Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

cse.umich.edu

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

21–30 of 52 posts

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#21

Post by Derferman »

The Open Voting Consortium is working on an open-source solution that uses everyday PCs and printers instead of these ridiculously expensive voting machines. Their solution[1] is actually paper-based, allowing for increased accountability and transparency. The source is available here[2] although the project hasn't seen activity in quite some time, so I am not sure of the status of the code base.

[1]: http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/our_solution [2]: http://sourceforge.net/projects/evm2003/

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#23

Post by aristus »

yummyfajitas wrote: post #13
dandelany wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know that we're opposed to it in theory, it's just that every single implementation thus far has been terrifically bad. Making the code open source would go a long way, I think, as would establishing open working groups to establish security standards. I may be an optimist, but I do believe that theoretically (at least information-theoretically[1]), it can be done well. [1] http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q…

It's also fairly easy for us techies to grasp the hacking of computer systems. But we often forget how insecure and error prone paper systems can also be: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJfj9ySYg0Q Massive voter fraud could be happening every election - it's pretty easy to vote fraudulently and there is almost no way to find out after the fact (I've done it unintentionally). For whatever reason, we are insanely afrai…

We're more concerned about electronic voting because it lowers the effort and manpower needed to defraud immensely.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#24

Post by biafra »

dandelany wrote: post #19
seldo wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I do not. As long as the hardware has been in possession of untrusted parties (and polling place workers do not count as trusted) any software solution can be compromised.

I'm not convinced that any method will ever be 100% foolproof, but I think it can be improved immensely, and if we could limit the inaccuracies/fraud to always be less than those incurred by a traditional paper ballot[1], I think I'd approve. In regards to your comment regarding untrusted parties handling the hardware, here are a few counterpoints: - We already trust polling place workers with paper ballots, the poss…

"We already trust polling place workers with paper ballots, the possibility for fraud already exists."

I don't know about the US, but here in Germany _anyone_ can watch the whole process including the counting of the votes.

So it is possible for me to check up on my polling place.

With the current paper ballot system you need a lot of people to cheat significantly. With voting computers you need only a really tiny number of people to steal an election.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#25

Post by russell »

reitzensteinm wrote: post #7
indrax wrote: post #3

Now make it so you have to eat the ghost labeled as the candidate you want to vote for, and it records the vote. I might actually go to the polls.

Alternatively, a 1 minute quiz on the constitution and/or your countries system of governance. Get all the answers right and you can vote!

Half a century ago, literacy tests and trick questions were widely used to keep blacks from voting. That's why it's illegal to do so now.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#26

Post by jasonjei »

yummyfajitas wrote: post #14
jasonjei wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the issue is the difficulty of auditing electronic votes. Computers and databases have made it so easy to forge data--just look at Bernie Madoff. The best way to ameliorate these discomforts is to ensure that a list of eligible voters is made available every year (already available under the current system), as well as a list and sum total of those eligible that voted. We would need to assign every voter a UU…

At least two obvious ways to hack your proposed system. Hackers could just add phony UUID/vote pairs to the totals. Activists could claim their vote was stolen if their preferred candidate loses. (We already saw a variant of the latter in 2000. Remember "I couldn't follow the arrow and accidentally voted buchanan"?). Further, if a person's vote is verifiable, it also opens the door to paying people for their votes.

I can't think of a fix for paying people for their votes since that problem still exists today (albeit to a lesser extent than if a voter's vote were verifiable), but I imagine they wouldn't be able to keep it under wraps for very long. Anyone offering to pay money will definitely risk drawing attention to themselves, and I believe ethical people will report suspicious people to voting investigators.

As far as the UUID/pair frauds, we could mail a confirmation letter to the voters stating that they voted. Since I don't think we could tie the UUID to the actual voter, we could tell them they participated in this year's election and to verify the results to the receipt. This part is compounded in difficulty partly due to federal voting regulations that don't allow us to tie a voter to his votes, so I think the only real way is to verify videotapes verifying that said voters appeared in person to vote.

Again there are flaws and it will take more people to resolve the issues with electronic voting.

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#27

Post by chadgeidel »

dandelany wrote: post #19
seldo wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I do not. As long as the hardware has been in possession of untrusted parties (and polling place workers do not count as trusted) any software solution can be compromised.

I'm not convinced that any method will ever be 100% foolproof, but I think it can be improved immensely, and if we could limit the inaccuracies/fraud to always be less than those incurred by a traditional paper ballot[1], I think I'd approve. In regards to your comment regarding untrusted parties handling the hardware, here are a few counterpoints: - We already trust polling place workers with paper ballots, the poss…

Certainly we trust the polling workers with paper ballots, and fraud exists there, but IMHO the ease of electronic fraud is much greater than the ease of paper ballot fraud. I'm thinking of the work involved with ballot stuffing - you basically can turn it into a "one click" operation.

(Speaking only of the US voting system)

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#29

Post by electromagnetic »

seldo wrote: post #8

It is one of the curious facts of modern culture that the people who love technology the most also seem to be the most opposed to electronic voting. I think it's because the people who most understand how computers work also understand that no data can be considered trustworthy if somebody else has been in possession of the hardware. Yet governments continue to trust the impossible promises of the people who make vot…

Well firstly these machines should have been riveted shut, leaving the only way to access the machine is by breaking the tamper-seals. (This at least eliminates everyone in the country without corresponding replacement tamper-seals from screwing around inside the machines)

Secondly, the OS on these devices should have been stored into ROM; not only is this a bastard way of ensuring people have to use the manufacturer to upgrade the systems, but it also makes tampering that much more of a pain in the ass.

Thirdly a proprietary data storage should have been used. Preferably one designed so that the voting machines only ever contain a write-only drive, in that it either cannot edit the data, or preferably doesn't even have the necessary hardware to read the data it writes (this would be complicated to get working right, but would be well worth it). This means only the manufacturer would have access to the edit/read connections.

I mean come on, compact flash, seriously. My phone can read flash drives, what were the designers thinking!

Re: Install PAC-MAN on Sequoia voting machine w/o breaking tamper-evident seals

#30

Post by Tichy »

seldo wrote: post #15
dandelany wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know that we're opposed to it in theory, it's just that every single implementation thus far has been terrifically bad. Making the code open source would go a long way, I think, as would establishing open working groups to establish security standards. I may be an optimist, but I do believe that theoretically (at least information-theoretically[1]), it can be done well. [1] http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q…

I do not. As long as the hardware has been in possession of untrusted parties (and polling place workers do not count as trusted) any software solution can be compromised.

I don't think that is necessarily true. Perhaps a public key scheme could be derived that would enable everybody to verify the votes on their home PC.

The challenge is to allow for anonymous voting. I don't think it is necessarily a problem that is impossible to solve. Practical solutions are also a challenge.

Post reply on HN