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"Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

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Re: "Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

#231

Post by KMag »

nightcracker wrote: post #226
KMag wrote: post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Non-uniformity in SHA-1 would be major news. Note that in the description below, I refer to any keyed involution as a block cipher. One may make a semantic distinction, but any keyed involution could be used as a block cipher (though, of course, most involutions would contain trivial cryptographic weaknesses). SHA-1 is based around a 160-bit unbalanced Feistel block cipher. The input in broken into blocks, where the…

Salsa/ChaCha does not halve the output and XOR it together, they add the input block to the output to get non-invertability. Salsa/ChaCha also does not have a block cipher, just an unkeyed permutation function which is applied to the key plus a constant and counter.

Thanks for the correction. Note that a couple of times I spelled Davies as Davie. Also note that after editing, my description of the Davies-Meyer addition step got mangled. The original copy is added to the result of the encryption.

Re: "Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

#233

Post by jaequery »

odammit wrote: post #230

Split brain your password storage. Another table, another database or another storage system in general. If an attacker SQL injections your database don’t go spilling every hashed or unhashed password you’ve got. I tend to store passwords in a separate keyvalue store from where my authentication identifier is (email, “username”). If someone gets into my network they need to get into my servers with the email addresse…

go a step further and you will get into key management devices like the HSMs and/or the Amazon KMS. KMS cost almost next to nothing and it is pretty neat since its a web service, especially coming from the world of $40k+ Thales/Safenet HSM devices which are a pain to deal with (backups, rehash, redundancy).

Re: "Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

#234

Post by vinchuco »

hmexx wrote: post #79

I just tried a 11 character password without special chars, that I’ve used on over 50 sites, over the last decade. It’s my password for throaway websites. Some pretty dodgy. Not in the database. Makes me feel pretty good about password security overall!

insert the mathematical joke about the half-black sheep

Re: "Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

#235

Post by Arn_Thor »

kbenson wrote: post #107

That moment when you test an old, but still highly valued and securely used, password that you think isn't super obscure but not likely to be used much and see a 4000+ count...

That moment when you test a very unique password you used to use and it's been pwned once.. GULP! Glad I stopped using that one

Re: "Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

#236

Post by dbaupp »

yarwelp_ wrote: post #70
dbaupp wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

FWIW, 'cargo install' is designed to be for distributing dev-tools, rather than for end-user tools. I believe https://github.com/japaric/trust is designed to make it very easy to publish Github Releases from CI systems.

I don't want to be distributing pre-compiled binaries because I don't want others to trust random pre-compiled binaries. The plan as I said is to get pgen into some package manager repos. Until then building from source will be the only way I will encourage anyone to get a copy of my tool.

I don't think encouraging people to download the precompiled Rust binaries and then blindly compile code downloaded from crates.io is that much different in practice to providing your binaries.

Re: "Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

#237

Post by ksenzee »

odammit wrote: post #230

Split brain your password storage. Another table, another database or another storage system in general. If an attacker SQL injections your database don’t go spilling every hashed or unhashed password you’ve got. I tend to store passwords in a separate keyvalue store from where my authentication identifier is (email, “username”). If someone gets into my network they need to get into my servers with the email addresse…

> don’t go spilling every hashed or unhashed password you’ve got.

Please don't store unhashed passwords. By now even PHP gives us the tools to do this right. You truly don't need secondary systems, or separate tables, or separate anything. Just hash the passwords.

Re: "Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

#239

Post by odammit »

ksenzee wrote: post #237
odammit wrote: post #230

Split brain your password storage. Another table, another database or another storage system in general. If an attacker SQL injections your database don’t go spilling every hashed or unhashed password you’ve got. I tend to store passwords in a separate keyvalue store from where my authentication identifier is (email, “username”). If someone gets into my network they need to get into my servers with the email addresse…

> don’t go spilling every hashed or unhashed password you’ve got. Please don't store unhashed passwords. By now even PHP gives us the tools to do this right. You truly don't need secondary systems, or separate tables, or separate anything. Just hash the passwords.

You need both.

https://www.trustedsec.com/2016/06/introduction-gpu-password...

Re: "Pwned Passwords" V2 With Half a Billion Passwords

#240

Post by grzm »

odammit wrote: post #239
ksenzee wrote: post #237

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> don’t go spilling every hashed or unhashed password you’ve got. Please don't store unhashed passwords. By now even PHP gives us the tools to do this right. You truly don't need secondary systems, or separate tables, or separate anything. Just hash the passwords.

You need both. https://www.trustedsec.com/2016/06/introduction-gpu-password...

All security decisions boil down to your threat model, doesn't it? At some point there are decreasing marginal returns with increasing security. What threat models are you satisfying with the strategies your proposing? Do you think these apply to everyone? Or even everyone who stores hashed passwords? I personally don't think so, but I'm interested in hearing about things I haven't come across yet.
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