Yes, it's partly about comparing the security model of CSPRNGs to the security model of ciphers (and I think some of the CSPRNG constructions are extremely closely related to popular ciphers and hash functions). Part of the argument is that a cipher can encrypt an extremely large amount of data under the same key, and in the same way a CSPRNG can create an extremely large amount of pseudorandom output from a small seed. In some cases, deriving the internal state of the CSPRNG from observed outputs should be as difficult as deriving the secret key of a cipher from observed ciphertext or from known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Maybe tptacek can do another go-round on this topic and make this more explicit (because he certainly still gets frustrated about people's intuitions when it comes up).
There was something either in that piece or in another one by another crypto expert saying that if we don't believe that CSPRNGs have this security property, we shouldn't believe in the symmetric ciphers that we use them to generate key material for either, because they are constructed using the same kinds of techniques.
I also don't remember what Matthew Green disagreed with Thomas about here.