Background: the "kernel self protection project" (KSSP) recently upstreamed the Grsecurity/PAX reference counting implementation which prevents a certain class of security bugs from being exploited. Grsecurity is a security hardening patchset for Linux that makes deliberate trade-offs in favor of security, sacrificing availability if necessary. This, aside from the political issue, is the main reasons why it's hard t…
> From a security standpoint, when you find an invalid access, and you mitigate it, you've done a great job, and your hardening was successful and you're done. "Look ma, it's not a security issue any more", and you can basically ignore it as "just another bug" that is now in a class that is no longer your problem. So to you, the big win is when the access is _stopped_. That's the end of the story from a security stan…
There will always be some bugs that are in between being discovered (by someone, maybe malicious, maybe not), and being fixed. How else do you prevent against vulnerabilities in that stage?