The Winkofloss brothers stores their codes right to prevent these type of kidnappings. They distributed the keys across states and bank vaults.
Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
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Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#42I raised this concern in a comment last week. We are going to see more instances of this. Remember how in the movies they break into a bank manager's house and hold the family captive while someone goes with the manager to open the bank vault? Same thing is inevitably going to happen IRL. I always say exchangers are Bitcoins weakest link. All it takes is one compromised employee at Coinbase or another large exchanger…
2018 will be an interesting year for decentralized exchanges and atomic swaps.
Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
The mathematical basis for multisig wallets is explicitly resistant to rubber-hose cryptanalysis, if the keys are distributed sensibly (e.g. with one going off to a counter party in a different political regime who can’t be compelled by the same state-actors as you to share keys.)
The best way to not get your car stoken is to leave the engine in a warehouse in Germany, the chassis in a car park in Brazil and the rest in your garage in California. That's super secure but how do you use it every day?
Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#44I raised this concern in a comment last week. We are going to see more instances of this. Remember how in the movies they break into a bank manager's house and hold the family captive while someone goes with the manager to open the bank vault? Same thing is inevitably going to happen IRL. I always say exchangers are Bitcoins weakest link. All it takes is one compromised employee at Coinbase or another large exchanger…
How many of these kidnappings are going to be faked to provide cover for a theft? It's exactly the thing I would do.
Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#45Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
Or you can use the strengths of cryptocurrency and split a key between a safe deposit box, your home, and yourself, and require 2 of 3 of them to get the original key.
That definitely helps against many scenarios, but "home and yourself" means you're still in immediate control of funds while you're at home, so you're still vulnerable to armed robbery. You want to make it so your answer to the robber is "I can't, the bank's not open."
Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#47Earlier quoted context omitted.
How many of these kidnappings are going to be faked to provide cover for a theft? It's exactly the thing I would do.
"We've been hacked" has been a cover for exchanges stealing funds for years now.
Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#48The Winkofloss brothers stores their codes right to prevent these type of kidnappings. They distributed the keys across states and bank vaults.
winklevoss? Distributing keys doesn't prevent you from having a few "digits" (no pun intended) removed. "Oh you can't get them? Call the other key-holders. Better hope they like your fingers as much as you do."
Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#49So it appears criminals are getting wiser and a new wave of home and personal robberies may emerge. Will this push crypto owners to entrust their currency with more secure institutions, leading to these "decentralized" currencies to be once again under control and manipulated by banks and governments?
Re: Exmo Bitcoin exchange chief executive kidnapped in Kiev
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
You should rather xor it with two other random keys.
I don't think I follow you, could you please explain what you mean a bit further?
Rather you have a private key p of n bytes. Create two cryptographically random keys k1 and k2 of n bytes each. Derive a key k3=(p XOR k1) XOR k2. k1, k2 and k3 are your distributed keys. To recompute p you need to do p = (k3 XOR k2) XOR k1.
A XOR is trivial to implement and I would expect be reasonably robust.