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> Claiming you're on windows while actually running on a Linux VM, your TCP fingerprint gives it away This is interesting, I’d not heard of this approach. What’s the technique for generating such a fingerprint?
http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/p0f3/
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I think this is a good example of "poisoning the well" in practice, and I was in a similar position as you describe when I was working in incident response at a consumer bank a few years ago. That said, this is a very particular scenario, and I don't think you can generalize the effectiveness of the technique from this example. In situations where attackers are looking for boolean responses, i.e. to verify email addr…
Man. I really like that idea, but is giving a random "success" to a supposed credit card charge PCI compliant?
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Your comment is why I feel automating engineers would be very hard. Cat and mouse game sounds like it requires a human... and a cat... and a mouse...
GANs are an automated ‘cat and mouse game’ https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generative_adversarial_netwo...
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In my experience, the most effective counter measure to scraping is not to block, but rather to poison the well. When you detect a scraper - through what ever means - you don't block it, as that would tip it off that you are on to it. Instead you begin feeding plausible, but wrong data (like, add a random number to price). This will usually cause much more damage to the scraper than blocking would. Depending on your…
That only works if the scrapers are either in a country where you can do something about it. Also poisoning only works for a while. As soon as they detect the poisoning, they can easily figure out what tripped the scraping detection, and now you need to poison in an even more subtle way because the scrapers know what to look for. You can't win this game. Especially the "obvious" type of browser checks, where you can…