31–40 of 132 posts
Taking the opposite side side of the argument, good UX only matters for inexperienced employees. People that mindlessly click are going to mindlessly click "yes" on the confirmation dialog
I've been "arguing" with people here as to what a better interface would look like, and it's interesting at how much disagreement there is. A lot (like too many) seem to think adding a yes/no dialog box would make things better, but it's well known users don't read dialog boxes. My preference would be a mcDonald's menu style UI, showing the text that will be sent in a 6x5 grid of buttons. Easy to press; easy to see w…
The system should start with two options: test vs. real alert, which open up separate menus. Those menus should be visually distinct (e.g., different color background, options for former all end in (TEST)".
Bad UX? There's no UX at all (and on that matter - please stop selling your UX position to companies).
At each level, people with grave responsibilities did not take their responsibility seriously enough. From the top to the bottom. Button-pusher: obviously. Interface designer: clearly. Manager responsible for project: also The manager's manager: yes The whole department head: how is this person making decisions? The people who set the budgets and procedures: How do they know that work is being done well enough? Vern…
Moreover, there is another dimension in that inertia in the org structure itself can't be pinned on any one person. Organizations by their very nature are supposed to be tolerant of changes and gaps in the knowledge of their members. This tolerance leads to inertia. the Inertia of the military is extreme and difficult to change. The more abstraction between the leader and the actual work, the more difficult it is to evaluate and enact the right change in the right way in the right timeframe.
So, while your comment may in essence be right that there is a chain of command failure around this issue, it also strains credibility to claim that this failure belongs to Obama, one year into his successor's presidency, when the structure that this event took place in is much older than either of them.
There was a very similar incident in 1971 ("code word hatefulness"). Back then, three tapes were kept next to a EBS transmitter, two real alerts and one for testing. One day, an operator accidentally loaded the real alert rather than the correct test alert, and many stations prepared to tell the country the nuclear war was imminent. The fix was to: > …In the past three tapes, one for the test and two for actual emerg…
It's similar to the "A gun is always loaded" principle. Unless you can tell at a glance that a firearm is not in a ready-to-fire state, you treat it as if it is. People are clumsy and forgetful, and you only have to mess up once.
Leaving the live rounds right next to the blanks, in that way, is pretty indefensible. (Ignoring of course that blanks can still kill, for this analogy.)
> Ige, in his speech, deplored the fact that employees of the emergency management agency were getting death threats since the events of Saturday. Sounds like they need to prosecute some people for terroristic threats to the fullest extent of the law. I understand being pissed off about the false alarm, but sending death threats should be an automatic jail sentence at minimum.
The design of this system is grossly negligent, which IS a management problem. It does look like a web page. How is the page served? An internal secure setup on a private network? Is the browser ever updated? Is there javascript? The number of failure modes on this type of setup is unconstrained. How are updates tested? It appears to me that somebody just put something together without any design or validation process at all. This is fine in many settings, but not for critical public safety infrastructure.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why do you see that as terrorism?
Because that's literally the law: > TERRORISTIC THREAT > > (a) A person commits an offense if he threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to: > > 2. place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury;
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because that's literally the law: > TERRORISTIC THREAT > > (a) A person commits an offense if he threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to: > > 2. place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury;
The operator did not threaten to commit violence.
There was a very similar incident in 1971 ("code word hatefulness"). Back then, three tapes were kept next to a EBS transmitter, two real alerts and one for testing. One day, an operator accidentally loaded the real alert rather than the correct test alert, and many stations prepared to tell the country the nuclear war was imminent. The fix was to: > …In the past three tapes, one for the test and two for actual emerg…
It's as if we lived in a world where bridges have been built for decades with structural engineers as optional, rather than required by building code. If your project had a budget for a structural engineer, you hired one, but if not, fine, you just had your construction contractor do their best.
And so now a bridge just collapsed again (fortunately everyone got off in time) and we're talking about how we really ought to design bridges better, but no one is suggesting the obvious, that we legislate building codes that require structural engineers as part of the bridge-building process.
I know this is a controversial idea, as it opens up the question of UX design certification and licensure (if you require UX for critical infrastructure, what are the qualifications?), which can lead to all sorts of unintended consequences of gatekeeping, exclusion, and administrative bloat. But I think Hawaii makes it clear that the status quo is unsafe and unsustainable.