> " Friday morning, after the hacker told us he had deleted much of Retina-X’s data, the company again said it had not been hacked. " I have to admit that, despite all the seriousness of the actual SPYware this obviously terrible company sells, that one sentence brightened up my normal depressing morning experience of reading the weekday morning news on the Internet. That's just funny.
I think this is a great example of the saying "There are two types of companies: those who have been hacked, and those who know they've been hacked"
A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
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Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
They also store extensive sensitive data and media about/from/with children with piss poor security. Is that not unambiguously bad?
Their security was bad, no doubt. I don't see how that justifies deleting their data, though.
Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
They also store extensive sensitive data and media about/from/with children with piss poor security. Is that not unambiguously bad?
Their security was bad, no doubt. I don't see how that justifies deleting their data, though.
Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#84Earlier quoted context omitted.
It should be mentioned that none of that should ever make its way into a Git repo in the first place. If a secret is committed to Git, it's compromised, period. Suck it up and generate a new secret.
only if your git is published.. I assume this is what you mean - that said: separate integration repo containing encrypted keys + separate, manual managment/configuration of the decryption process is fine for most cases. but yes, bare and in mainline and published, I will agree this is terrible. see also: http://docs.ansible.com/ansible/2.4/vault.html
Now, if your secrets are encrypted before being committed (using something like ansible vault) and the encryption key is not stored in the repo, that may be ok. However, you still need to be aware that any time you rotate that key, you also should to rotate every secret hidden behind that key.
Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#85Earlier quoted context omitted.
A better question is how can we give the owner a say without the typical owner getting pwned roughly 100% of the time? Which is what's happening on Android at the moment.
Someone invoking "personal responsibility" usually means that they try to drop their responsibilities on someone else, but for car maintenance it actually works. People know they should change tires when they are getting bald and leave brake maintenance to their mechanic unless they really know what they are doing. Anyone who gives a game access to their contacts really had it coming to them. (Disclaimer: don't own a…
I own an iPhone instead of an Android precisely because I don't want to be burdened with the task of determining if what I'm installing is or isn't going to backdoor its way into my phone. I trust that Apple will in most cases do the right thing. Maybe they won't every time, but the risk of that is less than the cost of time & energy required to play "deep dive into every fucking app I install on my phone".
Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#86How is this even possible that a 3rd party application can intercept all text messages, call history, and photos and still get published to the Android Play Store? Ins't Google supposed to be reviewing the apps?
As a regular Android user, I'll say that Android's permission model is simply awful. There's no way (in stock) to return blank data, so apps will simply shut down or silently malfunction if you refuse permissions. The grouping of permissions lumps "can portscan your network" and "run hidden in the background when your phone boots" under "Other", which you can't disable. J2ME had a more refined security model back in…
If an application won't work after I've turned off all the permissions that it shouldn't need, it simply gets uninstalled.
Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's all the more pathetic that they responded to the first hack by "obfuscating" the client-side secret, as if that could even theoretically stop any attacker with a budget of more than about an hour. Future service designers: if your client is talking directly to AWS, then your attacker will, too. Take the week to write a CRUD frontend server that enforces the policy you want.
Do you have a recommended security checklist for something like this? I remember seeing an old github repo with a bunch of good information but I cannot seem to find it and my search results are... unhelpful at best.
Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#88Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#89They stored the master key to their entire data store in a publicly distributed app? > ...we have been taking steps to enhance our data security measures. Sharing details of security measures could only serve to potentially compromise those efforts. Maybe they used ROT13 on the API key twice this time!
I can publish my public key all day long for encryption into a back-end ... and later I can only read it with my private key. So they may not have used ROT13 but it certainly looks like they used something symmetrical.
Re: A Hacker Has Wiped a Spyware Company’s Servers
#90They stored the master key to their entire data store in a publicly distributed app? > ...we have been taking steps to enhance our data security measures. Sharing details of security measures could only serve to potentially compromise those efforts. Maybe they used ROT13 on the API key twice this time!
This is a common issue, and many apps do this mistake. Another common mistake is having /.git/ available on the domain itself, often with PHP sites or backend-less SPAs this is common, giving full access to the source, including those API keys. Even major sites do this – The Hill until recently had their git repo, including API tokens and access keys for everything, publicly available.
Yeah and same for .svn and .cvs (which may happen to include your VCS credentials in that directory, too).