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Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

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Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's a support nightmare; it would be nearly trivial to start submitting false reports from a ton of accounts without establishing a pattern so those accounts could easily be ignored. What's stopping me from flooding false reports now ? Arguably, only reviewing the image they already have once a hash matches is less work, since they wouldn't have to review all incoming reports, only matched ones.

> Arguably, only reviewing the image they already have once a hash matches is less work, since they wouldn't have to review all incoming reports, only matched ones. They would still need to investigate reports that didn’t match known hashes, but you’re right that this would be beneficial. Images that match a known hash could be prioritized during review.

Don't they have to do that now anyway?

Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There was an excellent Twitter thread on why they didn't do this: https://twitter.com/alexstamos/status/928740488395608065 The salient bit: > A quick note to everybody who says 'calculate the hash locally': > A) Photo fingerprinting algorithms are usually not included in clients to prevent the development of circumvention techniques. > B) Humans need to review to prevent adversarial reporting. Further down the thread…

It's not a hard problem. Both A & B are bogus reasons. A) Any hash is going to be easily circumvented by anyone who owns Photoshop or any image editor. It's only going to catch those dumb enough not to modify the images, ie. most everyone. Doing the hash server side isn't the big problem though, because if you trust the Facebook App then by default you should trust the Facebook web applications. B) The big problem is…

It's definitely a hard problem, especially if you think about it a little rather than just dismissing it out of hand. For one thing, the hashes being discussed are resilient to some modifications - they're not general purpose hashes.

More importantly, this is a case in which FB is making a serious attempt to deal with a complex issue rather than simply throwing up their hands and trotting out one of their standard excuses - 'it's not our fault, there isn't anything we can do, it's a side effect of the algorithm, we aren't responsible for how people use the platform' etc. This is a welcome change.

Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#143
post #41
post #38

As other has pointed out, this is extremely creepy. The easiest solution would have been this one: - The user uses a JS solution to hash the images on the client, without the image being uploaded - She compiles a form with additional information (e.g: capture her account, reasons for uploading, suspect person sharing the picture) - The picture is saved in the DB as un-verified revenge porn. - The first time someone u…

Now figure out a way to do step #1 (user does a hash client-side) without making it trivial for someone else to create a filter that adds enough noise to invalidate step #4 (uploaded pics that match a hash are quarantined.)

Good point, that said, with the recent visual ML trend, I'm sure fb or the likes can engineer a solution for that.

Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#144
In this thread there are a lot of valid concerns about client-side fingerprinting and how this would allow sophisticated algorithms to be broken. Putting something like PhotoDNA on clients is probably not good.

However, I think a simpler approach would handle >95% of cases here, and that’s to just calculate the image sha and use that. It does nothing for resizes/obfuscations, but if Facebook users are dumb enough to volunteer their nudes to human review, they’re dumb enough to not modify images before reposting them as revenge porn.

Everything else with respect to modified images and elaborate fingerprinting and perceptual hashing can happen at the next tier, which I trust Facebook already has an intricate (and publicly tolerated) system to handle.

Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#146
post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I really don't understand why anyone uses Facebook. You have a phone, which can communicate with your friends. It's only remotely useful for its near-monopoly on event planning, and imo that's a job for the trustbusters.

Compared to a phone (SMS) and other messaging apps (whatsapp, email, signal), fb messenger has two big benefits for me: * Cross platform: I don't have to type on a tiny screen when I'm in front of a computer, and won't lose my account or my messages if I lose my phone or phone number. * Discoverability: most people who I meet are on it, so I can reach out to people I meet at events as well as friends of friends. I do…

Which is sort of weird, isn't it? As little as 10-15 years ago there was a huge flourishing ecosystem of IM and chat clients, many of which worked together fairly seamlessly. Individual clients like Pidgin would happily amalgamate several platforms together. Now, at least in terms of usage, it's a blasted hellscape of a one-pony show - what happened?

Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#147
post #121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not a hard problem. Both A & B are bogus reasons. A) Any hash is going to be easily circumvented by anyone who owns Photoshop or any image editor. It's only going to catch those dumb enough not to modify the images, ie. most everyone. Doing the hash server side isn't the big problem though, because if you trust the Facebook App then by default you should trust the Facebook web applications. B) The big problem is…

A) I think we're talking about modification-resistant fingerprinting methods, not just a simple hash of the data. B) That's a support nightmare; it would be nearly trivial to start submitting false reports from a ton of accounts without establishing a pattern so those accounts could easily be ignored. Regardless, how do you prove that you "own an image" (what does that even mean?) and that it was reported as an "inti…

The solution is to hash it locally and send the hash to Facebook without saving a local copy. Simple as that. Sure, someone could still do a lot of work to intercept or reverse engineer it and make an app to circumvent the hashing. But even if such an app existed, it would be obscure and people trying to upload unauthorized pics wouldn't bother or even know it exists.

If you've got pics you don't want on the internet, the first rule is to not upload them to anywhere on the internet. Actually the real first rule is not to take them. Flash people your bits in person instead.

Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#148
It's a cool idea, but isn't this pretty easily defeated by an adversarial attack, or just altering the image in any simple way?

E.g. as the perpetrator, open the image of your ex in MS Paint, add a stripe across the bottom in such a manner as to not obscure the primary content at all, ta-dah, upload, image will not have a matching hash.

Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#149

It's a cool idea, but isn't this pretty easily defeated by an adversarial attack, or just altering the image in any simple way? E.g. as the perpetrator, open the image of your ex in MS Paint, add a stripe across the bottom in such a manner as to not obscure the primary content at all, ta-dah, upload, image will not have a matching hash.

Already addressed in this other comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=turc1656

It seems like HN comment pages might have a critical mass beyond which it's impractical to see if somebody's already said what you want to say so people repeat the same idea - ballooning the comments page even further.

Re: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot

#150
post #131
post #104

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You should go put a $100 bill on the dashboard of your car along with your laptop on the front seat. Report back the results. snark-mode off: We use obscurity every day and its a completely valid layer of security.

> We use obscurity every day and its a completely valid layer of security. Not sure I agree with that, most of the time when we do that is because we don't want to spend the time to have better security. And then we get burned. To your example of the 100$ bill: at my parents home with the car parked in the garage? No problem to do that at all. Out on the street in SF? No. I don't trust my glass enough as a security m…

Facebook is pretty low on companies I would trust, on the other hand we know that NSA employees who have the highest level of security clearance were using their ability to intercept everything to stalk their exes and pass around their exes nude photos according to Snowden. Clearly nobody can be trusted, and as you write, a solution for this must incorporate this fact.
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