Live data from Hacker News

An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

security-center.intel.com

121–130 of 192 posts

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#121
So when do I start hearing all the BSD/MIT promoters apologize for allowing this normalization of tivoization and admitting RMS was right all along?

Oops, that potentially might interfere with profits, never mind, as you were, keep trying the same ol shit.

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#122

It's bad enough Intel have created the ultimate trojan, but their detection tool can't even fix the problem! The tool rightly points out that my desktop consumer system is vulnerable (from the list, no Intel CPU manufactured in the last 5 years isn't), then suggests I contact the manufacturer for an update. Here is what the tool says my system manufacturer is: Manufacturer: To Be Filled By O.E.M. Model: To Be Filled…

This isn't uncommon. You're not wrong to expect that, if they did not do their job when configuring these data, they will not do anything to support you postsale. Their lifecycles are so short maybe your product is several generations old now.

Some of the board vendors do a better job, but usually still not as good as "namebrand computers." There is a lot of engineering work that goes into integration. It's not readily visible to endusers/consumers and therefore difficult for us to appreciate it or evaluate it for completeness or accuracy.

I hope that someone does a survey of computer and board vendors' support for this problem. I would like to see who abandons products last.

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#123
post #117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I wonder if this will at all dissuade either Intel or AMD into continuing to make these super privileged processors whose functions are completely hidden. I think many discussions miss the nuance here. The problem is that the functionality is hidden, not necessarily that the function is there. In corporate use, these tools can be incredibly useful. If they were more transparent, then they could be used by normal us…

> I think many discussions miss the nuance here. The problem is that the functionality is hidden, not necessarily that the function is there. > If they were more transparent, then they could be used by normal users for remote administration as well. The fundamental objection with ME isn't that it's "proprietary" or "non-libre" or whatever other ideological objections, it's that it's an opaque embuggerance that makes…

> The fundamental objection with ME isn't that it's "proprietary" or "non-libre" or whatever other ideological objections, it's that it's an opaque embuggerance that makes any analysis or reasoning about the system's security/trustworthiness/reliability completely impossible and specious.

Erm, your fundamental objection is exactly the same objection as it being non-libre. You presented the same argument while trying to distance yourself from it. Maybe you don't like the words "non-libre" or "proprietary" but you certainly seem to be arguing for the same thing that they are arguing for.

> I don't care much about whether its source code is public or not, I care about the fact that I have no verifiable and irreversible way to disable that little implant's function.

Having source code is but a tool towards having the freedom to do what you want with your hardware. I can't see another tool that would also work and give the verifiability that you want.

Again, maybe you don't like the way people argue for it, but you're arguing for the same freedom that others want.

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#124
post #113

What was wrong with IPMI for out of band management? What problem was ME actually solving?

The question I think people should be asking is not "what problem was it solving?", but rather "why was it implemented directly into the processors hardware/firmware?"

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#125

Don't rush to apply the Intel ME patch! Several HN users here (beefhash, jlgaddis, joe_the_user) have raised the possibility that applying the patch might make it impossible to get rid of the Intel ME entirely. If you don't apply the patch, someone may come up with a nice new exploit (using the security bugs) to completely remove the Intel ME. If you do apply the patch, it might close off possible exploits and you'll…

Right now to remove ME you need to connect an external flash programmer. It seems really unlikely that anything they do with a firmware update will be able to block that at least if someone can get a pre-change image.

Maybe there is a way to reprogram to disable ME without the flash programmer which these fixes may block. If my laptop weren't already ME disabled, I'd probably apply the fixes.

Re: An in-depth security review of the Intel Management Engine

#130
Yet another reason owner-controlled machines like the Talos™ II [0] are so important. Yes, it may cost a bit more up front, but what's the cost again of having your data stolen and then, especially with the older machines here, having to replace all of your hardware to boot?

Plus, purchasing machines like that one not only sends a clear signal that we want backdoor-free computing, but also allows the further development of more libre computing options. Wouldn't you rather have Linux and BSD as first-class citizens on new hardware, instead of always needing to play catch-up from behind?

[0] https://raptorcs.com/TALOSII/

Post reply on HN