise.

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#103
post #26
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>The story I hear is that Cellebrite hires ex-Apple engineers and moves them to countries where Apple can't prosecute them under the DMCA or its equivalents. Crazy if true. Doesn't this also create a weird incentive problem where the FBI (or any other law enforcement agency) who would normally be tasked with helping Apple with this doesn't actually want to?

So Israel is like a high tech Guantanamo where our government goes when those pesky laws get in the way.

James Mickens said, “YOU’RE STILL GONNA BE MOSSAD’ED UPON”

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#104
post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think he got the the idea right. Yes, you need the secret key burned into the CPU to decrypt anything, and yes, you can't easily extract the keys. but his claim is that by fully restoring the flash storage (presumably where the retry counter is stored), it's possible to bypass the "erase data after 10 failed attempts" policy by constantly resetting the counter back to its original state. It might take a while (you…

> constantly resetting the counter back to its original state I wouldn't rule out some kind of electrical glitching attack.

That’s essentially the method used to bypass smart card processors.

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#105
post #45
post #13

I wish there was a kind of "dead man switch" app that would wipe a device if it is not unlocked for x days or met some other kind of personalized criteria.

Many years ago someone (possibly/probably Dan Kaminsky) suggested storing your gpg-encrypted+signed full device encryption key in the global DNS cache. If you don't do a lookup every X days, it'll expire from the cache and the drive will be unrecoverable assuming no other copies of the key exist.

> global DNS cache

No such thing exists

> If you don't do a lookup every X days, it'll expire from the cache

Requerying a cached DNS record doesn’t extend its TTL. TTL is based on when it was first added to the cache.

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#106
post #53
post #13

I wish there was a kind of "dead man switch" app that would wipe a device if it is not unlocked for x days or met some other kind of personalized criteria.

This is not exactly what you are looking for, but G Suite MDM has an "Auto Account Wipe" feature that "Automatically removes corporate account data when a device reaches a specified number of days of inactivity." Presumably, this would automatically delete your G Suite email, contact, calendar, and other data from your device. https://support.google.com/a/answer/6328708?hl=en#general

That’s not a feature implemented on device by Google, Apple built the feature explicitly to make this available to corporate customers. Same thing exists for Exchange.

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#107

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Breathalyzers are easily tampered with by police to provide false readings. One case of this in New Jersey could have potentially thrown out 20,000 DWI cases. But breathalyzer results in cases today are not thrown out after pointing this out.

It's irrelevant that breathalyzers in New Jersey were tampered with. You would need to show evidence that the breathalyzer in your specific case was tampered with. It's a basic rule of evidence...

In this case, a few breathalyzers were not calibrated correctly, but the officer responsible for testing them claimed to have done so. Now every device and calibration procedure is called into question, as their results may not be as verifiably precise as required by law. The device itself is not claimed to have been tampered with.

http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/10/20k_dwi_cases_c...

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#108
post #74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But Cellebrite apparently makes millions off of its service, so the economic incentives are still on their side.

I understand what you're saying here: why share the fact they've broken the SE for $100k when they can keep making millions. But if they cracked the SE, and kept that fact to themselves, they would be making even more money because every government on the planet would be coming to them. This is provided they kept it to themselves. It would mean a significant spike in the number of phones being cracked and people bein…

keeping it top secret and only cracking very high profile targets with the technology

Of course. The "big guns" are not to be used lightly, as the saying goes.

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#109
post #74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But Cellebrite apparently makes millions off of its service, so the economic incentives are still on their side.

I understand what you're saying here: why share the fact they've broken the SE for $100k when they can keep making millions. But if they cracked the SE, and kept that fact to themselves, they would be making even more money because every government on the planet would be coming to them. This is provided they kept it to themselves. It would mean a significant spike in the number of phones being cracked and people bein…

> This would be a statistic that would jump off the charts and trigger Apple to essentially develop a solution straight away.

How, though? If the only information Apple has is that their SE scheme is broken, how is that supposed to help them develop a solution?

Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model

#110
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Many years ago someone (possibly/probably Dan Kaminsky) suggested storing your gpg-encrypted+signed full device encryption key in the global DNS cache. If you don't do a lookup every X days, it'll expire from the cache and the drive will be unrecoverable assuming no other copies of the key exist.

> global DNS cache No such thing exists > If you don't do a lookup every X days, it'll expire from the cache Requerying a cached DNS record doesn’t extend its TTL. TTL is based on when it was first added to the cache.

You're not wrong, but it has been shown that you can store small amounts of data in open resolving dns servers.

https://github.com/benjojo/dnsfs

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