41–50 of 70 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The camera doesn't have (1) an attentional system, (2) a model of the world in memory, (3) a model of itself within that model.
for humans with cultures (4) a way to create and impose narratives (5) narratives about the world
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> he denies the existence of qualia No, he doesn't. He just says that qualia aren't what we intuitively think they are. Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences. It's quite true that…
> Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences. I don't think you're right. See here[1]: > There is a limited use for such interpretations of subjects' protocols, I have argued (Dennett…
However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they aren't what most people think they are.
Another way of looking at this is to ask what, exactly, the word "qualia" refers to. If it refers to subjective experiences themselves, then of course they exist; but, as Dennett says, they might not be what most people think they are. But if the word "qualia" refers to something else, then what it refers to might indeed not even exist. Many philosophical arguments come down to people using words to mean different things and talking past each other.
What's the big deal with consciousness? Isn't it an obvious trait of any human like, animal like, robot like semi-intelligent being? I'd expect it to emerge automatically, once correct base instincts & abilities are programmed.
What's the big deal with programming? Isn't it an obvious trait sure to emerge after tapping those square boxes on the computer board enough times?
Dennet is a reductive materialist. He'd probably disagree with my hardline depiction of him, but, in my opinion, if it quacks like a duck and swims like a duck, it's probably a duck. For what it's worth, he identifies as a 'teleofunctionalist' (???). The author of the piece doesn't seem to be a reductive materialist, so obviously Dennet won't jive with him. I'm also not a materialist, so I don't really find Dennet ve…
How are you going to formulate an objective phenomenological description of a subjective space which serves as a personal reification substrate for broadcast of 'qualia' models formulated from percepts and concepts by a received personal cognitive operating system? As you know, one school locks on to a 'bubbling-up' dy/dx = -yx and survival utility as overlords with 'consciousness' (whatever that is) as an emergent p…
The broadcast of qualia models element that you include feels debatable to me; the transmission of concepts and ideas is surely very new and anomalous in the history of the development of aware and experiencing entities if one accepts that consciousness is something that has developed and evolved.
This author elevates the idea of consciousness significantly. And dismissing Dennett attempts to reduce it. Now I am not saying there may be weirdness in consciousness such as possible quantum processes which makes it hard to simulate on a traditional computer but it is still physical and ultimately reducible given sufficient technical understanding.
I do not support this articles approach at all.
That said I find Dennett long winded and boring to read. But ultimately he is right. I guess I buy his argument at the beginning thus reading his thousands of pages is very unrewarding.
This is a really terrible review. I really want to say something that contributes more, but my god, this person does not understand or even care to understand Dennet. Again and again, he elides over all of Dennet's reasoning only to seize suddenly on the conclusion, which prima facie he disagrees with, as an apparent absurdity or contradiction. I don't intend to write an elaborate dissection of the article, but just…
Dennett’s arguments are very frustrating because he refuses to engage with the fundamental problem of explaining the existence of subjective experience, and how it could arise from physical processes. In dismissing this problem, he doesn’t do much more than simply refuse to engage with it. “Consciousness Explained”? More like consciousness denied. For example, he insists that our consciousness isn’t quite as broad as…
Dennet is a reductive materialist. He'd probably disagree with my hardline depiction of him, but, in my opinion, if it quacks like a duck and swims like a duck, it's probably a duck. For what it's worth, he identifies as a 'teleofunctionalist' (???). The author of the piece doesn't seem to be a reductive materialist, so obviously Dennet won't jive with him. I'm also not a materialist, so I don't really find Dennet ve…
> Dennet is a reductive materialist. "Materialism: 1a: a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter. scientific materialism" [1] [1] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/materialist Materialism became the guiding philosophy of Science in ~1845. Reductionism was all the rage. I think materia…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Denying the existence of qualia would mean denying that we have subjective experiences. Dennett doesn't deny that. But he does deny that many of our usual intuitions about qualia are correct, by showing how they lead to inconsistent and incoherent thinking about our experiences. I don't think you're right. See here[1]: > There is a limited use for such interpretations of subjects' protocols, I have argued (Dennett…
If you're willing to draw a distinction between "denying the existence of qualia" and "denying the existence of subjective experience", then yes, I agree that "denying the existence of qualia" can be taken in its usual sense--"they aren't a thing", as you say. Everything Dennett says about qualia has to be interpreted with this distinction in mind. However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with…
I read a lot of his back and forth with Chalmers & co. (and philosophy of mind in general), and no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist. But subjective experiences are not qualia. Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Indeed, that is what Dennett argues, see the IEP[1]
PS: Not sure why I'm getting downvoted -- guess the materialists have a bone to pick ;)
What's the big deal with consciousness? Isn't it an obvious trait of any human like, animal like, robot like semi-intelligent being? I'd expect it to emerge automatically, once correct base instincts & abilities are programmed.
Well that is like saying gravity is an emergent property of space-time. Perhaps it is, but that doesn't finish explaining what it is or why it is an emergent property.
What's the big deal with consciousness? Isn't it an obvious trait of any human like, animal like, robot like semi-intelligent being? I'd expect it to emerge automatically, once correct base instincts & abilities are programmed.
What's the big deal with programming? Isn't it an obvious trait sure to emerge after tapping those square boxes on the computer board enough times?