Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
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Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#2Section 5.1 (page 4) describes new rules for US CBP searches:
“Officers may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely. Officers will either request that the traveler disable connnectivity to any remote network…”
Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#3Section 5.3 pertains to requesting passcodes, and that an Officer may ask you for the passcode (I don't see anything about individuals being obligated -- though see 5.3.4, which could be interpreted by "legal remedies"). However, section 5.3.3 says:
> If an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the Officer may, in accordance with section 5.4 below, detain the device pending a determination as to its admissibility, exclusion, or other disposition.
Section 5.4 elaborates further.
Also, I found 5.1.2 interesting:
> Officers may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely. To avoid retrieving or accessing information stored remotely and not otherwise present on the device, Officers will either request that the traveler disable connectivity to any network (e.g. by placing the device in airplane mode), or, where warranted by national security, law enforcement, officer safety, or other operational considerations, Officers will themselves disable network connectivity.
Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#4The number of searches has increased quite a bit from 2016 to 2017
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-rele...
Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#5Section 5.3 pertains to requesting passcodes, and that an Officer may ask you for the passcode (I don't see anything about individuals being obligated -- though see 5.3.4, which could be interpreted by "legal remedies"). However, section 5.3.3 says: > If an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the Officer may, in accordance with secti…
> Officers may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely.
Probably until some court rules that a client making the information seem local to facilitate access is legally equivalent to having that information local (and hence not under protection of 5.1.2).
Most likely followed later by some other ruling that a browser can be considered such a client.
Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#6So what do we do if the CBP asks us to hand our devices over? Is there any way we can tell them to fly a kite?
Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#7We really need a definitive SCOTUS ruling that searches of electronic devices violate the Constitution but if course we will never get that far. The intent of border searches originally was to identify goods being brought into the country to avoid paying duties or fees or being brought in illegally. Searching an electronic device is more akin to demanding to see what words are on a piece of paper you have in your pocket. Obviously the reason to search electronic devices is for political purposes like finding terrorists or illegal porn which is not what the Constitution is talking about.
Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#8The best way is not to travel with anything that is not needed.
Use cloud services and a disposable OS.
The best way to play their (CBP) game is not to play. Don’t have anything available for them.
Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#9Section 5.1 (page 4) describes new rules for US CBP searches: “Officers may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely. Officers will either request that the traveler disable connnectivity to any remote network…”
So it sounds like a workaround is to avoid storing any data locally on the device. I wonder how effective that would be in practice. It might raise some suspicion if you unlocked your phone and they discovered you were logged out of everything, and there was nothing on the phone.
Re: Border Search of Electronic Devices – CBP Directive [pdf]
#10Section 5.3 pertains to requesting passcodes, and that an Officer may ask you for the passcode (I don't see anything about individuals being obligated -- though see 5.3.4, which could be interpreted by "legal remedies"). However, section 5.3.3 says: > If an officer is unable to complete an inspection of an electronic device because it is protected by a passcode or encryption, the Officer may, in accordance with secti…
> Officers may not intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely. Probably until some court rules that a client making the information seem local to facilitate access is legally equivalent to having that information local (and hence not under protection of 5.1.2). Most likely followed later by some other ruling that a browser can be considered such a client.
Doesn't 5.1.2 mean that the device would be without network access throughout the search (regardless of what information is meant to be protected as stored remotely)?