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Gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

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Re: Gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

#111

Earlier quoted context omitted.

FWIW, I now advocate Approval Voting because a) superior election integrity prospects and b) nearly ideal fairness. Score Voting and Instant Runoff Voting are a bit more fair than Approval Voting, but much more difficult to implement, execute, audit, describe / educate, etc.

Approval voting and score voting are problematic for reasons standard analyses overlook; there's no obvious mapping from actual preferences to ballot markings. Ranked preference ballots don't have this problem (well, unforced ranking that allows ties doesn't, forced rankings do, but to the degree that approval and score voting do.) Both scores and approvals are ambiguous in meaning and different people with the exact…

I supported instant runoff voting until I figured out that it's difficult to explain, implement, audit. Pretty much all the reasons election administrators dislike it.

Approval Voting seems like the best compromise between fairness and simplicity (to better ensure election integrity).

Re: Gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

#112

Dammit. For some years now I have been pointing out to people who would listen that what we need are policy solutions rooted in mathematical analysis, my go to case being gerrymandering. It seemed quite obvious that we could use geometric smoothing to set district boundaries based on census data to remove people from the process and therefore gerrymandering. Guess I had an untested assumption which wasn’t true, which…

Removing people from the process doesn't remove gerrymandering, it means that the gerrymandering will be done by analyzing the short and long-term (based on demographic trends) effects of different mathematical criteria, with partisan actors legislating the most advantageous criteria. You eliminate gerrymandering by eliminating single-member FPTP legislative districts in favor of multimeter districts with a system pr…

You don't eliminate gerrymandering in that way. You limit it.

STV works best in limited magnitude districts (three or five seems to be preferred) or else the number of options becomes too difficult for humans to express a coherent useful and accurate set of preferences. Once you limit magnitude, you can draw your districts to benefit you. For instance, perhaps you'll discover a preference for two or four seaters in reasonably strong Democrat areas and three seaters in reasonably strong Republican areas. You need fifty percent plus one to get a majority of seats in an odd numbered district, but fifty percent plus one only gets you fifty percent of the seats in an even numbered district. I can imagine Americans spending huge amounts of political capital for years getting STV in, only to discover that one party still has a manufactured majority because they wasted votes efficiently.

Its true that gerrymanders per se become harder and harder the higher the magnitude, but if your problem is you have a political system that is opposed to hearing the will of the people they're going to find a way to stuff their ears no matter what voting system you pick.

(Aside: Open list PR is both candidate centred and party-list. You vote for Fred Nurk of the Purple Party. That helps the Purple Party win more seats, and it moves Fred Nurk up in the list. It seems to be the only tick-a-box election system which doesn't devolve into FPTP in a district magnitude of 1 so it might be appealing in the US, where several states only elect a single representative. e.g. You vote for Gregory Hsien of the Maroon Party, who stands in a group with Josephine Yusuf of the Red Party. The Red-Maroon group win one more vote than the Blue-Cyan group even though the Blue party got more votes than the Red party. Reds win because you voted for their ally, the Maroons.)

Re: Gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

#113
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I very much agree with this. What gerrymandering (and partisan voter suppression) does, is reduce the number of competitive districts in the country. Next year, the expected number of competitive House districts is 23 to 38 - out of 450! So, in over 400 districts, primaries are the only thing that matters. On the other hand, primaries attract more motivated voters than the general. And those motivated voters tend to…

But if this process is as you describe, won't the moderate voters eventually start electing independent candidates?

The problem is that this process drags aside the two parties to the point where moderate voters in each are further away from each other than they are from extremists in their own party. More specifically, the other party becomes less acceptable - e.g. most people who voted for Moore in Alabama didn't really like him, but they couldn't fathom voting for his opponent, because of his position on one or the other wedge issue (e.g. abortion).

Re: Gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

#114
post #84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can hardly do MMP in America. Several states have only one or two seats, where MMP would be equivalent to FPTP or block vote - a significant step back.

You'd need to do it on the national level, not state. Our parties transcend state boundaries anyway, and House was always supposed to be representing people as a whole; the states have the Senate for their representation as entities.

I dunno, I'm just trying to play with the rules that exist. There's a dubious federal law designed to ensure minority representation which seems to prohibit proportional representation, but seeing as it so abjectly fails to achieve its goals it may have no grounds to stand on. A state which thought democracy was a good idea and might be useful trying in the US[] could unilaterally introduce a bill and it may succeed in the courts. But it's unthinkable that you could get enough states to pass an amendment to the constitution to abolish state-based districts without an experiment in proportional voting in the US first.

[]: I don't mean to say FPTP is undemocratic - Canada is plainly democratic - just that America isn't democratic in much the same way one says Russia isn't democratic. If the government is intent on not hearing the will of the people, it will find a way.

Re: Gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

#115

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The root cause is Duverger's Law https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law TL;DR: With FPTP, each belligerent tries to form the smallest winning coalition, resulting in a near even split two-party system. Proportional Representation is the remedy for assemblies, councils, houses. Approval voting is the remedy for executive races (eg sheriff, mayor, governor). Additional benefits of both PR and Approval Voting: -…

Duverger's law isn't the whole picture. Normal FPTP assemblies the size of America's have third parties (see Canada, UK, India). Some PR countries have strong two party systems (see most obviously Malta). There is something additional in America that causes a two party system which may or may not continue past a switch to PR because we don't know what it is. Also, it is good to specify your goals. You might want to m…

While there are a few minor examples of Plurality Voting countries escaping duoploy, they are by far the exception. America's duopoly seems clearly a result of using it.

I wrote something about this. https://asitoughttobe.com/2010/07/18/score-voting/

Re: Gerrymandering with geographically compact districts

#116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The root cause is Duverger's Law https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duverger%27s_law TL;DR: With FPTP, each belligerent tries to form the smallest winning coalition, resulting in a near even split two-party system. Proportional Representation is the remedy for assemblies, councils, houses. Approval voting is the remedy for executive races (eg sheriff, mayor, governor). Additional benefits of both PR and Approval Voting: -…

Proportional representation just shifts the coalition building from the electorate level to the legislative level. It's well known that such coalitions tend to be the smallest majority possible. You may think for various reasons that it's better to form coalitions at one level of the voting process than the other, but let's not pretend PR avoids it.

PR mostly nullifies Gerrymandering.
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