Surely I'm reading this wrong. Does the whole thing depend on users trusting that the nodes run the correct software, which uses these "enclaves" to hide private data from itself?
MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
121–130 of 258 posts
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#122Stellar is run by a set of trusted third parties, which makes it permissioned. If it gains any sort of traction, it will undoubtedly come under the control of any number of governments, thus negating the "peer-to-peer" part of cryptocurrency, and making usage conditioned on approval from some set of intermediaries.
It's not run by "a set of trusted third parties".
It's run by SETS of trusted third parties, where each individual node specifies what set of nodes it trusts to not collude against it.
You don't need any ones permission to run a node, but it is up to other nodes if they want to trust you
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#123Wow. MM is really going all-in on for Software Guard Extensions (secure enclave) on the server. What does HN say? Do we trust Intel (motivation and implementation) that much?
Any remote-attestation scheme is theoretically vulnerable to attacks where the CPU manufacturer includes backdoors in the processor hardware (either deliberately, accidentally, or under compulsion from a third party). Intel's implementation is considerably worse than that. Even if you assume the hardware itself isn't compromised, every remote attestation has to go through the "Intel Attestation Service" which has no…
So you can not start running any code session on the SGX at ALL without this Remote Attestation call to Intel? That seems silly, considering the SGX has two 128 bit keys on board (one known to Intel, and one known only to the SGX).
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#124> The currency is designed to utilize an Intel processor component known as Software Guard Extensions, or a "secure enclave."
Binding yourself to an implementation like this seems like mega big centralization. There's several decentralized coins that could solve some of these same problems.
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#125Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is significantly stronger and harder than what that paper suggested
In what way? I mean this (Mobile Coin) is almost the very definition of vapourware. A 4 page whitepaper, come on.
Yes i also find this high school level white paper pretty weird. Also no roadmap, no github, only 3 person team.
But Moxie Marlinspike though...
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#126An no word about price volatility? Even if btc were scalable it is unusable for commerce. Pegging to fiat should be #1 goal of a new blockchain that wants to solve problem. All others arejust sophisticated gambling platforms.
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#127Earlier quoted context omitted.
Tell us all about all the problems Lightning Network fixes once it is actually implemented.
I'm not sure if you're trying to imply that Lightning Network is vaporware, but there are currently three implementations that pass the integration tests: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning https://github.com/ACINQ/eclair https://cdecker.github.io/lightning-integration/
Not vaporware but vaporidea. They never solved incentive model to open channel so it is more like real software no one will touch.
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#128Earlier quoted context omitted.
Any remote-attestation scheme is theoretically vulnerable to attacks where the CPU manufacturer includes backdoors in the processor hardware (either deliberately, accidentally, or under compulsion from a third party). Intel's implementation is considerably worse than that. Even if you assume the hardware itself isn't compromised, every remote attestation has to go through the "Intel Attestation Service" which has no…
So you can not start running any code session on the SGX at ALL without this Remote Attestation call to Intel? That seems silly, considering the SGX has two 128 bit keys on board (one known to Intel, and one known only to the SGX).
Oh, it's not quite that bad. You can run SGX code and work with encrypted data, including generating attestation messages. It's just that there's no way to verify those attestation messages yourself; you have to ask Intel to do it.
It's also worth noting that SGX can run in two modes. There's "debug mode", which provides absolutely no security because a debugger has complete access to the state of the enclave. And then there's "release mode", which requires a key that you can only obtain by signing a commercial agreement and NDA with Intel.
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#129Earlier quoted context omitted.
I still think it's an interesting approach. If you want to be more efficient and less wasteful than Bitcoin, at some point trust has to come into play. And reducing your trust to the manufacturers of secure enclaves (whose products can also be audited to a degree) is surely an improvement still, even if it doesn't have the radical threat model of conventional cryptocurrencies (which inevitably run into scaling proble…
Bitcoin uses proof-of-work for its consensus system, but not all cryptocurrencies do. Bitcoin is a technological wonder, but it's ultimately not as advanced as its younger brethren. The Stellar Consensus Protocol, which MobileCoin say they're using, uses something more akin to a web of trust rather than proof-of-work. You do not need the SGX to get rid of proof-of-work.
> Bitcoin is a technological wonder
Oh, dear lord.
> ultimately not as advanced as its younger brethren.
These must then be simply out of this world. Superwonder technologies. Double digit transactions per second!! /$
The hype around this piece of software is getting out of hand.
Re: MobileCoin: A New Cryptocurrency from Moxie Marlinspike
#130Surely I'm reading this wrong. Does the whole thing depend on users trusting that the nodes run the correct software, which uses these "enclaves" to hide private data from itself?
The nodes can prove that they are running the correct software using SGX.