Earlier quoted context omitted.
me_cleaner already exists[1], and it takes advantage of several flaws in Intel ME's signing to remove large sections of the code thus neutering it. Some code still exists, but Intel ME cannot actually fully initialise on "cleaned" systems. Older machines used to have a bug where if you filled the first half of the Intel ME firmware with zeros the machine would boot but ME wouldn't start at all. But yes, I hope that w…
Is this enough to block this attack? That is, is a "cleaned" system vulnerable to a USB device?
If they have full debugger access to what's running in Intel ME then removing the code from the firmware probably doesn't make a difference (assuming they can run un-trusted code in that context). If they cannot write their own code and so an attack requires ROP gadgets then removing the code might make it harder (or impossible) to do, but I doubt it.
[1]: http://www2.lauterbach.com/pdf/directory.pdf#M8.newlink.DIR6...