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Interpreting a market plunge

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Re: Interpreting a market plunge

#151
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In terms of market value, you can say a financial asset was overvalued at time X if it later decreases a lot in vale, and undervalued the other way around.

What if it does both as most assets do? Apple was worth $500B in 2012 and $300B in 2013. Does that mean it was overvalued in 2012? Or was it undervalued in 2012 because it is worth $600B in 2014?

Most assets do both because most assets, most of the time, aren't really/severely* under- or over-valued. But in general, a moving average can help in determining when they were under/over valued.

As a counter-example, an example of "extremely overvalued" in my mind would be Enron before the fall.

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sorites_paradox

EDIT: not so much "determining", but "defining" - you can only know it ex-post...

Re: Interpreting a market plunge

#152
post #84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why debt to market cap? Maybe debt to assets, debt to sales and EBITDA, but debt to market cap doesn't look very significant.

That's a fair point. But what's important is debt to something ratio (I don't know to what exactly) which neither of the first two comments on this thread seemed to make clear enough.

Fair enough.

Re: Interpreting a market plunge

#153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, I meant which economists specifically? Economists are rational economic agents similar to the people that they study. They make mistakes, but more importantly - like us - they also respond to incentives. There's an interesting set of incentives in economics departments that the physics department simply doesn't have. I might go to a physicist to fix my boiler if all the plumbers in my area were shysters.

Well, if you put it that way, I'd distrust a lot of economists. Big bank economists, stock broker economists, union economists, any lobbying group economists... have I missed any? Oddly, I more or less trust the Congressional Budget Office. I kind of trust the Fed. (They have their own lens, which you can call bias, but they have more and better data than anyone else, and they are a lot more aware of second- and thir…

"Back in the days when the Rogoff/Reinhardt “government debt/GDP in excess of 90% is really really bad” was taken seriously, the CBO produced a forecast showing that Federal debt to GDP reached 89.8% by 2022, enough to give the deficit hawks plenty of grist. But Tom Ferguson and Rob Johnson pointed out in a 2010 paper that the CBO had neglected to net out financial assets. If you did that, it took the debt/DGP ratio to a lever that the scaremongers could not depict as troublesome, 82%."

(https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/07/cbo-still-pushing-de...)

Oh look. They "forgot" not net out financial assets in a way that conveniently providid deficit hawks more 'useful' data. That's A) deceptive? or B) not deceptive? You tell me.

For the Fed their strong objections to the audit and the long series of absolutely bullshit reasons they gave in an attempt to prevent it and the data that was subsequently revealed when those objections failed paint a pretty clear picture of whose side they were really on. It was the banks that wanted that audit prevented and the data was embarrassing for them because it revealed the true extent of their bailouts.

So yeah, both institutions align ideologically with those big bank economists whom you just told me you don't trust. You're familiar with the idea of "regulatory capture" I presume? Well, dig slightly below the surface of the output of these two institutions and it gets revealed in all of its nasty glory.

I have no doubt that their ideological bias could be shifted if the center of power in Washington moved, however. The CBO and Fed could be made impartial and objective, but the idea that they are right now is laughable.

>I read your original comment as saying that we should have gone to the unions as our sole source of economic advice. I think that's a terrible idea.

I've no doubt a lot of people think that. People who would see their power diminished and those who consume their tasty kool aid alike. The fact remains that the economy is built upon people who work - rather than own - for a living and that is who unions represent. Banks represent the opposite.

When this used to be more predominant (e.g. the 1950s), the economy was performing considerably better than it is now, and if you think that the actual policy reaction to the 2008 crisis was in any way appropriate you are either smoking some heavy shit or a beneficiary.

Re: Interpreting a market plunge

#154

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, I meant which economists specifically? Economists are rational economic agents similar to the people that they study. They make mistakes, but more importantly - like us - they also respond to incentives. There's an interesting set of incentives in economics departments that the physics department simply doesn't have. I might go to a physicist to fix my boiler if all the plumbers in my area were shysters.

> Economists are rational economic agents similar to the people that they study. Neither economists nor the people they study are rational economic agents, as the economists that use empiricism rather than trying to bash the observations to fit neat preconceived theoretical frameworks would probably recognize.

A key plank of neoclassical economics - taught in every econ 101 class - is that "people respond to incentives". Do you disagree with that? Coz I think most of what they teach is bullshit and even I don't disagree with that.

I don't see any reason why economists wouldn't respond to incentives too. They're people just like us, no? Perhaps not always 100% rational, but a close enough approximation.

Re: Interpreting a market plunge

#155

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Economists are rational economic agents similar to the people that they study. Neither economists nor the people they study are rational economic agents, as the economists that use empiricism rather than trying to bash the observations to fit neat preconceived theoretical frameworks would probably recognize.

A key plank of neoclassical economics - taught in every econ 101 class - is that "people respond to incentives". Do you disagree with that? Coz I think most of what they teach is bullshit and even I don't disagree with that . I don't see any reason why economists wouldn't respond to incentives too. They're people just like us, no? Perhaps not always 100% rational, but a close enough approximation.

> A key plank of neoclassical economics - taught in every econ 101 class - is that "people respond to incentives".

That people are “rational actors” is, indeed, a central tenet of neoclassical economics, but it is more “people respond to incentives”; it specifies exactly how people respond to incentives; the rational actor model holds that people behave so as to optimize the output of their own utility function as if they had perfect knowledge of the available options and the net utility of each.

Of course, that idea is at best a very loose approximation and, at worst — as behavioral economists tend to see it — a dogma that tends to lead people away from analysis and application of the available information on how people actually behave, which is very consistently at odds with the rational actor model.

Re: Interpreting a market plunge

#156

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Mostly on the basis that it is the only way they can justify to clients/viewers/etc to "not have seen it." One would very reasonably conclude that the failure of banks/regulators/analysts to see any of this would likely be a good sign that they prob. don't really know what they are talking about, and predicting the market is actually kinda impossible, and consequently the value they add to their clients is minimal/no…

I think it goes like this. The memory of a crisis fades over time - especially the emotional memory of how it felt to wonder if the world was ending. So the longer time since the last crisis, the less cautious people are. You can think of this as a system with gain. As time passes, people are willing to take more risks, which corresponds to the gain going up. That's fine... until the gain exceeds unity. Then there's…

Well, not so sure this is a virtue of the regulatory system -- mind you at the time there were a ton of regulations contributing to system instability (like laws preventing interstate banking). Can also be said about this crisis: Had regulators not been so thoroughly captured, there's an argument to be made that banks would be a lot more alert to these sorts of systemic risks.

Re: Interpreting a market plunge

#157

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A key plank of neoclassical economics - taught in every econ 101 class - is that "people respond to incentives". Do you disagree with that? Coz I think most of what they teach is bullshit and even I don't disagree with that . I don't see any reason why economists wouldn't respond to incentives too. They're people just like us, no? Perhaps not always 100% rational, but a close enough approximation.

> A key plank of neoclassical economics - taught in every econ 101 class - is that "people respond to incentives". That people are “rational actors” is, indeed, a central tenet of neoclassical economics, but it is more “people respond to incentives”; it specifies exactly how people respond to incentives; the rational actor model holds that people behave so as to optimize the output of their own utility function as if…

Nonetheless I don't see much that is irrational about the way economists actually behave in aggregate. I think they more or less rationally response to the incentives they are given.

The controversy surrounds what those incentives actually are.

Other people (e.g. gamblers) perhaps not so much.

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