The FastMail Security Mindset
blog.fastmail.com
The FastMail Security Mindset
1–10 of 301 posts
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#2> Just as important as what we do do is what we don’t. For example, we don’t do full message encryption (e.g. PGP) in the browser. In theory it means you “don’t have to trust us”. However in reality, every time you open your email you would be trusting the code delivered to your browser. If the server were compromised, it could easily be made to return code that intercepted and sent back your password next time you logged in; it could even just do this for specific users. It is very unlikely that a user would notice.
I don't agree.
I don't want full message encryption because I'm afraid that my email provider is reading my messages, but because I'm storing years worth of emails in my mailbox. With a provider such as ProtonMail that encrypts incoming messages with my personal key I know that if someone manages to get unauthorized access to my mailbox that person would only be able to read new emails, but none of my already archived mails. Of course it's possible that the intruder also manages to change the JS code returned to the client, but that's not the case for all of the possible scenarios where someone gets access to my mailbox. Full message encryption does not provide perfect security, but is able to significantly raise the provided level of security.
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#3> Just as important as what we do do is what we don’t. For example, we don’t do full message encryption (e.g. PGP) in the browser. In theory it means you “don’t have to trust us”. However in reality, every time you open your email you would be trusting the code delivered to your browser. If the server were compromised, it could easily be made to return code that intercepted and sent back your password next time you l…
For most providers, like Protonmail, the decryption password is the same as your login password. I'm curious what scenario you see allowing someone other than the provider to get access to your mailbox but not also your decryption key.
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#4> Just as important as what we do do is what we don’t. For example, we don’t do full message encryption (e.g. PGP) in the browser. In theory it means you “don’t have to trust us”. However in reality, every time you open your email you would be trusting the code delivered to your browser. If the server were compromised, it could easily be made to return code that intercepted and sent back your password next time you l…
For most providers, like Protonmail, the decryption password is the same as your login password. I'm curious what scenario you see allowing someone other than the provider to get access to your mailbox but not also your decryption key.
That could happen via a breach of the provider's servers, or through dumpster diving for a discarded drive that the provider didn't properly wipe (in the case the data wasn't also encrypted at rest).
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#5> Just as important as what we do do is what we don’t. For example, we don’t do full message encryption (e.g. PGP) in the browser. In theory it means you “don’t have to trust us”. However in reality, every time you open your email you would be trusting the code delivered to your browser. If the server were compromised, it could easily be made to return code that intercepted and sent back your password next time you l…
It would be fine if apps with in-browser crypto only made this sort of claim, but many/most of them are either stating or implying that users don't need to trust the service.
This is a dangerous mismanagement of expectations, and it can be argued that the risk of creating a false sense of security far outweighs any of the benefits you mention.
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#6> Just as important as what we do do is what we don’t. For example, we don’t do full message encryption (e.g. PGP) in the browser. In theory it means you “don’t have to trust us”. However in reality, every time you open your email you would be trusting the code delivered to your browser. If the server were compromised, it could easily be made to return code that intercepted and sent back your password next time you l…
For most providers, like Protonmail, the decryption password is the same as your login password. I'm curious what scenario you see allowing someone other than the provider to get access to your mailbox but not also your decryption key.
For proton mail you could set different passwords for decryption and login
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#7Wow what a coincidence — I switched from Gmail to Fastmail exactly 1 year ago today.
I couldn't be happier. I mostly use native clients, but the Web client is a joy to use, and everything I've observed about Fastmail gives me confidence in their service.
I never used the Gmail-exclusive features like labels, so switching was pretty easy. I highly recommend it to anyone considering it.
Keep up the good work, guys.
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#8> Just as important as what we do do is what we don’t. For example, we don’t do full message encryption (e.g. PGP) in the browser. In theory it means you “don’t have to trust us”. However in reality, every time you open your email you would be trusting the code delivered to your browser. If the server were compromised, it could easily be made to return code that intercepted and sent back your password next time you l…
For most providers, like Protonmail, the decryption password is the same as your login password. I'm curious what scenario you see allowing someone other than the provider to get access to your mailbox but not also your decryption key.
ProtonMail doesn't have access to the decryption password as it is not transferred to the server. Instead the client sends a password that's derived from it: https://protonmail.com/blog/encrypted_email_authentication/
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#9Wow what a coincidence — I switched from Gmail to Fastmail exactly 1 year ago today. I couldn't be happier. I mostly use native clients, but the Web client is a joy to use, and everything I've observed about Fastmail gives me confidence in their service. I never used the Gmail-exclusive features like labels, so switching was pretty easy. I highly recommend it to anyone considering it. Keep up the good work, guys.
Been using them for a few years now and they're great. Some things I like:
- plays nice with mbsync
- sane system: real folders, not labels
- customer service with an IRL person
- identities feature
Re: The FastMail Security Mindset
#10Wow what a coincidence — I switched from Gmail to Fastmail exactly 1 year ago today. I couldn't be happier. I mostly use native clients, but the Web client is a joy to use, and everything I've observed about Fastmail gives me confidence in their service. I never used the Gmail-exclusive features like labels, so switching was pretty easy. I highly recommend it to anyone considering it. Keep up the good work, guys.
I'm considering switching (in fact I just registered for the FastMail trial). I'm especially interested in the ability to use catchall addresses with a custom domain, which would allow me to give out an address like , and thus determine who shared my email address if I start receiving spam at that address.
This is partly possible with Gmail, as you can use addresses like , but not all sites support emails with a + in them.
What differences have you noticed in your year since switching? I'm especially interested in any downsides. My biggest worry about Gmail is the lack of privacy from Google.