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A proof-of-concept system for counter-surveillance against spy drones

wired.com

11–20 of 71 posts

Re: A proof-of-concept system for counter-surveillance against spy drones

#11
post #3

>In other words, they can see what the drone sees, pulling out their recognizable pattern from the radio signal, even without breaking the drone's encrypted video. The most interesting part of this is how encrypted traffic leaks enough info to be reliably analyzed. Really cool stuff.

The key insight is that the drone should store the video to local storage for later (1) recovery or (2) buffered encrypted transmission to the mother ship which would eliminate the leakage of clues about what subject is being spied upon.

Buffered transmission is unlikely to help; after all, the surveillance target could store the received stream and look for patterns - it would only delay detection for the length of the buffer (which often would need to be kept short due to the real-time nature of much surveillance.

Granted, you could obfuscate things by varying the buffer length and padding the data stream (as suggested near the end of the article) - but at some point, a high-value surveillance target will probably just assume that a nearby drone is probably not operated by an avid bird-watcher or something like that and just blast the drone out of the sky. (Preferably using a laser or better still lots and lots of microwave RF - tends to get the surroundings less aggravated than using a shotgun...)

Re: A proof-of-concept system for counter-surveillance against spy drones

#13
post #11
post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The key insight is that the drone should store the video to local storage for later (1) recovery or (2) buffered encrypted transmission to the mother ship which would eliminate the leakage of clues about what subject is being spied upon.

Buffered transmission is unlikely to help; after all, the surveillance target could store the received stream and look for patterns - it would only delay detection for the length of the buffer (which often would need to be kept short due to the real-time nature of much surveillance. Granted, you could obfuscate things by varying the buffer length and padding the data stream (as suggested near the end of the article)…

>Granted, you could obfuscate things by varying the buffer length and padding the data stream

Or maybe sending the blocks out of order to be reconstructed according to a shared ordering key?

Re: A proof-of-concept system for counter-surveillance against spy drones

#15
post #7

What's really interesting to me here is the watermarking part of this. I imagine a future where everybody has little IR pins on their shoulder and phones scanning encrypted traffic for their watermark...

This would be the second-greatest antiprivacy device ever. Just behind the mobile phone.

Re: A proof-of-concept system for counter-surveillance against spy drones

#18
post #7

What's really interesting to me here is the watermarking part of this. I imagine a future where everybody has little IR pins on their shoulder and phones scanning encrypted traffic for their watermark...

it doesn't work if everybody's doing it. your pin's flashing will get drowned out in the noise of everyone else's pin.

Re: A proof-of-concept system for counter-surveillance against spy drones

#19
My tl;dr understanding: Drones send video back to operator. Video is typically compressed so that it only updates part of the picture that have changed. Even if the video is encrypted, the researchers are able to measure the bitrate. Thus when the researchers make a significant change like putting a board against a window, and seeing if the traffic increases, the researchers can determine whether the drone is looking at that window.

Re: A proof-of-concept system for counter-surveillance against spy drones

#20

My tl;dr understanding: Drones send video back to operator. Video is typically compressed so that it only updates part of the picture that have changed. Even if the video is encrypted, the researchers are able to measure the bitrate. Thus when the researchers make a significant change like putting a board against a window, and seeing if the traffic increases, the researchers can determine whether the drone is looking…

I'm assuming this is predicated on the drone being absolutely still and that nothing in the scene (leaves on trees) is moving? Is that even realistic?
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